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Anti-Americanism and International Security

Indications in International Public Opinion

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1. Overview

International public opinion (that is, non-US public opinion) provides an important set of clues about the asserted rise of anti-Americanism and its implications for international security. Accordingly, this paper examines what polling in the first years of the 21st century reveals about the degree of anti-Americanism internationally, and prevailing differences between national publics. The polls examined were taken before and after September 11 and the invasion and occupation of Iraq. A central question is that of the extent to which negative views are specific to particular US policies and a particular American Administration (Bush II) or of a more encompassing nature. The former argues against the rise of the sort of anti-Americanism which would have broad international security implications; the latter argues for it. That appraisal should not assume that international public opinion can only take a pro-American or anti-American position. A third alternative would have publics less pro- or anti-American than they are uncertain, divided, or ambivalent about the US and its world role.

Yet in order to engage the second concern of this paper, implications for international security, it is necessary to go beyond ascertaining negative or positive sentiments about specific US policy lines or indeed about the US more generally. One also needs to consider how views of the US and its behavior and intentions fit or clash with the central security concerns perceived by foreign publics. After all, negative views could feature beliefs that the US acts unconstructively or even counter-productively on agreed upon threats to security. In this possibility, foreign publics in effect agree that the US has correctly identified priorities but has made mistakes in kind or degree about the means to pursue them. Alternatively, negative views may feature beliefs that the US has the wrong prioritization of problems and thus is doing too much about what is relatively unimportant in security terms and too little about what is of critical security importance in foreign eyes. The latter seems more likely to both stem from and foster anti-Americanism than the former.

By way of a preview, public opinion outside the US has in general been evolving in a direction which makes quick, blanket cooperation less likely. It increasingly suggests a preference for skeptical scrutiny of American proposals and serious consideration of options to delay, divert, and modify US government preferences. The burden of proof of the merits of compliant cooperation increasingly gets placed on its advocates elsewhere and on the US Administration. That, however, does not amount in general to predominant public demands for direct confrontation with the US and withdrawal from cooperative action with it on security matters. What emerges is not so much a desire for less international engagement and activism by the US but a reorientation of the policy emphases and institutional modalities most prominent in that engagement and activism.

The major sections which follow report poll results and discuss their implications. Before turning to those tasks it seems important to discuss briefly the relevance of international public opinion to the security relevant policy practices of non-US actors, and the approach that will be taken to poll responses as evidence for anti-Americanism and inferences about security implications.¹

2. The Relevance of International Public Opinion?

In what ways may international public opinion affect courses of action pursued by foreign governments and movements toward the US and international security? An extreme view is that of

¹ Determining past and present correlations between the particular patterns of public opinion found and the actual strategies used by non-US governments and movements lies outside the scope of this paper.

control of policy choice. Political elites act as if they are always expecting a referendum on what they have done and are doing *vis-à-vis* the US and about security. Those elites in this view resemble weathervanes, altering their positions to fit with what they think to be majority views among a public equivalent to a selectorate. This public opinion as automatic control mechanism position seems less tenable than a more complex set of limited influence possibilities.

In the second perspective, international public opinion—especially their own population’s—provides non-US elites with: 1) indicators of likely domestic political risks and rewards from one or another stance toward the US and security issues; 2) clues about how other non-US elites are likely to behave toward the US and security issues; 3) instrumentalities useful for bargaining with Washington to extract side-payments for acquiescence; and 4) credible excuses to use with Washington to gain acceptance, even if grudging, of ‘more independent’ security behaviors. Indirectly, the last two possibilities may influence international security by modifying US security behavior. The bargaining use may alter Washington’s assessments of the feasibility of policies which require a substantial, sustained volume of foreign contributions, and of the costs the US will likely have to bear on security or other matters (e.g. foreign economic policies) to get such contributions. The excuse use poses at least implicitly to Washington the eventuality of a ‘pyrrhic victory’ in which a compliant foreign leader will be replaced by a less cooperative one. These aspects of direct and indirect relevance are realistic rather than fanciful if we accept Putnam’s (1988) two-level game formulation in which the prospects for international joint action depend on mutually compatible domestic level and international level bargains.

How easily such bargains can be struck by foreign and US security policy elites obviously varies widely from place to place, time to time, and issue to issue. The presence of one or more of several sets of circumstances makes bargaining to an agreed outcome easier. In the first, issues of relationships with the US and of international security have low salience for the pertinent national publics, receive little media attention, and involve little change from past policy actions rather than a ‘bold departure’. In the second, some or all of the opposite features are present but in a context of widespread domestic public convictions that the US is a wise, trustworthy, fair, effective, generous, and irreplaceable provider of security club or public goods. The absence of either set of characteristics has far more negative implications for agreement and security cooperation with the US. The final set of circumstances involves the political capital of foreign officeholders (individual and political group) and pending needs to use it. Incumbent foreign elites that have a firm and confident grip on power at home are relatively willing to step outside the zone of ‘permissiveness’ the opinions of their public about the US and security suggest. Markers of such a situation involve the absence of a competitive opposition (especially one explicitly opposed to US policies), substantial time before a ‘mandate renewal’ occasion (e.g. a national election), and a high degree of public approval of policy performance on matters other than the US related issue(s) under consideration.

While such situations undoubtedly continue to occur, some conducive conditions often are missing in key foreign polities for the security issues on which the current US Administration (Bush II) has most clearly asserted policy preferences. Indeed, the early 21st century may be a period in which international public opinion may especially affect the prospects for convergence and divergence, leadership and followership between the US and others in the world. Ironically, the influence of international public opinion may well increase if the US even more energetically tries to demonstrate its international predominance, and exports American style democratic and economic forms. That consequence may also follow from assertive efforts to link positive relations to standing with Washington on the what, when, and how of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

3. How Poll Responses Will Be Used

The evidence discussed comes from a secondary analysis of responses gathered by public opinion polls conducted in recent years, with occasional reference to responses to similar questions earlier in the post-Cold War years. Because of data access limitations, national publics are the unit of analysis, and all observations are of those aggregates. The ecological fallacy is avoided formally by refraining from inferences to sub-national opinion or sub-national combinations of opinions (Langbein and Lichtman, 1978). Informally, of course, it is reasonable to infer that when opinions on several items in the same survey are held by very high percentages of a national public they are likely to be held simultaneously by a substantial fraction of the sample queried.

The analysis is further limited to those publics and queries canvassed in polls of high technical quality for which results were readily available. That brings with it several substantial compromises. More data are available for advanced industrialized countries than for those of the global South. Data on Southern publics more often than on Northern ones is drawn from only urban or metropolitan area samples rather than from national samples. (Information on the polls used, when polling took place, and other than national samples appears in Appendix A.) These are important limitations on the inferences which seem warranted, but not so severe as to deprive the data used of relevance to our central concerns. Northern countries do after all predominate in US security alliances, in many regional and global multilateral organizations, and have substantial assets which can be contributed to or withheld from US security initiatives. While Southern countries often have large fractions of their populations in rural areas, their urban publics frequently have special importance in their political affairs.

Poll responses provide a stronger basis for broad inferences about anti-Americanism and security implications when they have been elicited from many national publics responding to similar questions with similar alternative answers queried at the same time, and repeated at multiple times of similarly drawn samples. When present, those features warrant more confidence in cross-national and cross-time interpretations.

Public opinion is of course multi-faceted as it bears on anti-Americanism and security policies. That recommends bundling poll responses into substantively related packages of questions asked of the same public at about the same time and, with regard to opinion stability and change, of the same public at several points in time. It suggests particular caution in drawing inferences from answers to a one-time question on only one aspect of a major substantive issue basket. Much of what follows then groups questions by imposing a substantive (and of course arguable) judgment of shared relevance to anti-Americanism and to security matters. That is, the bundling involves an interpretive examination of ‘the marginals’ approach rather than a statistically established relationship between question responses.

Finally, distributions of responses will be reported in terms of crude scores rather than actual percentages for two kinds of reasons. The first has to do with the often recognized problems of margins of error, sensitivity to variations in question and response wording, interview situation, and question order within surveys. All those problems are compounded when drawing on many different surveys asked of many different publics in many different languages. Small percentage differences, even if beyond a poll’s margin of error, are for all those reasons not a firm basis for inferences.

The second set of reasons has to do with the aim of discerning the political significance of public opinion about the US and security matters. The point is to recognize patterns of public opinion likely to have different political implication for policy elites. Accordingly, prior to arriving at the results reported in this paper, percentage responses are placed on a positive to negative continuum with regard to views of the US or security problem priority. The results reported and used as a basis for inferences are expressed in terms of which crude category on that continuum the result falls into. The

categories are ones which on their face seem to have significantly different implications for political elites in terms of public reactions and the latitude public opinion provides.

Scoring rules for net percentage responses, and for thermometer readings and positive percentages when only those are available, can be found in Table 1. As data availability permits, the scores reported are the net calculated by subtracting negative from positive percentages. The larger the number, the more preponderant an opinion. The underlying premise for doing this is that politicians gauge a public's zone of permissiveness on that net result rather than just positive or negative percentages. When more than one query was pertinent, the number of queries is reported in the data tables. The larger that entry, the more confidence we can place in the reading. Finally, when opinions can be placed in the context of related responses, the rank of the response is reported in order to show relative emphases by a particular national public. The smaller the rank number, the more widely held the opinion in relation to other possibilities probed. That serves to provide perspective about the public's view in relation to other matters of possible concern. It is for the reader to judge whether the loss of information these procedures involve is outweighed by their usefulness for drawing inferences about anti-Americanism and its security implications.

4. Patterns Found in International Public Opinion

Four categories of international public opinion will be examined. The first two deal with broad views of the US, first, in terms of general evaluations of America, the American way or model, and of future US international importance, and, second, general evaluations of American foreign and security policies. Those enable some tentative inferences about anti-Americanism and its broad security implications. The last two focus on views of the US and of security alternatives for two prominent current issues. Those are terrorism and the invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq in the context of concerns with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A concluding section integrates these results to arrive at an overall assessment of anti-Americanism in international public opinion and its security implications.

5. International Views of the US

5.1 General Appraisals of the US, 'the American Way', and American Importance

This set of opinions deals with very broad appraisals of the US. It includes evaluative views of America in general, and US ways of conducting politics, business, science and technology, and 'soft power' matters of mass culture. It also includes expectations about the future international prominence of the US and thus the importance of non-antagonistic relations with it. Anti-Americanism would seem of no more than modest importance if evaluations are positive and judgments of the importance of good relations high; of substantial importance, if evaluations are negative and judgments of importance low. The security implications for following America or standing apart from it are obvious and contrasting. A more complex, indeed conflicted, situation combines negative evaluations and recognition of the continuing importance of the US and getting along with it. Security cooperation seems the only practical course, but only to the minimum extent pragmatically needed to avoid punishment from or disengagement by the US.

In the last decade of the 20th Century most national publics polled had large or modest majorities who gave a favorable response when questioned about their general view of the United States. Positive judgments became less widespread in polls after 2001. Averaging the results of those polls shows that

only minorities held such a favorable view in several major West European countries (France, Germany, Spain), major Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), most states with predominantly Moslem populations (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia) and longtime ally South Korea. This shift can be interpreted to support the view of a rising tide of anti-Americanism. Doing so slights continued although often smaller balances on the side of favorability among other West Europeans (the UK, Italy, the Netherlands), Canada, smaller Latin American states, Israel, Japan, and most polled publics in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in sub-Sahara Africa. In sum, the US seems to retain the political capital of a favorable image among publics in many countries, but less so than in the past and has moved to a negative favorability balance in a number of countries certainly of regional, and possibly global, importance.

Yet publics in most of the middle power countries at the same time overwhelmingly thought it important to have good relations with the US, that the US was not a declining superpower, and that the US would remain the world's largest economic power (Canada, Mexico, France, the UK, Spain, Russia, Australia, Japan, South Korea). In Canada, Japan, and South Korea publics did, however, tend to view the US as losing international respect. These opinions for the most part argue against support for translating anti-American sentiments into anti-American policy actions..

Even favorable views, however, need not go so far as to welcome emulating major American practices (of politics, business, science and technology management, ideas and customs) and mass culture production and consumption. In 2002-04, publics around the world were almost always very positively disposed towards U.S ways of science and technology management and mass culture products (music, movies, TV). Net percentage scores on the attractiveness of US style democracy, business practices, and ideas and customs appear in Table 2.

Negativism averaged across US ways of politics, business, and ideas and customs was far more prevalent than a positive view in major country publics (the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Australia). Exceptions were Italy and Japan. Regionally, positive views were more common in East Europe and sub-Sahara Africa. Middle Eastern publics (with the exceptions of Israel and Kuwait) were massively negative. These crude patterns suggest that many but not all major country publics are selectively 'anti-American' in the sense of negative judgments about US policies seen as altering their domestic societies or, perhaps, those of others. The publics of a set of smaller countries are 'pro-American' about such changes.

5.2 General Evaluations of America Foreign and Security Policies

The next set of opinions deals with the extent to which America's world shaping policies are seen positively or negatively. It includes general views on the extent to which the US can be relied on to pursue foreign and security policies which take into account the interests of other countries, and whose consequences are positive for them. It also includes appraisals of American foreign/security policy in general, and of the US role with respect to several broad aspects of international affairs. Finally, it considers views about whether respondents' problems with US international behavior are for them associated with specific policies and the Bush II Administration or inherent in the nature of America.

Interpretively, opinions on these matters suggest the extent to which generally anti-American foreign and security policy beliefs predominate based on conflict of interest grounds (Table 3), or ones differentiated according to issue areas featured in one or another contemporary conception of

international security (Tables 4 and 5).² Whatever prevailing negative views are found have different implications if they seem more by way of anti-Bush II practices than what are thought by respondents to be continuing US tendencies (Table 6).

International public opinion can after all view the US as simply having a temporarily bad period, or misguided on some but not all issues. If such views prevail, labeling them as signs of general and lasting anti-Americanism seems unwarranted. Such labeling would seem far more warranted if the negative judgments extend to most at least arguably security policy matters and rest on judgments about ongoing characteristics of the US. A positive disposition suggests public opinion placing a special burden on those who advocate withholding security cooperation; a negative disposition, on those who advocate cooperating. More subtly, the more positive the evaluation in general, on specific issues viewed negatively there is likely to be more support for and more hope about the effectiveness of security policy alternatives which emphasize modification of current US policies through patient persuasion and less than confrontational measures ('a loyal opposition'). There is likely to be less support for pursuing security alternatives with high costs and long lead-times to take effect.

The first four columns of Table 3 present scores on probes into broad appraisals of US international policies: effects on the respondents' country and similar countries; the extent to which US policy-making takes their interests into account; the extent to which the US is thought to be a positive influence in the world; and the extent to which the US is thought to be a good influence on the respondent's country. The fifth column presents an average score across those probes.

The most obvious feature is that few national publics have positive evaluations, and most report negative ones. The positives are for the most part limited to some countries of East and Southeast Europe, a number of sub-Saharan African states, several Latin American publics, and countries which are in some sense protectorates of the US (Israel, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Taiwan). Most major powers be it in political-military or economic terms are negatively inclined. That is, the US tends to be seen as a source of harms, inattentive to how its policies affect others, and intentionally or not acting in ways with negative consequences for others. Any coalition of the willing based on public support, the data suggest, will consist for the most part of smaller states and those whose leaders do not feel bound by their public's views of the benefits to their country from cooperating on the policy in question.

The picture of what amounts to negative political capital for the US as an international actor with more, and more important, foreign national publics than those with which it has a positive credit balance is reinforced by the results in Tables 4 and 5 for contributions to world peace, environmental quality, and several aspects of the international political economy. To an extent often greater than for the probes in Table 3 negative views prevail for US efforts affecting world peace, including an excessive propensity to use force (the first three columns of Table 4). On environmental quality contributions, EU-15 publics are very strongly negative, while those of the accession countries tend for the most part to be positive.

With respect to the world economy, opinions appear in Table 5 on contributions to growth and to poverty alleviation; globalization in terms of the degree of US influence and the extent to which it is trusted; and whether or not the US poses an economic threat in terms of competition or protectionism. An average of those scores is also provided. On growth, the negativism of EU-15 publics is less with many having a positive view. Accession country publics are even more positive than on the other aspects covered in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The previous negative patterns reappear for the EU-15 on the other international economy aspects. As for poverty alleviation, a substantial number of positive evaluations appear only for the accession county publics. With that exception,

² For discussion of those various conceptions, see Bobrow 2001, 1996.

strongly negative views are almost universally held in all global regions regardless of national levels of economic wealth. Averages of the economic probes are then negative with the exception of some of the accession countries, Kenya, and Nigeria.

For the functional matters reported, the implications are that foreign leaders will find more public acceptance for cooperating with US policies as they involve hooking on to the US as a growth locomotive. Negativism about cooperation will be especially strong when it involves US proposed use of force, approaches to global poverty, and globalization strategies. Geographically, foreign leaders in a number of the EU accession countries, several African states, and scattered US ‘protectorates’ have publics whose opinions are for these policy areas more pro- than anti-American. Those of most major and middle powers, regional powers, and large emerging economies do not and their leaders may well need to spend their political capital or secure compensatory side-payments if they are to pursue sustained cooperation with Washington.

The extent to which Washington begins with the benefit of the doubt from foreign publics with regard to its foreign policies can be crudely gauged by combining with equal weight the summary averages in Tables 3, 4, and 5, and the environmental quality contribution score.³ No national publics are massively pro-America in international policy terms. Few national publics are predominantly supportive (Romania, Israel, Kuwait, Thailand) or clearly supportive (Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Malta, Taiwan, Nigeria). By this composite measure, many of those publics previously thought to be relatively supportive turn out to be seriously split, including in Western Europe Italy and Ireland, many of the East European accession countries (including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltics), smaller Latin American states, many in Africa, and, in Asia, India and the Philippines. All the other publics are either negative or predominantly negative, with the exception of the public of the Palestinian Authority which stands alone as massively negative.

Those clearly inclined in a rejectionist direction include a number of EU-15 publics (including that of the UK), and those of such important states as Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Australia, China, Japan, and South Korea. Predominantly rejectionist publics include major Europeans (France, Germany, Spain), and major regional security states such as Argentina, Canada, Egypt and Turkey. That is, not only are far more national publics negatively than positively disposed, but those negative publics are from many of the countries most able to provide major political-military or economic contributions—or resistance—to Washington’s international security preferences, including a number which are core security alliance partners of the US

Inferences about the implications of these opinion patterns should be withheld until we consider responses to questions about the foreign policies of the Bush II Administration and the extent to which those policies are so deeply rooted in the US as to be continuing rather than temporary. Also, any degree of concern about US policy content or style needs to be placed in the perspective of emphasis relative to other international concerns. As shown in Table 6, international public disapproval was the rule with very few exceptions, a disapproval reported to be negatively affecting opinions about the US. That does not, however, warrant concluding that international publics are anti-American so much as they are negative about policies or a policy style they associate with the Bush II Administration. Support for the latter interpretation appears in the second from the last column of Table 6 in terms of the net majorities in most of the publics who choose to attribute dissatisfaction with the US to the current Administration and particular policies.

One much criticized aspect of Bush II international practices is their ‘unilateralism’, as reported in the last column of Table 6. The significance of that style in terms of the US as threat in the next decade has been posed to some European publics and to that of South Korea. The query allowed for

³ The scoring conventions are those in Table 1 for net percentages rounded to the nearest level.

independent responses to a number of possibly ‘extremely important’ or ‘important’ or ‘critical’ international threats in the coming years. US unilateralism was thought to pose such a threat by substantial majorities in the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Poland, and by half of the public in South Korea. When that perception is placed in the context of how other queried threats were viewed, it was in South Korea, France, and Germany 4th, and much lower in the other Europeans.⁴ While such concerns should not be ignored, they allow for security cooperation with the US on more pressing threats—especially if the responses to them are arrived at in a multilateral rather than unilateral manner.

6. Issue Specific Stresses

Many of the poll responses discussed to this point were gathered during the period when the US was actively seeking acceptance of and contributions to its policies toward international terrorism and Iraq—initially justified by Washington in relation to WMD proliferation. American priorities for and policies on those issues surely have been controversial in international policy circles. Looking at international public opinion on those issues allows us to see to what extent there has been support for or opposition to prominent and relatively specific contemporary American security emphases. Doing so can shed some light on the nature of security disagreements and agreements which can occur while the public holds the broader views discussed previously. The robustness of security policy constraints derived from general anti-Americanism seems stronger if simultaneous views of the US on the two stressful issues have been prevalently negative.

6.1 Terrorism

International public opinion may favor or disfavor cooperation with the US war on terrorism for reasons more specific than general attitudes toward the US. One crucial factor involves the priority given to the issue, with those giving high priority more open to accepting this part of a US security agenda. Yet, even for publics for whom terrorism abroad and at home is a high priority problem, judgments about the efficacy of particular means and thus the effectiveness of US policies may well affect the degree of support for participating in a US designed ‘war on terrorism.’

A number of polls provide some insight into the question of priority in itself and in relation to other issues and problems. The key to interpreting publics’ priorities seems to vary with the focus of the queries and what other issues and problems were posed. Table 7 summarizes the data.

A small number of European publics were asked in effect whether they agreed with the emphasis the US was placing on terrorism. Of the publics asked, those in Western Europe largely agreed in 2002, but that agreement was much less by 2004. In the latter period, Middle Eastern publics disagreed often massively so. Key European public massively agreed on the importance of international terrorism as did those of Mexico and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. In most of those

⁴ The other threats posed to Europeans were: US economic competition, Islamic fundamentalism, international terrorism, immigrants, Israel-Arab military conflict, Iran WMD, and North Korean WMD. We combine the two WMD queries. Those to South Koreans were: international terrorism, AIDS/the Ebola virus/other potential epidemics, global warming, the development of China as a major power, economic competition from low wage countries, world population growth, North Korea becoming a nuclear power, the rise of Japanese military power, Sino-Japanese rivalry, a large number of illegal foreign workers, and tensions between China and Taiwan.

publics, more saw it as such a threat than did for a number of other possibilities.⁵ Terrorism was associated with citizen fear and worry to a predominant or massive extent in all of the EU-15 and accession country publics, with the exception of Hungary. That was not the case in Asia, with the exception of India and Malaysia.⁶ Further, the EU-15 and accession country publics, there were very large majorities for making counter-terrorism an EU priority. Yet in only a few (the UK, Italy, Spain, the Czech Republic) did it have more support than all other possibilities.⁷ The opinions just reviewed suggest substantial European and accession country demand for attention to terrorism as an international problem much more than for treating it as simply an American obsession. With a few exceptions, such demand was not present in Asia or the Middle East.

The picture changes in a somewhat complicated way when terrorism is posed as a problem at home, in the respondents country. Most European publics reject it as major problem in their own life space or as a priority compared to others for their country.⁸ Accession country publics were more prone to see it as an important issue but not relative to others as the low ranking indicate. High standing or even a split public on that question was limited to Spain, the UK Italy, France, Germany, Poland, and Russia. For Latin American publics, majorities did see terrorism at home as a problem, while those in Africa did not. A number of Asian publics agreed, to an extent substantially greater than the place given to it in their worries. In sum, many publics have seen terrorism as pressing in either international or domestic terms, but relatively view it that way in both. That suggests possible favor for cooperation with some measures in a US led war on terrorism but hardly all, and of from different publics according to the counter-terrorism measure.

The last two columns of Table 7 pull together public views of terrorism as a priority. The balance of opinion often seems to be in favor of treating it as an important problem, although with few exceptions (Spain, Mexico, many of the accession countries, India) not massively or preponderantly so. The ranking averages suggest neither ignoring it or a welcoming stance to giving counter-terrorism overriding priority at the expense of all other issues.

What then would foreign publics support in terms of US leadership in dealing with terrorism? Scores in Table 8 deal with support for a US led policy and proclaimed leading role.

⁵ For the Europeans and South Koreans, the possibilities were those listed in Footnote 4. For the Mexican public, they were: international terrorism, world environmental problems, the development of China as a world power, chemical and biological weapons, economic competition from the US, drug trafficking, and world economic crises.

⁶ The other possibilities posed to the EU and accession country publics were: a world war, a nuclear conflict in Europe, a conventional war in Europe, an accidental launch of a nuclear missile, an accident in a nuclear power station, spread of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts in Europe, organized crime, and epidemics. Those others posed to publics in Asia and Uzbekistan were: poverty, economic inequality in your society, fair world trade, environmental problems, wars and conflicts, natural disasters, globalization, health issues, domestic economic problems, global recession, crime, human rights, corruption, lack of democracy, illegal drugs and drug addiction, refugee and political asylum problems, unemployment and difficulties getting employment, education, domestic social welfare system, ethics in science, the aging of society, the fast pace of social change and technological improvement, the threat of industry power, religious fundamentalism, overpopulation, and moral decline/spiritual decadence.

⁷ The other possibilities for EU priority were: successful enlargement of the EU, getting closer to European citizens by informing them more about the EU, implementing successfully the single European currency, fighting poverty and social exclusion, protecting the environment, guaranteeing the quality of food products, protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of products, fighting unemployment, reforming the institutions of the EU, fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the EU around the world, maintaining peace and security in Europe, guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for democracy in Europe, and fighting illegal immigration.

⁸ The other possibilities queried were: crime, public transport, economic situation, rising prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, defense/foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health care system, educational system, pensions, and protecting the environment.

US led policy usually was supported, often to a predominant or massive extent, in most of the publics polled in all regions except the Middle East. There only Israeli and Kuwaiti publics were positive. The publics always opposed when asked were mostly from Islamic majority states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, Bangladesh, and Indonesia). Of countries formally US allies, only the South Korean public was predominantly negative and the Turkish public moved from massively positive to negative. Even the French public with a negative evaluation of the US role did not have majorities rejecting a US led policy. When asked in 2002-2004, publics in the UK, France, Germany and Italy supported a US led policy although to a declining extent. That support was especially pronounced in 2002, even though the same European publics prevailingly had negative views about its particulars. That does not seem to fit with most versions of anti-Americanism with the exception of the largely Islamic states.

The opinions in Table 8 suggest a puzzling combination, especially in the EU-15, of criticisms of the US stance in the war on terrorism combined with considerable support for the US taking the leading role in that endeavor. After all, support for a US led policy often seems greater than views of the US role in terrorism or it being just an innocent victim (the first two columns). Perhaps the pertinent publics could make their views compatible by accepting or rejecting specific forms of security cooperation. The entries in Table 9 suggest what sorts of US desired cooperation would be supported or opposed by various foreign publics.

Initially after September 11, most EU 15 publics supported taking part in counter terrorist military action with the US, unlike those in other regions. When a few weeks later the questions were more specific to the EU-15, that support almost always had shrunk. For the publics in the EU-15 there was, however, massive support for a civil role against terrorism in its Afghan application. For most EU publics, there was prevailing support for security enabling measures (use of bases, intelligence sharing). Where there was clear division along national public lines was with regard to military participation with a significant number taking a negative view. In sum, while they have been selective on means, the willingness of major European publics to support many of them hardly suggests that anti-Americanism or a preference for no participation in defeating terrorism were predominant.

If views of America determine public support for or opposition to counter-terrorist policy measures, than sponsorship by a favorably viewed non-US actor should produce different results for the less well-disposed publics than does sponsorship by the US. If the public inclination is a matter of the particular policy measure, it should not. Conflating those possibilities makes it harder to see clearly the extent to which international public opinion disagreements with US are about effective counter-terrorist policy content or general negative views of America. A 2003 poll posed the problem of 'another country harboring dangerous international terrorists.' The sponsor alternatives probed were the EU, the US, or both; the policy alternatives, use of force or economic sanctions. All possibilities met with massive or predominant rejection from the publics of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Poland. That supports a policy content based interpretation more than one based on views of the US

6.2 Weapons of Mass Destruction and Iraq

The next set of opinions focuses on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the attempt ostensibly to address that problem through regime change in Iraq by means of US dominated invasion, occupation, and reconstruction. We begin with opinions on WMD and then turn to views of the Iraq venture. For our subject, a central question involves the extent to which views on Iraq reflect a general disagreement with the US on WMD as a threat (the initial public justification offered by the Bush II

Administration) or are instead a response to the specifics of the Iraq venture. If the first seems to be the answer, we have disagreements with the US of a narrowly focused kind on means and their application to a specific case more than on broader international security problems.

Table 10 reports the opinions of various national publics about WMD as a problem and threat, and their rankings of it relative to other possible threats and problems.⁹

The distribution of opinions among national publics shown in the first two columns suggest a grant of substantial threat status by the publics polled on WMD proliferation as a fear and for two specific proliferators (Iran and North Korea).¹⁰ When WMD is queried in competition for priority with other often-discussed threats to international wellbeing, opinion for the most part is prevailingly negative. The rankings do not, however, either place the WMD problem in first place (with the notable exceptions of Japan and Pakistan) but also do not treat it as of least importance among the possibilities posed. As the average opinion column suggests, most publics outside of Latin America and Africa tend to view the WMD problem as a serious danger. Yet, as the ranking average in the last column indicates, they do not make it the most important danger or concern relative to other threats. As with terrorism, the publics do not seem disposed to indifference or rejection of coping measures, but they do not want WMD focused on to a degree that reduces attention to or substitutes for ameliorative actions on some other problems.

Recognizing the WMD problem is one thing and taking actions against it another. A set of queries in 2003 explored whether and in what ways sponsorship matters for calls to military action against a North Korea possessing nuclear weapons and an Iran on the edge of doing so. Four sponsors of military action were posed: the US, the US and allies (a coalition of the willing), NATO, and the UN Security Council (UNSC). Note that all four situations inherently involve US support for such actions. The publics polled were those of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. As queries moved from the most unilateral (the US only) to the most multilateral sponsorship (the UNSC), public opinion moved in a positive direction.¹¹ With UNSC sponsorship, the British public became predominantly positive about taking part, and those of France, the Netherlands, and Portugal became split. Opposition in German and Italian publics declined from predominantly negative to negative.

These results are less suggestive of the blanket opposition to American preferences simple anti-Americanism implies than of opposition to following unilaterally established US initiatives lacking in multilateral sponsorship. There apparently has been an absence of a massive and reflexively negative disposition toward military actions against proliferators just because the US might favor such steps. Publics of different EU members do, however, seem to differ in their prevailing view of active military measures, a pattern which casts doubt on the chances of a unified EU position on taking a direct part in military measures whether or not the US operates in a unilateral fashion.

Attitudes on WMD proliferation do not support the possibility that for the most part prevailing negativism toward the Iraq venture by the US follows from dismissal of the general problems such weapons and their diffusion pose. Indeed, as of 2002, Table 11 shows among those few but key country publics polled substantial prevailing sentiment that Saddam's Iraq was developing WMD, posed a substantial danger, and that his removal was necessary. Even in Turkey opinion was only split

⁹ Possible important threats (col. 1) were those listed in Footnotes 4 and 5; for fears of citizens, they were those listed in Footnote 6; for world dangers, they were nuclear weapons, religious and ethnic hatred, infectious diseases/AIDS, pollution and environmental problems, and the rich/poor gap.

¹⁰ The South Korean public when asked in 2004 has shifted to give a high degree of recognition to North Korean becoming a nuclear power as a 'critical threat' to its national 'vital interests.'

¹¹ The Polish public was an exception to this pattern.

rather than rejecting on several of those matters. Yet what was also present was skepticism about whether the WMD threat was the real motive for the then proposed US invasion.

In any event, as shown in Table 12, world publics have, with very few exceptions, differed only in their prevailing degree of negativism toward the Iraq venture. Most national publics have found the US invasion unjustified and the war not worth its cost. Many of the negative net views are massively or predominantly so, while the net positive publics are not as strongly so. Supportive publics or split ones are found only in a very few major European countries (the UK, Italy, Poland), several small entities in Southeast Europe, Israel, Kuwait, Australia, the Philippines, and Nigeria. For those publics polled on several occasion which were not extremely negative in early Spring of 2003, assessments subsequently became more negative.

That verdict accompanies negative judgments on the security and stability consequences of the venture. The scores on whether the Iraq venture has reduced terrorism and increased world safety are usually even more negative than those on its justification and overall cost worthiness. The third column (international system consequences) summarizes opinions about the effects of the war on perceptions of the US (military strength, trustworthiness, democracy promotion), continuing Iraq related damage to American alliances, and damage to the UN. Positive scores indicate judgments that perceptions of the US were not made worse, alliance rifts were easily repairable, and that the UN was not damaged—in sum the *status quo ante* will be reinstated. Almost all national publics viewed the UN as damaged. Opinions on alliance repair varied widely with many publics split. Most of the few international publics polled (France, Germany, Russia, Jordan Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey) thought that the US was less powerful, trustworthy, and committed to democracy.¹² Examination of opinions on Middle East regional consequences show considerably less negativism in Western Europe, but not elsewhere. That was also true with regard to perceived consequences for the Iraqi population.

Iraq has then largely been viewed as a grievous mistake on America's part and, as shown in Table 11 there was initial skepticism about WMD reduction as the genuine US motive. In that light the scores for military participation (the last column in Table 12) are as the previous findings lead us to expect—that is, negative. In the most recent poll used (November, 2004- early January, 2005), public opinion was predominantly net negative even in some of the countries which had troops in Iraq (Italy, Poland, Australia). There were few publics split or net positive.

That sense of an American error seems to have carried over to the subsequent processes of reconstruction and regime transformation. As shown in Tables 13 and 14, international public opinion on roles to be played in the transformation and reconstruction of Iraq assigns responsibility for financing to the US. All but the publics of countries with military participation in Iraq favored placing the funding costs of reconstruction solely on the US and its allies there. With regard to who should play a leading role in rebuilding and regime formation, majority preference for those roles has gone to the United Nations, with only minorities (often small ones) for the US. With regard to who should play a security guarantor role during reconstruction, the preference was again for the UN, ideally with a multinational peacekeeping force under its direction. There has been, for the most part, only trivial support for that security role to be played by the US alone or with its allies, or by a US run force wrapped in a UN flag. That lack of support was, if anything, even more pronouncedly negative for the EU taking such a leading role. There was, however, in ways echoing supportive stances against terrorism, massive support for the EU playing the role of a helper in civil, humanitarian ways.

Opinions on the Iraq venture provide perhaps the strongest basis for concluding that massive anti-Americanism exists and has major security implications. Before accepting that conclusion, several

¹² That of the UK provided a mixed verdict – perceived military strength increased, trustworthiness decreased, and a split on promotion of democracy.

other possibilities warrant consideration. After all, if publics were firmly anti-American, they might be expected to in a sense welcome and see positive consequences from the US being deeply involved in a situation which reduced its international standing. If they were not, and viewed a US centered security order as the best available option, they might oppose the Iraq venture precisely because they thought it would undermine it.

Some clues as to whether for Europeans this indicates a general rejection of the use of force in conjunction with the US in Iraq or rather a reaction to the specific circumstances surrounding the use of force there can be drawn from polling in mid-2002 in Germany, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland. As indicated in Table 15, respondents were posed situations in which Iraqi had WMD, or was providing aid to Bin Laden. For each of those, support for military participation was elicited with the additional conditions of the presence or absence of UN approval, as well as with few or many Western casualties.

With UN approval and few casualties, the scores were mostly positive, especially for the WMD situation. They are mostly negative without UN approval and with many casualties. Interestingly, with UN approval they do not become predominantly negative for either the WMD or the aid to Bin Laden conditions even with many casualties. This suggests neither an allergy to the use of force, or a blanket rejection at the beginning of the Iraq venture of military action with the US. Venus is not the only alternative to Mars. In short, a preference for clear international organization authorization and the multilateralism associated with seems at least as persuasive an explanation as one emphasizing anti-Americanism.

7. Tallying Up Anti-Americanism

It remains to try to draw together the various facets of international public opinion in terms of what they as a whole suggest about anti-Americanism. That will be done through a set of tables which place national publics in terms of positions which span two or more of the four aspects discussed in the preceding sections.¹³

Views of WMD and the US Iraq venture provide an appropriate starting point as providing the strongest evidence for anti-Americanism, and that will be followed by a similarly constructed table about terrorism and the US response. Interpretively, the upper left part of each table reports national publics who both shared a declared sense of policy priorities with the US and supported its response to the problem; the lower right part, prevailing denial of priority to the problem and negative views of the US response; the lower left part, denial of priority but positive views of the US response; and the upper right, recognition of the problem as a priority but negative views of the US response. Accordingly, placements of national publics in the left half of the table clearly do not fit with anti-Americanism and those in the lower right do to the greatest extent. Those in the upper right portion surely indicate negativism about US policies but not disagreements with the US on the importance, respectively, of WMD and terrorism. Such prevailing public opinion arguably does not conform to the most encompassing notions of anti-Americanism

Table 16 relates the priority of concern attached to WMD to views of the US Iraq venture. The right hand side is empty and the lower right hand section contains many publics from countries of clear international security importance. The same, however, can be said of the upper right hand section, although with fewer key security countries. Also, publics of some countries often thought to be central to US regional and global security policies are split. In sum, there is an absence of pro-

¹³ Placements are possible only for those publics for which data were available on the several aspects covered in a particular one of the tables which follow.

American placements. There are notable cases of disagreement with the US on both broad and narrow issues which can arguably be construed as indicative of anti-Americanism. Those placements are approximately matched by placements suggestive neither of prevailing pro- or anti-Americanism.

A strikingly different picture appears in Table 17 which relates the priority of concern attached to terrorism to views of the US response to it. The right half of the table has far more placements than the left half suggesting if anything pro-Americanism. The lower right section has few entries, for the most part of predominantly Islamic publics. When the split publics are also considered, it seems clear that the national publics of the EU are divided in terms of predominant sentiment between those whose views seem aligned with US policies and those divided about or negatively disposed toward its broad or narrow aspects. Since for the most part the same publics appear in both Tables 16 and 17, the contrasting pattern of placements argues against a widespread prevalence of encompassing anti-Americanism. Those in which rejectionist sentiment clearly prevailed are limited to Jordan and South Korea. For more countries, divisions in public opinion argue for governments either needing especially persuasive arguments to align with US security policies or for their being willing to pay a domestic price for doing so. The national publics which pose these possibilities are those of: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia. In sum, there are a significant number of ‘America skeptic’ publics but few clearly anti-American ones across our two stressful issues.

The extent to which these placements should or should not be interpreted as indications of encompassing anti-Americanism needs to take into account the results found for the first two aspects of international public opinion. Negativism about the US may span perceived features of domestic American ways of life, and thus of their export, and how the US approaches and contributes to international affairs. Even if publics are prevailing negative on all those counts, it seems at least premature and even exaggerated to label them as anti-American if they attribute their negativism to specific policies and a current US presidential administration rather than to more basic features of the US. The possibilities are explored in two stages in Tables 18 and 19.

Table 18 combines findings on opinions of the American way of life as a role model with those on US relationships to the rest of the world in order to arrive at credible candidate publics for designation as anti-American. Table 19 subjects those candidates to the test of believing that their disagreements with the US follow from basic features of America. The entries are limited to publics for which poll results were readily available on the pertinent aspects. The interpretation of placements follows the same lines as that for the two preceding tables.

The entries in Table 18 do not support a view of globally predominant anti-Americanism or pro-Americanism. Also, numerous publics are almost evenly divided in their opinions. Among such publics there is no general established tendency to support their country cooperating with or separating itself from US security preferences. Their national political elites are then left with room to maneuver according to the specifics of the security issue at hand and their domestic standing. The entries do, however, suggest prevailing negative views in a number of countries traditionally thought of as core US allies, in predominantly Islamic countries, and in major states of Latin America. Their placement indicate possible anti-Americanism of a far broader kind among their publics than was shown in the WMD-Iraq table and may somewhat counter the more positive view in the terrorism table.

That leaves open the question of the extent to which those publics predominantly negative or rather evenly split on US foreign policies, the bottom four rows of Table 18, are firmly anti-American or rather only negatively inclined toward some specific policies and the Bush II Administration. If the latter is the case, there will be less public demand for commitments to alternatives to a US centered security order and for the sorts of opposition to the US which would hinder positive relationships in

the future. As shown in Table 19, most of the anti-American candidate publics are in the first three columns.¹⁴ That argues against their designation as in general anti-American at the time of polling. Large majorities in those publics had yet to conclude that there was little hope for the US to return to what they view as its better self.

Such beliefs obviously make it easier to accept the need for and feasibility of pragmatic accommodation to, or at least not hostile relations with, a US perceived as a source of rewards or punishments. They argue against most of those publics having concluded that it was imperative to give cardinal priority to pursuing a security alternative to one centered on the US, as distinct from tentative explorations of alternatives should the US fail to engage in self-corrective actions. That mixed stance seems especially likely as those alternatives involve subordinating security and other issues the pertinent international publics have with non-Americans or diverting their national resources from domestic priorities.

8. Afterword

While the presence of some anti-Americanism in the world surely has been established, the previous sections show that it is not as comprehensive as some have proclaimed it to be. What is more generally present amounts to disagreement about some (but not all) US policies and a unilateral style. What anti-Americanism exists seems then to be outweighed by the sort of division in public opinion which calls reflexive followership into question, and by a willingness to believe that the US is in what amounts to a ‘bad patch’ which may pass with a change of Administration—and thus of Washington policies in content and style.

Beyond the sound bite quality of the phrase, why then has there been so much talk about anti-Americanism internationally and in the US? I would suggest in a highly speculative vein that the answer lies in a combination of the following factors. Outside the US, the asserted tide of anti-Americanism may have seemed a useful instrument to drive up the gains that could be extracted from the US for cooperation, and to limit US pressures on foreign governments to conform to its preferences. It may also have seemed useful to mobilize pressures within America for foreign and security policy modifications.

Inside the US, opponents of the Bush II policies outside of the government, and minority factions within it, may also have seen the alleged tide as a way to mobilize pressures for policy change. There is, however, another and more disturbing possibility. It is that proponents of Bush II policies have seen the potential of domestic political gains by stylizing foreign demurs as anti-Americanism. That is, foreign doubts and objections are not of substantive merit but rather stem from hostile motives, motives so inimical to the US that just changing policies will not lead to more support from abroad. Indeed, it may only weaken what friends the US has in the world and fuel additional rejection of US leadership.

¹⁴ Several of the candidates from Table 18 do not appear because of lack of data.

Appendix A: Tables

Table 1
Scoring Conventions

<i>Score:</i>	<i>Net %s</i>	<i>Thermometer</i>	<i>Positive %s</i>
+3	Massively Supportive 50% or more	Mean 75 degrees or higher	75% or more
+2	Predominantly Supportive 25 to 49%	Mean 65 to 74 degrees	65 to 74 7%
+1	Supportive 10 to 24%	Mean 55 to 64 degrees	55 to 64%
0	Split 9% to -9%	Mean 45 to 54 degrees	45 to 54%
-1	Rejecting -10 % to -24%	Mean 35 to 44 degrees	35 to 44%
-2	Predominantly Rejecting -25% to -49%	Mean 25 to 34 degrees	25 to 34%
-3	Massively Rejecting -50% or more	Mean 24 degrees or less	24% or less

Table 2
The US as a Role Model

<i>Country</i>	<i>Democracy, 2002-04, Avg. Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>Business, 2002-03, Avg. Score, (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>Ideas and Customs, 2002- 03, Avg. Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>Average</i>
West Europe				
UK	-3 (3)	0 (2)	-1 (2)	-.4
France	-1.5 (2)	-3 (2)	-2 (2)	-2.2
Germany	-5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-2 (2)	-1.3
Italy	1 (2)	1 (2)	-1 (2)	.3
Spain	-2 (1)	-1 (1)	-3 (1)	-2
North America				
Canada	1.3 (3)	-1 (2)	-2 (2)	-.6
Latin America				
Argentina	-1 (1)	-2 (1)	-3 (1)	-2
Bolivia	-2 (1)	-1 (1)	-3 (1)	-2
Brazil	-1.5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-2 (1)	-1.7
Guatemala	2 (1)	2 (2)	-2 (1)	.7
Honduras	2 (1)	2 (2)	0 (1)	1.3
Mexico	0 (2)	0 (1)	-2 (1)	-.7
Peru	1 (1)	1 (1)	-1 (1)	.3
Venezuela	2 (2)	2 (1)	0 (1)	1.3
East Europe				
Bulgaria	2 (1)	2 (1)	0 (1)	1.3
Czech	2 (1)	0 (1)	-1 (1)	.3
Poland	1 (1)	2 (1)	-1 (1)	.7
Russia	0 (3)	1.5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	0
Slovakia	1 (1)	1 (1)	-1 (1)	.3
Ukraine	1 (1)	2 (1)	-1 (1)	.7
Conflict Area				
Egypt		-1 (1)	-3 (1)	-2
Israel	2 (2)	2(1)	0 (1)	1.3
Jordan	-1.5 (2)	.5 (2)	-3 (2)	-1.3
Kuwait	1 (1)	3 (1)	-3 (1)	.3
Lebanon	0 (2)	2 (2)	-2 (2)	0
Morocco	0 (1)	2 (1)	-3 (1)	-.3
Pakistan	-2.5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-3 (2)	-2.3
Pal Auth	-3 (1)	-2 (1)	-3 (1)	-2.7
Turkey	-2 (2)	-2.5 (2)	-3 (1)	-2.3
Uzbekistan	2 (1)	3 (1)	-1 (1)	1.3
Asia				
Australia	1 (1)	-2 (1)	-2 (1)	-1
India	0 (1)	2 (1)	-2 (1)	0
Indonesia	-5 (2)	1 (2)	0 (2)	.2
Japan	1.5 (3)	0 (1)	1 (1)	.8
Phil.	2 (1)	3 (1)	1 (1)	2
Rok	.7 (3)	2 (2)	-1 (2)	.6
Vietnam	2 (1)	0 (1)	-2 (1)	0
Africa				
Angola	1 (1)	0 (1)	-1 (1)	0
Ghana	3 (1)	3 (1)	0 (1)	2
Ivory Coast	3 (1)	3 (1)	2 (1)	2.7
Kenya	3 (1)	3 (1)	-1 (1)	1.7
Mali	1 (1)	0 (1)	-2 (1)	-.3
Nigeria	3 (2)	3 (2)	2 (2)	2.7
Senegal	2 (1)	0 (1)	-2 (1)	0
So Africa	1 (1)	2 (1)	0 (1)	1
Tanzania	1 (1)	1(1)	-2 (1)	0
Uganda	3 (3)	3 (1)	0 (1)	2

Table 3
Broad Appraisals of US Foreign/Security Policies and International Influence

<i>Country</i>	<i>Effects on our country, Countries like ours 2001-03 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>US FP Making Takes Account of Interests 2001-04 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>US Positive Influence in World 11/04-1/05 Score</i>	<i>US Positive Influence on Own Country 2003 (1 query)</i>	<i>Average Score of Previous Columns</i>
West Europe					
Austria	-1.3 (5)				-1.3
Denmark	-.6 (7)				-0.6
Finland	-1 (4)				-1
Uk	-.1 (8)	-1.3 (7)	0		-0.5
France	-2.3 (7)	-2.6 (7)	-1		-2
Germany	-1.4 (8)	-1.3 (7)	-2		-1.6
Italy	-.9 (5)	-1 (4)	0		-0.6
Greece	-2 (3)				-2
Iceland	-1.3 (3)				-1.3
Ireland	0 (1)				0
Lux	0 (5)				0
Neth.	-1.6 (7)				-1.6
Norway	-2 (1)				-2
Portugal	.2 (7)				0.2
Spain	-2 (7)	-2.5 (2)			-2.3
Switz.	-1.8 (5)				-1.8
North America					
Canada	-1.8 (5)	-2 (2)	-2		-1.9
Latin America					
Argentina	-2.6 (7)	-3 (1)	-2		-2.5
Bolivia	-2 (3)	0 (1)			-1
Brazil		-1.7 (3)	0		-0.8
Chile			-1		-1
Columbia	.8 (4)				0.8
Ecuador	-1.8 (6)				-1.8
Guatemala		1 (1)			1
Honduras		2 (2)			2
Mexico	1 (1)	-1 (2)	-1		-0.5
Peru	-1 (1)	0 (2)			-0.5
Uruguay	-2 (4)				-2
Venezuela	-1 (1)	3 (1)			1
East Europe					
Albania	3 (3)				3
Bosnia	0 (1)				0
Bos & Herz	-2 (1)				-2
Bulgaria	-.4 (7)	-2 (1)			-1.2
Croatia	1 (1)				1
Czech	1 (1)	-2 (1)			-0.5
Estonia	.8 (4)				0.8
Georgia	1.6 (5)				1.6
Kosovo	3 (3)				3
Latvia	0 (2)				0
Lithuania	.7 (3)				0.7
Macedonia	-1.6 (5)				-1.6
Poland	-.3 (3)	-2 (1)	2		0.2
Romania	.5 (2)				0.5
Russia	-2.3 (6)	-1.7 (6)	-2		-2
Serbia	-1.7 (3)				-1.7
Ukraine	-1.5 (2)	-2 (2)			-1.8
Conflict Area					
Egypt		-2 (1)			-2
Israel	2.3 (4)	2 (1)			2.2
Jordan		-2.5 (6)			-2.5
Kuwait		2 (1)			2

Table 3 – continued
Broad Appraisals of US Foreign/Security Policies and International Influence

<i>Country</i>	<i>Effects on our country, Countries like ours 2001-03 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>US FP Making Takes Account of Interests 2001-04 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>US Positive Influence in World 11/04-1/05 Score</i>	<i>US Positive Influence on Own Country 2003 (1 query)</i>	<i>Average Score of Previous Columns</i>
Conflict Area – cont'd					
Kuwait		2 (1)			2
Lebanon		-2.7 (3)	-1		-1.9
Morocco		-1.7 (3)			-1.7
Pakistan	-2 (7)	-1.6 (5)			-1.8
Pal Auth		-3 (1)			-3
Turkey	-3 (3)	-3 (5)	-2		-2.7
Uzbekistan		2.5 (2)		1	1.8
Asia					
Australia	-1.4 (5)	-2 (1)	-1		-1.5
Bangladesh		-2 (1)			-2
China			0	-2	-1
India	-1.4 (7)	0 (1)	1	1	0.2
Indonesia		0 (1)	-1		-0.5
Japan	-2.3 (3)	-5 (2)	0	-1	-1
Malaysia	-1.2 (5)			-3	-2.1
Nz	-1.8 (4)				-1.8
Phil.	2 (3)	3 (1)	3		2.7
Rok	-2 (3)	-2 (3)	0	-1	-1.3
Sri Lanka				-1	-1
Taiwan	1 (1)				1
Thailand				2	2
Vietnam	-1.7 (3)	3 (1)		-3	0.6
Africa					
Angola		1 (1)			1
Cameroon	-6 (5)				-0.6
Ghana		1 (1)			1
Ivory Coast		0			0
Kenya	-5 (4)	1 (1)			0.3
Mali		1 (2)			1
Nigeria	.2 (5)	3 (1)			1.6
Senegal		-2 (1)			-2
So Africa	-5 (4)	2 (1)	1		0.8
Tanzania		1 (1)			1
Uganda	0 (4)	2 (2)			1
Zimbabwe	0 (1)				0

Table 4
Assessments of Particular US International Contributions

<i>Country</i>	<i>To World Peace 2002-04 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Not Overly Prone Use Force 2003 Score</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Environmental Quality 2001-03 Avg. Score (Number of Observations)</i>
West Europe				
Austria	-2 (4)	-3	-2.5	-2.7 (3)
Belgium	-1.5 (4)		-1.5	-2 (3)
Denmark	0 (4)	0	0	-3 (3)
Finland	-2.3 (4)	-3	-2.7	-2.3 (3)
UK	-2 (5)	-1	-0.6	-2.2 (5)
France	-2 (5)	-3	-2.5	-3 (5)
Germany	-1.8 (5)	-2	-1.9	-2.8 (5)
Italy	-2 (5)		-0.2	-1.8 (5)
Greece	-3 (4)	-3	-3	-3 (3)
Iceland		-3		
Ireland	-5 (4)		-0.5	-3 (3)
Lux	-1.2 (4)		-1.2	-3 (3)
Neth.	-8 (4)	-2	-1.4	-2.8 (4)
Portugal	-1.2 (4)	-2	-1.6	-2 (3)
Spain	-2.3 (4)	-2	-2.2	-2 (3)
Sweden	-1 (4)		-1	-2.7 (3)
Switz.		-3	-3	
North America				
Canada	-1 (2)	-2	-1.5	
Latin America				
Argentina	-3 (1)	-2	-2.5	
Brazil	-3 (1)		-3	
Chile	-2 (1)		-2	
Columbia		-2	-2	
Ecuador		-2	-2	
Mexico	-2.5 (2)			
Uruguay		-3	-3	
East Europe				
Albania		-1	-1	
Bulgaria	-5 (2)	-3	-1.8	.5 (2)
Cyprus	-3 (2)		-3	-3 (2)
Czech	1 (2)		1	0 (2)
Estonia	-5 (2)	-3	-1.8	.5 (2)
Georgia		1	1	
Hungary	-5 (2)		-0.5	.5 (2)
Kosovo		0	0	
Latvia	-1 (2)	-3	-2	
Lithuania	1 (2)	-2	-0.5	
Macedonia		-3	-3	
Malta	.5 (2)		0.5	1.5 (2)
Poland	1 (3)	-2	-1.5	.8 (4)
Romania	1.5 (2)		1.5	2.5 (2)
Russia	-1 (3)	-3	-2	
Serbia		-3	-3	
Slovakia	-5 (2)		-0.5	0 (2)
Slovenia	-2 (2)		-2	-2 (2)
Conflict Area				
Israel	2 (1)		2	
Lebanon	-2 (1)		-2	
Pakistan		-2	-2	
Turkey	-3 (3)	-3	-3	-2 (2)
Asia				
Australia	-2 (1)	-2	-2	
China	-2 (1)		-2	
India	2 (1)		2	
Indonesia	-2 (1)		-2	

Table 4 – continued
Assessments of Particular US International Contributions

<i>Country</i>	<i>To World Peace 2002-04 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Not Overly Prone Use Force 2003 Score</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Environmental Quality 2001-03 Avg. Score (Number of Observations)</i>
Asia – cont'd				
Japan	-5 (2)	-2	-1.3	
Malaysia		0	0	
NZ		-2	-2	
Phil.	2 (1)	0	1	
Rok	-5 (2)	-2	-1.3	
Vietnam		-2	-2	
Africa				
Cameroon		-1	-1	
Kenya		-2	-2	
Nigeria		0	0	
So Africa	-1 (1)	-2	-1.5	
Uganda		-1	-1	

Table 5
Assessments of US International Economic Contributions

<i>Country</i>	<i>Growth World Economy 2002-03 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Reduction World Poverty & Inequality 2002-03 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Globalization Influence & Trust 2003 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Economic Threat 2002-04 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Average</i>
West Europe					
Austria	-.3 (3)	-2 (3)	-3 (2)		-1.8
Belgium	-.7 (3)	-2 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-1.7
Denmark	1 (3)	-2 (3)	-1.5 (2)		-0.8
Finland	1 (3)	-2 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-1.2
UK	1 (3)	-1 (4)	-2 (2)	-2 (2)	-1
France	-1.3 (3)	-3 (4)	-3 (2)	-3 (2)	-2.6
Germany	.3 (3)	-2.3 (4)	-3 (2)	-2 (2)	-1.8
Italy	1 (3)	-1 (4)	-2 (2)	-2 (2)	-1
Greece	-2.7 (3)	-3 (3)	-3 (2)		-2.9
Ireland	2 (3)	0 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-0.2
Lux	-.3 (3)	-2 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-1.6
Neth.	0 (3)	-2 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-1.5
Portugal	0 (3)	-1 (3)	-1 (2)	0 (1)	-0.5
Spain	-.7 (3)	-2 (3)	-3 (2)	-3 (1)	-2.2
Sweden	1.3 (3)	-2 (3)	-2.5 (2)		-1.1
North America					
Canada		-3 (1)		-2 (1)	-2.5
Latin America					
Argentina		-3 (1)			-3
Bolivia		-3 (1)			-3
Brazil		-2 (1)			-2
Guatemala		-2 (1)			-2
Honduras		-1 (1)			-1
Mexico		-2 (1)		-1 (1)	-1.5
Peru		-2 (1)			-2
Venezuela		-1 (1)			-1
East Europe					
Bulgaria	2 (2)	-.7 (3)			0.7
Cyprus	-2 (2)	-3 (2)			-2.5
Czech	2 (2)	0 (3)			1
Estonia	2 (2)	1 (2)			1.5
Hungary	2 (2)	0 (2)			1
Latvia	1.5 (2)	0 (2)			0.8
Lithuania	2 (2)	1.5 (2)			1.8
Malta	2 (2)	1.5 (2)			1.8
Poland	2 (2)	.3 (3)		-1 (1)	0.4
Romania	2.5 (2)	2 (2)			2.3
Russia		-2 (1)		0 (1)	-1
Slovakia	1 (2)	-1 (3)			0
Slovenia	0 (2)	-1.5 (2)			-0.8
Ukraine		-2 (1)			-2
Conflict Area					
Egypt		-2 (1)			-2
Jordan		-2 (1)			-2
Lebanon		-3 (1)			-3
Pakistan		-2 (1)			-2
Turkey	-2 (2)	-2.7 (3)			-2.4
Uzbekistan		-1 (1)			-1
Asia					
Bangladesh		-2 (1)			-2
India		-2 (1)			-2
Indonesia		-2 (1)			-2
Japan		-3 (1)			-3
Phil.		0 (1)			0

Table 5 – continued
Assessments of US International Economic Contributions

<i>Country</i>	<i>Growth World Economy 2002- 03 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Reduction World Poverty & Inequality 2002-03 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Globalization Influence & Trust 2003 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Economic Threat 2002-04 Avg. Score (Number of Queries)</i>	<i>Average</i>
Conflict Area – cont'd					
Japan		-3 (1)			-3
Phil.		0 (1)			0
Rok		-3 (1)		-2 (1)	-2.5
Vietnam		-2 (1)			-2
Africa					
Angola		-2 (1)			-2
Ghana		0 (1)			0
Ivory Coast		-1 (1)			-1
Kenya		1 (1)			1
Mali		-1 (1)			-1
Nigeria		2 (1)			2
Senegal		-1 (1)			-1
So Africa		-1 (1)			-1
Tanzania		-2 (1)			-2
Uganda		0 (1)			0

Table 6
Focusing on the Bush II Administration

<i>Country</i>	<i>Approval Bush Foreign Policies 2001-04 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>Bush Foreign Policies Not Worsen Views of US 2004 (one query)</i>	<i>Problems Bush, Policies Not Values, General Nature of the U.S. 2002-03 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>U.S. Unilateralism Not an Important Threat 6/2003 (Rank of 7)</i>
West Europe				
UK	-1.3 (9)	-3	1.7 (3)	-2 (6)
France	-2.8 (9)	-3	2.7 (3)	-3 (4)
Germany	-2 (8)	-3	2 (3)	-3 (4)
Italy	-1.1 (7)	-2	1 (3)	-3 (6)
Neth.	-1.5 (2)	-3		-3 (5)
Portugal	-1 (1)			3 (7)
Spain	-2.7 (3)	-3	1 (2)	
Sweden		-3		
North America				
Canada	-1.5 (2)	-3	1.5 (2)	
Latin America				
Argentina		-3	2 (1)	
Bolivia		-1	0 (1)	
Brazil	-3 (2)	-2	1 (2)	
Columbia		-1		
Dominican Rep.		-1		
Guatemala			1 (1)	
Honduras			2 (1)	
Mexico	-2 (1)	-3	1 (1)	
Peru		0	2 (1)	
Uruguay		-2		
Venezuela		0	2 (1)	
East Europe				
Bulgaria			1 (1)	
Czech		-2	-2 (1)	
Poland	.8 (3)	-2	2 (1)	-2 (6)
Russia	-2.3 (4)	-1	.7 (3)	
Slovakia			0 (1)	
Ukraine			2 (1)	
Conflict Area				
Egypt			0 (1)	
Israel	2.5 (2)		0 (1)	
Jordan	-3 (2)	1.5 (2)		
Kuwait	2 (1)		0 (1)	
Lebanon	-3 (1)		1 (2)	
Morocco	-3 (2)		3 (1)	
Pakistan	-3 (2)		1.5 (2)	
Turkey	-2.7 (3)	-1	1 (2)	
Asia				
Australia	-1.5 (2)		1 (1)	
Bangladesh			1 (1)	
China		-3		
India		0	2 (2)	
Indonesia	-3 (1)	0	-2 (1)	
Japan	-2 (1)	-2	0 (2)	
Phil.		2	2 (1)	
ROK	-2 (2)		-2 (2)	0 (4)*
Thailand		0		
Vietnam			2 (1)	
Africa				
Angola			2 (1)	
Ghana		-1	0 (1)	
Ivory Coast			-1 (1)	
Kenya		-2	2 (1)	
Mali			-2 (1)	

Table 6 – continued
Focusing on the Bush II Administration

<i>Country</i>	<i>Approval Bush Foreign Policies 2001-04 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>Bush Foreign Policies Not Worsen Views of US 2004(one query)</i>	<i>Problems Bush, Policies Not Values, General Nature of the U.S. 2002-03 Avg. Score (N of Queries)</i>	<i>U.S. Unilateralism Not an Important Threat 6/2003 (Rank of 7)</i>
Africa – cont'd				
Nigeria	0 (1)	0	1 (1)	
Senegal			-1 (1)	
So Africa		-1	1 (1)	
Tanzania		-1	0 (2)	
Uganda			2 (1)	
Zimbabwe		-3		

Notes: Unlike the other entries in this column, that for South Korea is for 2004, is not a net percentage, and the rank is out of 12 possibilities queried.

Table 7
Terrorism as a Threat and Problem Net %s

<i>Country</i>	<i>US Concern Warranted 4/02 Net %s</i>	<i>US Concern Warranted 2-3/04 Net %s</i>	<i>IR Terrorism Important Threat 2002-2003 Avg. of 2 Net %s (Rank of 7)</i>	<i>Terrorism Strong Threat/Big Problem In Our Country 2002-2003 (N of queries) Net %s</i>	<i>One of Two Fears, Most Important Issues in Our Country Avg of two, 2003 % (Rank of 14)</i>	<i>Fights Worries of Citizens 2003 For EU & Accession Countries of 9, for Others of 27)</i>	<i>Average Opinion</i>	<i>Average Rank</i>	
West Europe									
Austria				-3 (1)	-3 (9)	2 (1.5)	3 (4)	-3	4.8
Belgium				-2 (1)	-3 (9)	3 (1)	3 (3)	.3	4.3
Denmark				-3 (1)	-3 (6)	3 (1.5)	3 (4)	0	3.5
Finland				-3 (1)	-3 (12)	2 (1.5)	3 (8)	-3	7.2
UK	3	2	3 (1)	0 (2)	-3 (3)	3 (1)	3 (1)	1.6	1.5
France	2	-1	3 (1)	1 (2)	-3 (6)	3 (1)	3 (4)	1.1	2.8
Germany	2	0	3 (1)	0 (2)	-3 (9)	3 (1)	3 (3)	1.1	3.5
Italy	3		3 (1)	2 (2)	-3 (5)	3 (1)	3 (1)	1.8	2
Greece				-1 (1)	-3 (8)	3 (3)	3 (6)	.5	5.7
Ireland				-2 (1)	-3 (10)	2.5 (2.5)	3 (3)	.1	5.2
Lux				-3 (1)	-3 (10)	3 (1)	3 (8)	0	6.3
Neth.			3 (1)	-2 (1)	-3 (8)	2 (1)	3 (4)	.6	3.5
Portugal			3 (1)*	-1 (1)	-3 (8)	3 (2)	3 (2)	1	3.3
Spain				3 (1)	0 (1)	3 (2)	3 (1)	2.3	1.3
Sweden				-3 (1)	-3 (10)	2.5 (1.5)	3 (5)	-1	5.5
North America									
Canada				-3 (1)				-3	
Latin America									
Argentina				2 (1)				2	
Bolivia				1 (1)				1	
Brazil				1 (1)				1	
Guatemala				1 (1)				1	
Honduras				1 (1)				1	
Mexico			3 (4)**	2 (1)				2.5	4
Peru				2 (1)				2	
Venezuela				1 (1)				1	
East Europe									
Bulgaria				-3 (1)	3 (9)	2.5 (2.5)	3 (3)	1.4	4.8
Cyprus					-3 (10)	3 (2.5)	3 (2)	2	4.8
Czech				-2 (1)	3 (10)	2 (1)	3 (1)	1.5	4
Estonia					1 (12)	2 (3.5)	3 (4)	2	6.5
Hungary					2 (11)	1.5 (4)	3 (4)	2.7	6.3
Latvia					2 (11)	2 (3.5)			
Lithuania					2 (10)	2 (5)	3 (5)	2.3	6.7
Malta					2 (13)	3 (1.5)	3 (8)	2.7	7.5
Poland			3 (1)	0 (1)	2 (8)	2 (1)	3 (3)	2	3.3
Romania					3 (11)	2 (2)	3 (4)	2.7	5.7
Russia		1		2 (1)				1.5	
Slovakia				-2 (1)	2 (10)	2 (2.5)	3 (3)	1.3	5.2
Slovenia					1 (14)	2 (2)	3 (5)	2	6.3
Ukraine				-2 (1)				-2	
Conflict Area									
Jordan		-3		-3 (1)				-3	
Morocco		-3						-3	

Table 7 – continued
Terrorism as a Threat and Problem Net %s

<i>Country</i>	<i>US Concern Warranted 4/02 Net %s</i>	<i>US Concern Warranted 2-3/04 Net %s</i>	<i>IR Terrorism Important Threat 2002-2003 Avg. of 2 Net %s (Rank of 7)</i>	<i>Terrorism Strong Threat/Most Big Problem In Our Country 2002-2003 (N of queries) Net %s</i>	<i>One of Two Fears, Worries of Citizens 2003 For EU & Accession Countries of 2, avg. of 2, (Rank of 14)</i>	<i>Fight Against Terrorism Priority for EU Avg. of 2 Net %s (Rank of 15)</i>	<i>Average Opinion</i>	<i>Average Rank</i>
Conflict Area – cont'd								
Pakistan		-3		3 (1)			0	
Turkey		-1		1 (1)	-3 (6)	3 (3)	2 (3)	4
Uzbekistan				1 (1)		1 (3)	1	3
Asia								
Bangladesh				3 (1)			3	
China						-2 (12)	-2	12
India				3 (1)		2 (3)	2.5	3
Indonesia				0 (1)			0	
Japan				2 (1)		-1 (10)	.5	10
Malaysia						2 (1)	2	1
Myanmar						-1 (4)	-1	4
Phil.				3 (1)			3	
ROK			1 (1)***	-3 (1)		-3 (18)	-1.7	9.5
Sri Lanka						1 (2)	1	2
Thailand						-2 (9)	-2	9
Vietnam				-3 (1)		0 (10)	-1.5	10
Africa								
Angola				0 (1)			0	
Ghana				-2 (1)			-2	
Ivory Coast				1 (1)			1	
Kenya				-1 (1)			-1	
Senegal				-2 (1)			-2	
So Africa				-1 (1)			-1	
Tanzania				-2 (1)			-2	
Uganda				0 (1)			0	

Notes: * Indicates 1 query (2003). ** Indicates one query, not net percentage and asked in 2004. *** Indicates one query, not net percentage, asked in 2004, and rank out of 12.

Table 8
Assessing the US in Combating Terrorism

Country	US							Average
	US Role Positive Avg. of 2 2003 Net %s	US Foreign Policy Not Cause 9/11 6/2002 Net %S	US Sincerely Against Terrorism 6/2002-2- 3/2004 (Number of queries) Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 7-10/02 Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 4-5/03 Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 2-3/04 Net %s	US Handling Well 6/02 Net %s	
West Europe								
Austria	-1							-1
Belgium	0							0
Denmark	2							2
Finland	0							0
UK	2	-1	1.5 (2)	2	2	2	0	1.2
France	-1	-2	-5 (2)	3	1	0	-2	-2
Germany	1	0	-2 (1)	2	2	1	0	.6
Italy	1	0	2 (1)	3	2		0	1.3
Greece	-3							-3
Ireland	1							1
Lux	0							0
Neth.	2						0	1.3
Portugal	0							0
Spain	-1							-1
Sweden	2							2
North America								
Canada				2	2			2
Latin America								
Argentina				-2				-2
Bolivia				2				2
Brazil				1	-1			0
Guatemala				3				3
Honduras				3				3
Mexico				1				1
Peru				3				3
Venezuela				3				3
East Europe								
Bulgaria	2			3				2.5
Cyprus	-2							-2
Czech	2			3				2.5
Estonia	2							2
Hungary	2							2
Latvia	1							1
Lithuania	2							2
Malta	2							2
Poland	3	-1	2 (1)	3			1	1.6
Romania	3							3
Russia			-1 (1)	3	1	3		1.5
Slovakia	2			2				2
Slovenia	0							0
Ukraine				3				3
Conflict Area								
Egypt				-3				-3
Israel					3			3
Jordan			-2 (1)	-3	-3	-3		-2.8
Kuwait					1			1
Lebanon				-2	-2			-2
Morocco			-2 (1)	-3	-3	-2		-2.3
Pakistan			-3 (1)	-2	-3	-2		-2.5
Pal Auth					-3			-3

Table 8 – continued
Assessing the US in Combating Terrorism

Country	US							Average
	US Role Positive Avg. of 2 2003 Net %s	US Foreign Policy Not Cause 9/11 6/2002 Net %S	US Sincerely Against Terrorism 6/2002-2- 3/2004 (Number of queries) Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 7-10/02 Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 4-5/03 Net %s	Favor US Led Policy 2-3/04 Net %s	US Handling Well 6/02 Net %s	
Conflict Area – cont'd								
Turkey	-3		-2 (1)	3	-2	-1		-1
Uzbekistan				3				3
Asia								
Australia					2			2
Bangladesh				-1				-1
India				3				3
Indonesia				-2	-2			-2
Japan				2				2
NZ					1			1
Phil.				3				3
Rok				-2	-2			-2
Vietnam				2				2
Africa								
Angola				2				2
Ghana				2				2
Ivory Coast				3				3
Kenya				3				3
Mali				1				1
Nigeria				3				3
Senegal				-2				-2
So Africa				1				1
Tanzania				1				1
Uganda				2				2

Table 9
Support for Responses to 9/11 Net %s

<i>Country</i>	<i>Take part Mil. Action w/US 10/2001</i>	<i>Send Troops To Fight w/US 11/01</i>	<i>US Use Mil. Bases 11/01</i>	<i>Share Intell w/US 11/01</i>	<i>EU Must Support Democ. Afghan 11/01</i>	<i>EU Must Finance Afghan Reconstr uct 11/01</i>	<i>Average Military Participa tion (Cols. A & B)</i>	<i>Average Security Enabling (Cols. C & D)</i>	<i>Average Civil Role Contribu tion (Cols. E & F)</i>
West Europe									
Austria	-3	-3	-2	0	3		-3	-1	3
Belgium		0	2	3	3	0	0	2.5	1.5
Denmark	3	0	2	3	3	3	1.5	2.5	3
Finland	-3	-3	-3	-1	3	1	-3	-2	2
UK	3	2	2	3	3	3	2.5	2.5	3
France	3	1	2	3	3	2	2	2.5	2.5
Germany	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2.5	1.5
Italy	2	0	2	3	3	2	1	2.5	2.5
Greece	-2	-3	-2	-2	3	2	-2.5	-2	2.5
Ireland		-2	-1	2	3	2	-2	.5	2.5
Lux	3	0	2	3	3	3	1.5	2.5	3
Neth.	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	3
Portugal	2	-2	2	2	3		0	2	3
Spain	1	-2	1	2	3	3	-5	1.5	3
Sweden		-3	-2	2	3	3	-3	0	3
North America									
Latin America									
Argentina	-3						-3		
Mexico	-3						-3		
Peru	-3						-3		
Venezuela	-3						-3		
East Europe									
Bulgaria	-2						-2		
Czech	1						1		
Ukraine	-3						-3		
Conflict Area									
Pakistan	-3						-3		
Asia									
India	2						2		
Rok	-1						-1		
Africa									
So Africa	-3						-3		

Table 10
Spread of WMD as Problem and Threat

<i>Country</i>	<i>Important Threat of Iran & North Korea 2003 (Rank of 7)</i>	<i>Avg. Fears of Citizens 2003 Avg. of 2 (Rank of 9)</i>	<i>One of Top two World Dangers 2002 (Rank of 5)</i>	<i>Average Opinion</i>	<i>Average Rank</i>
West Europe					
Austria		1 (4)		1	4
Belgium		1.5 (3)		1.5	3
Denmark		1.5 (3.5)		1.5	3.5
Finland		.5 (3.5)		.5	3.5
UK	3 (3)	3 (2)	-1 (2)	1.7	2.3
France	3 (5)	2.5 (3)	-2 (5)	1.2	4.3
Germany	3 (5)	2 (2.5)	-1 (3)	1.3	3.5
Italy	3 (4)	2.5 (3.5)	0 (1)	1.6	3.3
Greece		3 (5)		3	5
Ireland		2.5 (4)		2.5	4
Lux		2 (4)		2	4
Neth.	3 (3)	0 (4.5)		1.5	3.6
Portugal	3 (2)	3 (3.5)		3	2.8
Spain		2 (4)		2	4
Sweden		2 (3)		2	3
North America					
Canada			-2 (4)	-2	4
Latin America					
Argentina			-1 (2)	-1	2
Bolivia			-1 (2)	-1	2
Brazil			1 (1)	1	1
Guatemala			-1 (3)	-1	3
Honduras			-1 (3)	-1	3
Mexico	3 (2)*		0 (2)	1.5	2
Peru			0 (2)	0	2
Venezuela			1 (1)	1	1
East Europe					
Bulgaria		1.5 (5)	-1 (2)	.3	3.5
Cyprus		1.5 (6)		1.5	6
Czech		0 (5)	-1 (3)	-.5	4
Estonia		2 (5)		2	5
Hungary		1 (4.5)		1	4.5
Latvia		2 (3.5)		2	3.5
Lithuania		3 (4)		3	4
Malta		3 (4.5)		3	4.5
Poland	3 (2)	1 (5.5)	0 (2)	1.3	3.2
Romania		2 (5.5)		2	5.5
Russia			-1 (4)	-1	4
Slovakia		1.5 (4.5)	0 (1)	.8	2.8
Slovenia		2 (5)		2	5
Ukraine			-1 (3)	-1	3
Conflict Area					
Jordan			-2 (5)	-2	5
Lebanon			0 (2)	0	2
Pakistan			0 (1)	0	1
Turkey		3 (4)	0 (2)	1.5	3
Uzbekistan			-1 (3)	-1	3
Asia					
Bangladesh			-1 (1)	-1	1
China			-2 (4)**	-2	4
India			-1 (3)	-1	3
Indonesia			-3 (5)	-3	5
Japan			2 (1)	2	1
Phil.			0 (1)	0	1
ROK	1 (2)***		-2 (3)	-.5	2.5
Vietnam			-2 (3)	-2	3

Table 10 – continued
Spread of WMD as Problem and Threat

<i>Country</i>	<i>Important Threat Avg. Fears of Citizens 2003 of Iran & North Korea Avg. of 2 (Rank of 9) 2003 (Rank of 7)</i>	<i>One of Top two World Dangers 2002 (Rank of 5)</i>	<i>Average Opinion</i>	<i>Average Rank</i>
Africa				
Angola		-1 (2)	-1	2
Ghana		-1 (2)	-1	2
Ivory Coast		-1 (3)	-1	3
Kenya		-3 (3)	-3	3
Mali		-1 (3)	-1	3
Nigeria		-3 (4)	-3	4
Senegal		0 (2)	0	2
So Africa		-1 (2)	-1	2
Tanzania		-2 (2)	-2	2
Uganda		0 (2)	0	2

Notes: * Indicates query only about chemical and biological weapons asked in 2004.** Indicates only 4 possibilities posed. *** Indicates query about North Korea becoming a nuclear power, asked in 2004, rank out of 12.

Table 11
Threat from Iraq and US Motives

<i>Country</i>	<i>Developing WMD 6/02</i>	<i>Substantial Danger 7- 10/02</i>	<i>Removal Saddam Necessary 11/02</i>	<i>Great Danger ME Stability 11/02</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>US Motivated By Perceived Threat 11/02</i>
West Europe						
UK	3	3	3	-1	2	
France	3	2	2	-2	1.3	-3
Germany	3	3	3	-1	2	-1
Italy	3				3	0
Neth.	3				3	
North America						
East Europe						
Poland	3				3	
Russia		2	1	-2	.3	-3
Ukraine						
Conflict Area						
Turkey		0	0	-2	-.7	-1

Table 12
Assessing the Iraq Venture

<i>Country</i>	<i>U.S. Justified, War Worth It 2003-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For Terror-ism & World Safety 2002-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For IR System 2003-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For ME 2002-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For Iraqi People 2003-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>Avg.</i>	<i>Support for Military Participation 2002- 05 Score (No. of Queries)</i>
West Europe							
Austria	-2.5 (2)	-3 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.5	-2 (1)
Belgium	-3 (1)					-3	-1 (1)
Denmark	1.5 (2)	-2 (2)	-1.5 (2)	0 (1)		-5	3 (1)
Finland	-2 (2)	-2.5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-2 (1)		-2	0(1)
UK	.3 (3)	-1.4 (5)	-8 (5)	1 (6)	1.5 (6)	.1	0 (3)
France	-2.8 (4)	-2.6 (5)	-2 (5)	-5 (6)	.7 (6)	-1.4	-2.3 (3)
Germany	-2.3 (3)	-2.5 (4)	-2 (5)	0 (6)	.3 (6)	-1.3	-2.3 (3)
Italy	-1.5 (2)			1.3 (3)	.7 (3)	.2	-1.3 (3)
Greece	-3 (2)	-3 (2)	-5 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.4	-2 (1)
Iceland	-1 (1)	-2 (2)	0 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.3	
Ireland	-1 (13)					-1	2 (1)
Lux	-3 (1)					-3	-1 (1)
Neth.	0 (3)	-1.5 (2)	-1.5 (2)	0 (1)		-8	2 (1)
Portugal	-2 (3)	-1 (2)	-5 (2)	0 (1)		-9	-1 (1)
Spain	-2.7 (3)	-2.3 (3)	-1.5 (2)	-3 (4)	.3 (4)	-1.3	-2 (2)
Sweden	-1 (1)					-1	1 (1)
Switz.	-2 (1)	-3 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.4	
North America							
Canada	-1 (2)	-1.3 (3)	-1.5 (2)	-7 (3)	1.7 (3)	-6	-3 (1)
Latin America							
Argentina	-3 (1)	-3 (2)	-2 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.8	-3 (1)
Brazil				1 (2)	-1.3 (3)	-2	-3 (1)
Chile							-3 (1)
Columbia	-2 (1)	-2.5 (2)	-1 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.9	
Ecuador	-2 (1)	-2.5 (2)	-5 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.8	
Mexico	-3 (1)	-3 (1)				-3	-3 (1)
Uruguay	-3 (1)	-3 (2)	-2.5 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.9	
East Europe							
Albania	2 (1)	.5 (2)	1.5 (2)	0 (1)		1	
Bulgaria	-1 (1)	-1.5 (2)	.5 (2)	-1 (1)		-8	
Estonia	-1 (1)	-2 (2)	-2 (2)	-1 (1)		-1.5	
Georgia	0 (1)	-1.5 (2)	0 (2)	-2 (1)		-9	
Kosovo	3 (1)	2 (2)	.5 (2)	-2 (1)		.9	
Latvia	-2 (1)	-3 (2)	-1 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.3	
Lithuania	0 (1)	-1 (2)	-5 (2)	-1 (1)		-6	
Macedonia	-2 (1)	-2.5 (2)	0 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.6	
Poland	-1 (2)	-1 (2)	-5 (2)	.5 (2)	2 (1)	0	-2.5 (2)
Russia	-2 (2)	-2.8 (4)	-1.6 (5)	-8 (5)	-1.7 (6)	-1.8	-3 (2)
Serbia	-3 (1)	-2 (2)	-1 (2)			-2	
Conflict Area							
Israel	2.5 (2)	2 (1)		2 (2)	0 (2)	1.6	
Jordan		-1 (1)	-2 (3)	-2.3 (3)	-2.8 (4)	-2	
Kuwait				1 (2)	1 (2)	1	
Lebanon				-1 (2)	-2.5 (2)	-1.8	-3 (1)
Morocco		-3 (1)	-1.7 (3)	-7 (3)	-2.4 (5)	-2	
Pakistan	-3 (1)	-2.3 (3)	-2 (5)	-2 (4)	-2.4 (5)	-2.3	
Turkey	-2 (1)	-2.5 (4)	-2 (5)	-1.2 (6)	-1.5 (6)	-1.8	-3 (1)
Asia							
Australia	2 (1)	-1.5 (2)	-1 (2)	0 (2)	2 (1)	.3	=1 (1)
China							-2 (1)
India	-2 (1)	-2 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.9	-2 (1)
Indonesia				-3 (1)	-3 (2)	-3	-3 (1)

Table 12 – continued
Assessing the Iraq Venture

<i>Country</i>	<i>U.S. Justified, War Worth It 2003-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For Terror- ism & World Safety 2002-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For IR System For ME 2002-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>For Iraqi People 04 Score (No. 2003-04 Score (No. of Queries)</i>	<i>Avg.</i>	<i>Support for Military Participation 2002- 05 Score (No. of Queries)</i>
Asia – cont'd						
Japan	-2 (2)	-3 (3)	-2 (2)	-2 (1)	-2.3	-1 (1)
Malaysia	-3 (1)	-1.5 (2)	-1 (2)	-2 (1)	-1.9	
NZ	0 (1)	-2 (2)	-1 (2)	0 (1)	-.8	
Phil.	1 (1)	0 (2)	.5 (2)	-1 (1)	.1	-1 (1)
ROK	-2.5 (2)	-1.7 (3)	-2.5 (2)	-5 (2)	-3 (2)	-2.4
Vietnam	-3 (1)	-5 (2)	-2 (2)	-3 (1)		-2.6
Africa						
Cameroon	-1 (1)	-2 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.6
Kenya	-1 (1)	-2 (2)	-1 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.5
Nigeria	0 (1)	-5 (2)	.5 (2)	0 (2)	1 (2)	.2
So Africa	-1 (1)	-2 (2)	-1.5 (2)	-1 (1)		-1.4
Uganda	-1 (1)	-1.5 (2)	-1 (2)	-2 (1)		-1.4

Table 13
Participation in the Reconstruction of Iraq

<i>Country</i>	<i>Others, not just US & allies Help Pay 4-5/03</i>	<i>EU, Country Help Pay Rebuilding 10/03 (No. of queries)</i>	<i>Country Help Pay Rebuilding 10/03</i>	<i>EU Manage Reconstruction 10/03</i>	<i>Country Send Hum. Aid 10/03</i>	<i>EU Help Establish Iraqi Govt. 10/03</i>	<i>EU Manage Transition to Sovereignty 10/03</i>	<i>EU Guarantee Security 10/03</i>
West Europe								
Austria	-3	-2.5 (2)	-2	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Belgium		-1.5 (2)	-1	-1	3	3	-1	-3
Denmark	2	.5 (2)	3	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Finland	-3	-2.5 (2)	-2	-3	2	3	-3	-3
UK	0	.5 (2)	2	-2	3	3	-2	-3
France	-1	-1.5 (2)	0	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Germany	-1	-1.5 (2)	-1	-1	2	3	-1	-3
Italy		-.5 (2)	2	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Greece	-3	-1.5 (2)	0	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Ireland		-1.5 (2)	0	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Lux		-1 (2)	1	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Neth.	0	-.5 (2)	2	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Portugal	-2	-2.5 (2)	-2	-3	2	3	-3	-3
Spain	-1	-1 (2)	1	-3	3	3	-3	-3
Sweden		-1 (2)	1	-3	3	3	-3	-3
North America								
Canada	1							
Latin America								
Argentina	-3							
Columbia	-2							
Ecuador	-2							
Uruguay	-3							
East Europe								
Albania	3							
Bulgaria	-2							
Estonia	-3							
Georgia	0							
Kosovo	-2							
Latvia	-3							
Lithuania	-3							
Macedonia	-3							
Poland	-2							
Russia	-3					2		
Serbia	0							
Conflict Area								
Pakistan	-2						-2	
Turkey	-1						-2	
Asia								
Australia	0							
India	-1							
Japan	3							
Malaysia	-2							
Phil.	-2							
Rok	0							
Vietnam	-3							
Africa								
Cameroon	-2							
Kenya	-1							
Nigeria	0							
So Africa	-2							
Uganda	-2							

Table 14
UN and U.S. Roles in the Reconstruction of Iraq

<i>Country</i>	<i>UN Role Important 4- 5/03</i>	<i>UN / US Provide Security 10/03</i>	<i>UN / US Manage Transition to Sovereignty 10/03</i>	<i>UN / US Manage Trans-Re- Building 10/03</i>	<i>Avg. UN</i>	<i>Avg. US</i>	<i>UN / US Finance</i>
West Europe							
Austria		1/-3	1/-3	1/-3	1	-3	-2/3
Belgium		1/-3	1/-3	1/-3	1	-3	-1/2
Denmark		1/-3	1/-3	2/-3	1.3	-3	0/1
Finland		2/-3	2/-3	2/-3	2	-3	-2/2
UK	1	1/-3	2/-3	2/-3	1.5	-3	1/1
France	1	2/-3	1/-3	0/-3	1	-3	-1/1
Germany	0	1/-3	2/-3	2/-3	1.3	-3	1/3
Italy	0	1/-3	0/-3	-1/-3	0	-3	-1/0
Greece		1/-3	0/-3	-1/-3	0	0	-2/1
Ireland		1/-3	1/-3	2/-3	1.3	-3	-1/1
Lux		1/-3	1/-3	0/-3	.7	-3	-2/2
Neth.		1/-3	1/-3	1/-3	1	-3	0/0
Portugal		0/-3	0/-3	0/-3	0	-3	-2/1
Spain	1	1/-3	0/-3	0/-3	.5	-3	-2/1
Sweden		2/-3	2/-3	2/-3	2	-3	-1/2
North America							
Canada	0						
Latin America							
Brazil	2						
East Europe							
Russia	2						
Conflict Area							
Israel	3						
Jordan	3						
Kuwait	0						
Lebanon	2						
Morocco	1						
Pakistan	2						
Pal Auth	3						
Turkey	1						
Asia							
Australia	1						
Indonesia	1						
ROK	2						

Table 15
Participate with U.S. in Military Action under Certain Conditions 6/2002

	<i>WMD + UN OK + Few Western Casualties</i>	<i>WMD w/out UN OK + Few Western Casualties</i>	<i>WMD + UN OK + Many Western Casualties</i>	<i>WMD w/out UN OK + Many Western Casualties</i>
Germany	0	-2	-2	-2
Britain	2	-1	2	-1
Italy	2	-1	2	-1
France	1	-2	2	0
Netherlands	2	-2	2	-1
Poland	1	-1	-1	-2
	<i>Aid Bin Laden + UN OK + Few Western Casualties</i>	<i>Aid Bin Laden w/out UN OK + Few Western Casualties</i>	<i>Aid Bin Laden + UN OK + Many Western Casualties</i>	<i>Aid Bin Laden w/out UN OK + Many Western Casualties</i>
Germany	-1	-2	-1	-2
Britain	2	-2	3	-1
Italy	0	-2	0	-2
France	1	-2	1	-1
Netherlands	1	-2	1	-1
Poland	0	0	0	-2

Table 16
The Problem of WMD and the U.S. in Iraq

	The U.S. in Iraq						
	<i>Massively Supportive</i>	<i>Predominantly Supportive</i>	<i>Supportive</i>	<i>Split</i>	<i>Rejectionist</i>	<i>Predominantly Rejectionist</i>	<i>Massively Rejectionist</i>
<i>Massively Supportive</i>					Ireland, Portugal, Lithuania.	Greece	
<i>Predominantly Supportive</i>				Denmark, UK, Italy	Neth., Spain, Sweden	Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, Japan	Lux., Mexico
<i>Supportive</i>			Poland				Austria, Belgium
<i>Split</i>				Philippines,	France, Germany, Bulgaria, Uganda	Finland, Brazil, Lebanon, Pakistan	
<i>Rejectionist</i>				Bolivia	South Africa	Russia, India, ROK	Argentina
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist</i>					Canada	Jordan	Vietnam
<i>Massively Rejectionist</i>				Kenya			Indonesia,

Notes: Based on average opinion columns in Tables 10 and 12.

Table 17
The Problem of Terrorism and the U.S. Response

	The US Response						
	<i>Massively Supportive</i>	<i>Predominantly Supportive</i>	<i>Supportive</i>	<i>Split</i>	<i>Rejectionist</i>	<i>Predominantly Rejectionist</i>	<i>Massively Rejectionist</i>
<i>Massively Supportive</i>	India, Philippines,	Hungary, Malta, Romania,	Mexico,		Bangladesh		
<i>Predominantly Supportive</i>	Peru, Czech Rep.,	Estonia, Lith., Poland, Russia	UK, Italy, Latvia	Slovenia,	Spain	Argentina, Cyprus,	
<i>Supportive</i>	Guat., Hond., Venez., Bulg., Ivory Coast	Denm., Bolivia, Slovakia, Uganda	Neth.	France, Germ., Portugal, Brazil			
<i>Split</i>	Uzbekistan	Japan, Angola	Ireland	Belgium, Finland, Lux.	Austria, Turkey	Indonesia	Greece, Pakistan
<i>Rejectionist</i>	Kenya	Sweden	South Africa				
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist</i>	Ukraine	Vietnam, Ghana	Tanzania			ROK, Senegal	
<i>Massively Rejectionist</i>		Canada				Morocco	Jordan

*Note: Based on average columns in Tables 7 and 8.

Table 18
An Integrative View of Attitudes toward America

	The US as a Role Model						
	<i>Massively Supportive</i>	<i>Predominantly Supportive</i>	<i>Supportive</i>	<i>Split</i>	<i>Rejectionist</i>	<i>Predominantly Rejectionist</i>	<i>Massively Rejectionist</i>
US Foreign Policies		Philippines					
		Nigeria	Israel, Uzbekistan	Kuwait			
		Ghana, Uganda	Guat, Hond., Venez., S. Africa	Vietnam, Angola, Mali, Tanzania			
		Ivory Coast	Kenya	Poland	India		
				Bulgaria, Japan, ROK	UK, Italy, Czech Rep., Indonesia,	Mexico	Bolivia, Brazil,
				Ukraine	Peru, Russia, Lebanon, Morocco, Senegal	Canada, Australia	France, Germ., Spain, Egypt, Pakistan,
						Jordan	Argentina, Turkey, Palestinian Authority

Notes: Based on average opinion columns in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 19
Basis for Negativism about U.S. World Role

Cell in 7A (Foreign Policies / Role Model)	<i>Massively Not Basic</i>	<i>Predominantly Not Basic</i>	<i>Not Basic</i>	<i>Split</i>	<i>Basic</i>	<i>Predominantly Basic</i>
<i>Split/Supportive</i>		Poland				
<i>Split/Split</i>		India				
<i>Rejectionist/ Supportive</i>			Bulgaria, Japan			ROK
<i>Rejectionist/ Split</i>		UK,	Italy			Czech Rep., Indonesia
<i>Rejectionist/ Rejectionist</i>			Mexico			
<i>Rejectionist/ Predominantly Rejectionist</i>		Brazil		Bolivia		
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist/ Supportive</i>		Ukraine				
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist/ Split</i>	Morocco	Peru	Russia, Lebanon		Senegal	
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist/ Rejectionist</i>		Canada	Australia			
<i>Predominantly Rejectionist/ Predominantly Rejectionist</i>	France	Germany, Pakistan	Spain, Egypt			
<i>Massively Rejectionist/ Predominantly Rejectionist</i>		Argentina	Turkey			

Notes: Based on results from Table 18 and "Problems Bush..." column of Table 6.

Appendix B: Public Opinion Sources

Samples are national ones unless specifically indicated.

Data are drawn from Bobrow and Boyer 2005 and from the following survey sources.

Americans & the World. 2002. Conflict with Iraq. http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/Conflict_Iraq/disarmInsp.cfm.

BBC World Service Poll. 2005. <http://www.pipa.org/onlinereport/BBCworld>. Polling November, 2004-January, 2005. Urban/major metropolitan samples in Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, Turkey.

BBC World Service. 2005. 23-Country Poll Finds Strong Support for Dramatic Changes at UN and for Increased UN Power. <http://www.pipa.org>. Polling Nov. 2004-Jan. 2005. Urban/metropolitan in Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey.

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. 2004. Global Views 2004. Comparing South Korean and American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. <http://www.cfr.org>. Polling July 2004.

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Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund. 2002. Worldview 2002: Comparing American and European Public Opinion. <http://www.worldviews.org>. Polling June, 2002.

European Commission. 2004. EUROBAROMETER: Public Opinion in the European Union. No. 61. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. Polling Feb.- March, 2004.

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- _____. 2001. FLASH EUROBAROMETER: Europeans and the International Crisis. No. 114. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch.htm. Polling Nov., 2001.
- Gallup International. 2004. US Foreign Policy Effect: An Overall Negative Opinion Across the World. <http://www.voice-of-people>. Polling Dec., 2003.
- _____. 2003. New Gallup International Post War Iraq Poll—Global Opinion from 45 Countries. <http://www.gallupinternational.com>. Polling April-May, 2003.
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- _____. 2002. Voice of the People, Poverty and Not Terrorism is the Most Important Problem Facing the World. <http://www.voice-of-people>. Polling July-Aug., 2002. Same less than national samples as in previous item.
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