Urban humanitarian challenges and the way forward
A case study analysis on humanitarian assistance in Beirut, Zamzam Camp and Kathmandu
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URBAN HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD

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Executive Summary

Humanitarian and developmental actors find themselves embedded within differing political, social and economic contexts. However, they often lack knowledge of challenges inherent to these contexts and are pre-existent to a crisis.

The following case studies illustrate such diverging contexts and preconditions. This policy brief will provide recommendations aiming at acknowledging the specific capabilities of humanitarians in varying contexts by focusing on available tools and mechanisms to provide sustainable solutions. The results then allow for the identification of relevant categories of recommendations in general for urban humanitarian aid.

Since the offset of the Syrian crisis, the Central Urban Areas formed by Mount Lebanon and Beirut have seen increased numbers of Syrian refugees. In Beirut governorate alone, 305,687 Syrians arrived (March 2016 est. UNHCR). The continuing of the Syrian crisis has exhausted refugees’ resources and has put an increased pressure on initially welcoming host communities. This crisis has evolved into an urban crisis within Beirut and Mount Lebanon and has put additional pressure on public service delivery within these areas that are already characterized by high rates of urbanization, having the highest density of population.\(^1\) The situation of Syrian refugees has deteriorated due to pre-existent and current urban challenges with regards to specifically increased labor market competition, lacking affordable and adequate shelter and increased negative coping mechanisms. Host-refugee relations are worsening given the severe living conditions of impoverished Lebanese communities who feel being neglected when compared to the influx of humanitarian assistance targeted as *de facto* refugees.

Zamzam is one of the biggest camps in North Darfur. It has grown more than double in size, manifested through a chaotic urbanization that directly influences the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. Some of the most important problems of Zamzam include the challenging physical, and environmental realities of the camp to the economic, health and social problems generated by its troublesome size and, at the same time, the dependency of the camp on humanitarian aid and urban economy. In a protracted situation of this magnitude, humanitarian assistance becomes unsustainable due to the changing environment and the changing needs of the people. Therefore, the most important issues that humanitarians should try to tackle is how to better respond (or prevent) the urbanization tendencies of the camp and how to ensure the sustainability of those new economic and social landscapes of the camp. Potential solutions should focus on connecting the existing economic and social networks with local and national institutions, investment in urban planning and new technologies and the combination of existing solutions (return, integration and resettlement) with a long-term perspective.

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Kathmandu with its more than one million inhabitants is the capital and largest municipality of Nepal. It is at the center of the country’s biggest urban conglomeration Kathmandu Valley and is one of the fastest growing urban areas in South Asia. Nepal depends strongly on foreign development aid accounting for more than five percent of annual GDP. Money has been invested to build up the country’s economy and infrastructure. In 2010, 25.2 percent of the population lived below national poverty lines. It is the world’s most earthquake prone city and on April 25, 2015 an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale struck 81 km north-west of Kathmandu. Nearly 9,000 people were killed, and up to one million houses destroyed. Urbanization in Kathmandu is characterized by high speed, informal and unplanned development and uncontrolled filling of open spaces. A government stable enough to foster timely recovery is now in place after a decade of political turmoil due to the introduction of a new constitution. However, governmental efforts center on dealing with the political opposition which strongly delays recovery. An area-based approach with community driven decision-making should be employed also to address the lack of knowledge of numerous agencies regarding the specific local needs and issues of local governance and capacity.

Recommendations drawn from these case studies for revising current approaches in urban humanitarian assistance include:

• investing in capacity building for humanitarian practitioners, local and national governance structures including trainings, tool kits, technologies
• creating sufficient communication links with local actors prior to potential disasters and further investments in prevention; creating country profiles based on potential vulnerabilities and increasing knowledge of the existing institutions and structures
• involving people at risk in local and national legislative processes and enforcement
• investing in technological solutions; mapping, informational tools, online, platforms and smart urban planning solutions
• finding funding mechanisms enabling multi-year planning and providing financial incentives to local authorities
Introduction

“Rampant urbanization is without doubt one of the major challenges of our century.”

Due to internal and external migration, 180,000 people move to cities every day. While in 1950 the urban population was 746 million, it increased to 3.9 billion in 2014. In the same year, urban settings were home to 54 percent of the world’s population, compared to 30 percent in 1950. Most large urbanized clusters are located in the global South and 41 cities will have more than 10 million inhabitants in 2030. More than 80 percent of the world’s population will live in urban agglomerations. Asia and Africa will account for close to 90 percent of the boost.

This does not only have consequences for the urban conglomerations themselves. Urban and non-urban areas are interdependent. Rural areas often depend on services and markets provided by urban settings. High rates of internal displacement from rural to urban areas are partly driven by urban opportunities. In 2011, internally displaced persons (IDPs) amounted to a total of 26.4 million, refugees to 10.4 million. The majority of international migrants pass through urban areas. However, the increased usage of the word ‘crisis’ for the arrival of a large influx of refugees to a host-country, is illustrative for the unpreparedness of many cities to changes in their urban and social fabric. Issues of uncontrolled urbanization include problems for local administrations, unaffordable housing and construction practices, tensions between different groups, pressure on resources, services issues such as waste management, water, sanitation and hygiene and electricity. These issues are often intensified by pre-existing challenges.

Most affected are the already vulnerable parts of society. Close to one billion people live in slums. The number is expected to rise to two billion within the next 15 years. In addition to challenges created by migration, their living situation is more and more affected by natural hazards and climate change. Nearly 285 million people live in earthquake prone urban areas.

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storm force affects 157 million. Especially low-income households and residents of informal settlements lack the capacities and networks for adequate risk reduction, management and recovery.

Natural and man-made disasters increasingly affecting urban areas raise the need for adequate humanitarian and development response. Solutions and approaches developed by the international community, however, are only slowly adapting to these new complex urban environments. Examples are Port-au-Prince (Haiti), Syria, Kabul, the Philippines, Palestine, Gaza or Mogadishu. Methods are still largely based on rural contexts and camps and humanitarian agencies often lack understanding of an urban context and adequate technical solutions. However, with growing global urbanization and in the perspective of ever-shrinking resources, the need for humanitarian and development response effectively adapted to urban contexts rises.

Building on the current discussion on urbanized humanitarian and development work, this policy brief will present three case studies exemplifying different scenarios. The city of Beirut is facing major urban challenges due to the large influx of Syrian refugees. Zamzam initially envisioned as a temporary IDP camp is slowly transforming into a permanent urban setting. Kathmandu is the world’s most earthquake prone city. Recommendations will be provided for revising existing approaches taking into account the legal dimension, the development and humanitarian agenda, the embedding of urban-rural access and the role of the domestic political context.

This report reconfirms the criticism raised in the current debate on humanitarian and developmental assistance and is attributing with a critical assessment of three cases. Solutions and approaches must be adapted to the local context. ‘Best practice’ blue prints do not work. In order to do so, coordination between local, national and international actors and between clusters themselves needs to be revised and enhanced and capacity building for local and national government bodies and organizations is crucial. Moreover, humanitarian and developmental actors should acknowledge the jurisdiction of the concerned host countries when providing assistance. Finally, structures established should aim at ultimately being self-sustained to decrease the risk of permanent donor reliance of affected countries.

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Case Studies

1. Beirut, Lebanon: The Urban Impact of the Syrian Crisis in Beirut

Background Information

Lebanon is challenged by an increased pressure on its overstressed service delivery system and responding to the needs of Syrian refugees. (Pre)-existing legal, political and social-economic conditions of the different regions in Lebanon have affected these responses significantly. The large concentration of Syrian refugees within an already impoverished Beqaa and North Lebanon, the primary destination of refugees, has negatively affected both host communities and Syrian refugees in these areas. Decreased resilience and changed host-refugee relations are reflected within public perceptions on Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees are increasingly perceived as a security threat by the Lebanese population as indicated by a survey in 2013 by the International Alert and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS). However, it is important to mention that this public perception is historically embedded within the Syrian occupation of Lebanon from 1976-2005.\footnote{“Citizens perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon”. International Alert. February 2015. \url{http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Lebanon_SSRSyrianRefugees_EN_2015.pdf}}

Lebanon remained a politically volatile country since its 15-year Civil War, which is exacerbated by an easy access to weapons, ongoing sectarian divisions, along with an endemic weakness of the Lebanese state.\footnote{Madoré, Marianne. "The Peaceful Settlement of Syrian Refugees in the Eastern suburbs of Beirut: Understanding the causes of social stability". \textit{Civil Society Knowledge Center}. Lebanon Support. March 1 2016. \url{http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/paper/peaceful-settlement-syrian-refugees-eastern-suburbs-beirut-understanding-causes-social}} The sectarian balance in Lebanon is a critical issue and is characterized by a power-sharing formula which resulted from the Taif Agreement in 1989 after the end of the civil war. Syria’s demographics differ from the Lebanese’. Hence, the arrival of the majority Sunni refugees from Syria has changed Lebanon’s demographics. However, to what extent this is perceived as a threat differs per region. Also, different perceptions are observed.

Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and has not signed its 1976 Protocol. In general, Lebanon’s position is that it is not a final destination for refugees and country for asylum, or resettlement. Individuals that have fled to Lebanon are addressed as displaced, which is not in line with the UN’s statement, addressing civilians who have fled from Syria as refugees. Moreover, perceiving Syrian refugees as temporary settlers has caused new urban challenges given the likelihood of the continuation of the Syrian crisis, which has evolved into a protracted crisis.
among Christian and Shia areas within Lebanon.\(^{14}\)

Unstable politics, and ineffective government structures and decision-making processes have resulted in low public trust and a rather passive central level governmental approach to the Syrian crisis. The lacking responsiveness of the Directorate General of Urban Planning (DGUP) and the Council of Development and Reconstruction (CDR), have complicated developmental assistance.\(^{15}\)

With municipalities and Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) acting as the main decision-makers in responding to the Syrian crisis, a shift has occurred from Lebanese central level governmental actors to local level governmental actors. 51 Municipal Unions have been formed, which are a joint collaboration between 750 municipalities within Lebanon (2/3 of the total). Also, Regional Technical Offices (RTOS) have been established by UN-Habitat at the Union level to strengthen the UoMs capacities.\(^{16}\) However, local authorities have not been systematically included by UNHCR, which has been responsible for coordinating responses.\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, new enhanced efforts have been made under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LRCP) 2015-2016 to include municipalities in strengthening the capacity of both national and local service delivery systems.

The LRCP has been coordinated by the UN (77 international organizations) together with the Government of Lebanon to ensure equity within humanitarian responses and addressing the needs of both displaced Syrians and other vulnerable groups such as the poorest Lebanese. Besides this, the LRCP seeks to reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, environmental, and institutional stability. In order to reach these aims, a $2.14 billion plan has been made focusing on e.g. providing food assistance, shelter- and protection assistance, education, improving infrastructure, and supporting technical training.

\(^{14}\) “Citizens’ perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon”,  

\(^{15}\) Boustani, Marwa. "Enhancing Municipal Capacities: From Emergency Response to Planning".  

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
Urban Challenges

A total number of 8,680 households has been registered by UNHCR by the end of January 2016 as residing in Beirut. Beirut is currently facing an influx of refugees in vulnerable and mostly impoverished living environments, so called ‘poverty within poverty’. This concentration of both the Lebanese poor and refugees in already vulnerable neighborhoods has been the result of larger urban planning and rebuilding processes within Beirut after a 15-year Civil War, which has destroyed much of the city’s infrastructure. Although, the reconstruction of Beirut by real-estate developers has given back much of down-town Beirut’s pre-war allure, it has not been reconstructed to host the urban poor. Consequently, refugees have settled in the poor suburban quarters of Beirut: Bourj Hammoud, Tariq al-Jadida, and Dahie.18

Labor Market

The influx of Syrian refugees and this additional labor supply has worsened the employment situation and competition on the Lebanese labor market has increased due to the high number of Syrian unskilled workers with low educational attainment and high willingness to work under problematic working conditions. This additional workforce is threatening Lebanese workers, specifically in the fields of agriculture, construction and to a lesser extent, service sector. Moreover, the increase in labor supply and a higher unemployment rate has caused a decline in overall wages for Lebanese nationals, fueling tensions between Syrians and Lebanese.20

Syrian refugees have joined Syrian workers and have settled in urban areas with low-skilled economic activities. Participation rates of Syrian refugees are low, specifically among women and unemployment rates are high as indicated by a survey of the ILO Regional Office of the Arab states in 2014. However, economic activity varies per location. Beirut and Mount Lebanon are considered economically better off when compared to other governorates. The highest participation rates of refugees are seen within South Lebanon (61 percent) and the lowest in Akkar (50 percent).21

21 Ibid.
The legal status of Syrian refugees is an important constraint to their access to economic opportunities and services. Also, confusion exists surrounding regulations applying to Syrians with regards to their entry, stay, employment, property- and ownership rights. The bilateral agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation of 1993 between Lebanon and Syria, which stated that nationals of both countries were granted freedom to stay, work and carry out economic activities, initially allowed Syrian refugees to work in Lebanon. However, this right has been suspended in 2015 following social unrest and problems with public services provision. In order to obtain a residence permit, displaced Syrians are now required to sign a pledge not to engage in economic activities. The legal status of Syrian refugees shifts to ‘migrant workers’ in case they are able to obtain sponsorship and a work permit. However, these work permits are often not renewed. Also, work permits vary per sector and more financial constraints exist outside of ‘third sector jobs’ such as agriculture, construction, and cleaning service. Outside of this third sector, employers must first prove their inability to find a skilled Lebanese worker for the given job before requesting a permit for a Syrian worker.22

These legal issues have forced Syrian refugees to enter the labor market informally. Moreover, Syrian workers are mainly engaged in occupations that provide little social protection, job security, or income. According to the ILO, instances of humiliation at the workplace are common and their extremely weak bargaining position has caused that refugees are willing to take any job at lower wages when compared to their Lebanese counterparts. Hence, chances of exploitation by employers are high.23 The extended displacement of Syrian refugees had exhausted their resources and has put pressure on host communities, while increasing vulnerability among both refugees and Lebanese communities.24 Women-headed households are among the most vulnerable within society and are severely limited to leading a dignified life, struggling with their caring responsibilities at home and a disadvantaged position on the labor market.25

To address some of these problems, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) operated from Livelihood Centers in Mount Lebanon and Akkar to generate employment opportunities for both refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. Also, under the LCRP 2015-2016 the need for establishing income opportunities and the need for job creation for vulnerable communities has been addressed by supporting economic activities and strengthen labor market governance. Lebanese businesses receive support under this governmental plan to improve

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23 “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile. International Labor Organization Regional Office for the Arab States. 2014.
labor standards, and dialogues are promoted to mitigate tensions. However, more attention for the legal situation of refugees will be needed in order to make serious improvements.\footnote{26 United Nations and Government of Lebanon. “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016”. \textit{UN OCHA}. 15 December 2014. \url{http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php}.}

\textit{Accommodation}

The Lebanese governmental ‘no camp policy’, which has prohibited the creation of refugee camps and tented settlements for refugees, and the continuing of the crisis have resulted into a move of Syrian refugees to informal settlements.\footnote{27 Kukreti, Nupur. Oxfam GB, and Issam Fares Institute of American University Beirut. “Poverty, Inequality, and social protection in Lebanon. \textit{Oxfam Novib}. January 2016.} An estimated 18 percent of Syrian refugees lives in informal settlements, and 58 percent in apartments, collective shelters and tented settlements, unfinished housed, garages, warehouses, or worksites in vulnerable and often volatile neighborhoods (see annex 3). This is different from rural areas where Syrian refugees have mostly settled within tented settlements.\footnote{28 Fawaz, Mona, Saghiyeh, Nizar, Nammour, Karim. “Housing, Land & Property Issues in Lebanon: Implications of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. UN Habitat & UNHCR. August 2014.}

Informal settlements are settlements where land is disputed and/or not legally registered, where the settlement is violating zoning regulations, or not meeting planning regulations and/or building standards.

Rental expenses make up for an estimated 50-60 of the monthly expenses of a family, which is creating new urban challenges. The rental market has obtained an exploitative character; Syrian refugees are often obliged to pay high prices for small shelters. As a result, for 41 percent of Syrians in Lebanon affordable and adequate shelter has become unavailable and this housing crisis has predated the arrival of Syrian refugees.\footnote{29 Ibid.} Exploitative relationships are established within the rising informal settlements between on the one hand property owners, realtors, slum lords and tenants on the other, further complicating the regulation of the housing market.\footnote{30 Ibid.} However, it should not be overlooked that informal housing is often the only alternative for low-income households and that this is therefore increasingly suggested as a solution to people’s housing by urban planners. It will be crucial to include this perspective to provide developmental assistance within urban areas.\footnote{31 Von Rabenau, Burkard. “Aleppo Urban Development Project: Report on Local Economic Development in Aleppo”. \textit{The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)}. 2009. \url{http://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/Rabenau_LED.pdf}}
Refugees, municipalities, and landlords are often not aware of their housing rights granted through Lebanese law. Without prior permission in Lebanon, Syrians have the right to own constructed, or non-constructed properties of less than 3,000 m². The disadvantaged position of Syrian refugees has been abused by landlords and their middle-men. This is especially of concern in neighborhoods where property-owners have left due to an increased refugee population within their area, and have allowed middle-men to manage their properties.

Within Mount Lebanon and Beirut, an estimated 300,000 Syrian refugees have settled. Beirut and Mount Lebanon are characterized by a high degree of socio-political diversity, hosting refugees within an urban setting in so-called upper class Achrafiye to mostly poor suburbs Bourj Hammoud, Tariq al-Jadida, and Dahiye (see annex 1), with Bourj Hammoud hosting an estimated 20,000 refugees since 2011. As a result, the current ratio of refugees compared to the local population is one out of five.

National and local actors have been rather absent in establishing coping mechanisms to provide adequate solutions to the shelter issue within overcrowded urban areas and shelter assistance has been provided mainly by international programs. Municipal actors vary in both their willingness and responsiveness to the housing needs of Syrian refugees. However, local authorities have expressed feeling bypassed by international organizations that directly distribute goods and services to refugees within their jurisdiction according to a report on housing land and property issued by UNCHR and UN Habitat in 2014. Thus, a closer collaboration between these governmental, humanitarian and developmental actors will be crucial in providing long-term rehabilitation options next to emergency shelter.

Coping Mechanisms

Increased vulnerability among Syrian refugees has resulted in a situation where 70 percent of the households are living below the poverty line, and 52 percent in extreme poverty according to UN-OCHA in 2015 (see annex 3). Refugees have adopted a range of worrying coping mechanisms to withstand stress and shocks and to deal with increased debts. The most commonly used strategy in 2015 to cope with stress is controlling expenditures by reducing e.g. food expenditures, meaning a reduction in the number of meals, quantity consumed, buying...
cheaper and lower quality food (soon to expire and damaged), and reducing meat products. This has serious implications for the growth and nutritional status of children.³⁶

Next to reducing food expenditures, expenditures are decreased, or ceased by withdrawing children from school (19 percent), and by deferring health expenses. Other coping strategies include: spending of savings (35 percent), selling of household goods (29 percent) and selling of productive assets (8 percent). While national estimates are unreliable, various international organizations have indicated that child labor is on the rise. This predated the crisis and is already traditionally seen in the Lebanese informal sector.³⁷ Specific attention has to be given to women and children in order to address coping strategies mostly adopted in urban areas such as child labor, child marriage, begging and prostitution.³⁸

Way Forward

The most needed short-term responses are related to providing the minimum requirements for refugees. The high number of Syrian refugees settling in informal settlements has complicated both locating refugees and providing efficient humanitarian and developmental assistance. Solutions should focus on mitigating the social and economic impact of the crisis to enable urban development.

Programming tools: Capacity Building & Cash Programming

New programming tools have already emerged within Lebanon that serve the purpose of both meeting the needs of families and benefitting local markets. UNHCR and partners have provided $575 USD via ATM cards to 87,700 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon from November 2013 to April 2014 with the aim of keeping people warm and dry during winter months. A report of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) that assessed the impact of this cash assistance has indicated that while such assistance does not meaningfully affect domestic pricing, it has significant multiplier effects on a local economy: every $1 spend by beneficiaries results in an increase of Lebanon’s GDP of $2.13.³⁹ It is of importance that new programming tools benefit local economies, which is crucial to improve public service delivery in both rural and urban areas.

³⁷ Ibid.
The ILO Regional Office of the Arab States has already urged to implement cash-for-work programs in sectors that are affected by the overcrowded living situation, such as solid waste management. These programs contribute to improving service delivery while providing income-earning opportunities through local job creation that mutually benefits both refugee and host communities. Moreover, capacity building should be promoted through skills enhancement programs, extending labor market information and statistics, and developing special programs that target youth, children and women.40

**Fundraising Mechanisms**

While Lebanon has been receiving humanitarian aid, funding levels have been insufficient to address both the short- and evolving long-term needs of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese host communities.41 Humanitarian assistance (cash and food assistance) compromises about 40 percent of a refugees’ household income, causing high income uncertainty. Syrian refugees have become increasingly reliant on humanitarian assistance to sustain their livelihoods due to the suspended rights to engage in economic activities since 2015.42 Also, while the prices of commodities and services have increased, humanitarian assistance has decreased due to funding constraints. Hence, the risk of high-aid dependency of Lebanon is of particular concern.43

The Decree-Law no.118 from 1977 provides municipalities with financial and administrative autonomy. However, in practice, the finances and administration are constrained and highly dependent on irregular payments of the Independent Municipal Fund, which is reflected in their limited capacities for service provision. Financing should directly target UoMs and municipalities, given that they are the most appropriate local partners in coordinating both humanitarian and developmental responses according to Marwa Boustani, an officer at UN Habitat in Lebanon.44

40 “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile. International Labor Organization Regional Office for the Arab States. 2014.
Creating transparency in international funding has been facilitated by databases such as the Activity Info Reporting Database and the Financial Tracking Service for the tracking of humanitarian aid flows. Humanitarian and developmental partners should collaborate more efficiently and rely on these tools to fill financial gaps. The LRCP is likely going to benefit from the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings of 2016 where the financing fragility of the Middle East has been addressed. Additional funding is needed in order to enhance national responses and address the needs of the high numbers of displaced within this region. It also offers opportunities to focus on strengthening urban preventions.
### Key Challenges

- Improving living conditions for both Lebanese and *de facto* refugees and reinsuring the “Do No Harm” principle of humanitarian intervention where equity is of importance,
- Providing humanitarian and developmental assistance which builds upon existing municipal resources by closely collaborating with Unions of Municipalities and Municipalities, and emerging informal support systems set up by sheikhs, anonymous supporters and local charities,
- Strengthening capacities of Unions of Municipalities and Municipalities, and enhance side-lining with the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LRCP),
- Adopt cash programming that promotes the local labor economy by introducing income generating opportunities via cash-for-work programming, small loans or grants, livelihood programs and emergency employment centers,
- Introducing efficient programming that targets the large share of Syrian *de facto* refugees which has settled in informal settlements, independently arranged accommodation, and rented apartments
- Increasing shelter assistance within urban areas in close collaboration with municipalities,
- Addressing refugees’ legal opportunities by informing municipalities, refugees and other involved economic actors upon their housing and working rights,
- Improve labor standards, and promote dialogue with regards to sharing space within divided cities to mitigate tensions,
- Moving from short-term relief into more strategic far-sighted development by mitigating the social and economic impact of the crisis.
2. Zamzam, Darfur, Sudan: A Case Study of Protracted Displacement

Background Information

The Camp

Zamzam is one of the largest camps for internally displaced persons in North Darfur. It is located 14 kilometers south of North Darfur’s Capital El Fasher and is crossed by one of the main roads going towards Nyala, a major city in South Darfur. Since 2013 estimates have placed the camp between 125,000 people and 160,000 people, reaching 180,000 in 2016. The protracted conflict in Darfur and the incoming refugees from South Sudan’s renewed violence continue to put pressure on the camp.\(^{45}\) The camp was initially created during the 2004 conflict, it expanded in 2009 and has become a permanent presence in the economy of the region, sustained by the aid economy and the unintended urbanization process.\(^{46}\) With three markets, a health clinic and around 30 small schools we could already talk about a variation of a city rather than a camp.\(^{47}\) All of these services are provided entirely through funding from international organizations. In this context, an exit situation, i.e. the withdrawal of the humanitarian assistance, is becoming increasingly hard to conceive due to the protracted nature of the displacement and to the level of embeddedness of the camp with its surroundings, the changes in people’s livelihoods and coping mechanisms and their changing roles and relations.\(^{48}\)

The challenges generated by the camp nowadays are related to its economic, environmental and political/social sustainability. The existence of the camp, on a land property that belongs to the state or a private entity, is in itself unsustainable as it leads to unsustainable exploitation of the most important natural resources (water, wood, soil, charcoal, oil, etc.) in the immediate surrounding and generates economic practices that create a type of dependency between the camp and its environment. These resources are then used to sustain and encourage the urban economy and urbanization of the camp (manifested through high density, urban infrastructure in terms of roads and buildings and type of economic activities – trade and other non-agricultural activities) and the region as most of these resources are used in the cities around. Finally, in the case of Darfur, the political sustainability is challenging because of the ethnic composition of the camps, as well as the phenomena of political apathy of the displaced\(^{49}\), choosing to solve problems through kinship means rather than using existing political institutions at local and national level.

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46 De Waal, “‘Do Darfur’s IDPs Have an Urban Future?’ Humanitarian Issues, Making Sense of Sudan: Urbanization,.”
48 UNDP, “In ZamZam Camp.”
49 Abdelmoneim, “Referendum Little Comfort for Darfur Displaced.”
The Conflict

The camp as well as the constant and increasing number of displaced people is fundamentally interrelated with the conflict. The nature of the conflict has a direct impact on the type of displacement and people’s coping mechanisms.

The sporadic nature of the conflict, involving multiple actors with different agendas, has led to it affecting all important aspects of the lives of Darfur people in terms of livelihoods, stock, security and land.\(^5^0\) For the nomads it has meant limited mobility or stolen cattle, for the pastoralists it has meant sporadic attacks on their livelihoods and forced occupation of their land and for all other people it has meant coping with the effects of a broken economy and the rise of a war elite and economy. Currently, the main drivers of war are land and exploitable resources related, opportunism and political fragility, with a strong ethnical background\(^5^1\).

The conflict, that has its roots from the beginnings of post-colonial and independent Sudan, experienced violent outbreak in 2003 and has since continued. In this older than a decade conflict there have been various attempts at negotiation and peace agreements\(^5^2\), in Abuja in 2006 and Doha in 2009. It was considered to be over with the peace agreement, the Doha Document for Peace (DDP), signed in July 2011 and in 2013. Some of DDP’s provisions tackle the issue of recovery and reconstruction of Darfur through the return, integration and compensation of the displaced and refugees and the construction of physical, institutional and social infrastructure in post-conflict Darfur. Yet, the most specific document on the assumed national responsibility for the protection and regulation of IDPs’ rights is the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons from 2009. It refers to IDPs as “person or group of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, as a result of natural or human-made disaster and have not crossed the Sudanese border”.\(^5^3\) It adds that they should be protected as well as their “freedom of movement, belonging to a family, access to food, water and sanitation, shelter, health, education, access to documentation, right of possession of property, civil rights, economic and employment opportunities, access to justices and all rights of citizenship stipulated in the INC”\(^5^4\) under the monitoring and supervision of The High Committee on IDPs of Sudan and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.


\(^{51}\) Bromwich, “Violence Over Land in Darfur Demands We Look Again at Links Between Natural Resources and Conflict.”

\(^{52}\) Young, The Fate of Sudan.

\(^{53}\) Republic of Sudan, “The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) - 2009.”

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 7.
The Displacement

Displacement in Sudan is predominantly of a protracted nature and the percentage of displaced people amounts to more than a third of the eight-nine million people population of Darfur.\(^\text{55}\) During the most intense years of the war, between 2003 and 2005, the number of internally displaced people rose to more than a million people, but until 2016 not only have the numbers not decreased but they have remained steady or increased. A visual representation of the yearly displacements shows how they are connected with the periods of heightened violence but also how they continue in periods of relative calm. Hence, understanding displacement and tackling displacement is one of the major issues in finding sustainable urban solutions to Zamzam and Darfur as a region in need.

![New displacements in Darfur by year](image)

Zamzam has seen its second generation being born in the camp, knowing nothing about rural life, having maintained no connection with their community and experiencing the provision of services and standard of life provided in the camp. This has profoundly shaped people’s attitudes towards return and resettlement.\(^\text{56}\)

The practice in Zamzam has shown that there were at least two phases in the displacement process. The first phase is the initial displaced people, driven by conflict, violence and looting. In this initial phase, the increase in the provision of services localized in IDP camps has become an attraction in time for other people, most disadvantaged but not necessarily displaced, with the development of urban economies and the prospect of job creation in urban areas, such as the big cities in close vicinity, Al Fasher and Nyala.\(^\text{57}\) These realities contradict the underlining


assumption of humanitarian response to displacement that portrays it as something “temporary” and “static”, preferring the camp to other solutions. The creation of camps, neglects the historical and cultural experience of people coping with forced migration in an active and creative manner, through seasonal migrations, combinations between nomadic livestock breeding and temporary activities in urban areas. Encouraging protracted displacement by the creation of the camp has led to both the continuation of these practices, intervening with the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and the encouragement of new practices, discouraging return. A new body of literature is increasingly trying to mainstream the understanding of displacement as a process, rather than an object, in which the solution of the camp comes out as restricting or enhancing people’s vulnerabilities.

Way Forward

Urbanization as a Solution to Recovery

Urbanization is perceived as both a threat and a solution to the camp’s situation. On one side, there are clear signs of urbanization, if we consider some of its characteristics: density, type of infrastructure, type of economic activities, access to resources and governance. This becomes worrisome if we take into consideration the fact that in itself, the constructions are fragile and weak, infrastructure, namely roads, water and sanitation is still an issue. Health issues are very hard to control in these type of settlements because of issues of access in the camp of constant supervision of mobile patients, and of control over the mobility of the people.

Urbanization can become a solution only for that segment of the population for which return and resettlement is impossible and that have lived in the camp for the last decade. Transforming the camp into a city seems a very unlikely solution currently, because of the density, the physical space, the exploitation of the land and resources, the land property issues, the divide between the communities and the lack of infrastructure and supervision by local authorities. Instead, urbanization should be considered in a broader sense, as connected to the development of the entire area, thus allowing the integration of those people in the urban settlements surrounding the camp and designing innovative ideas of how to use this labor force in the overall development of the region. At the same time, there should be a more localized and flexible understanding of solutions. In the case of Zamzam it could be a combination

58 Eltigani, War and Drought in Sudan; Ibrahim and Ruppert, “The Role of Rural-Rural Migration as a Survival Strategy in the Sahelian Zone of the Sudan - a Case-Study in Burush; N Darfur”; Eldin, “Internal Population Displacement in Sudan.”
59 Hammar, Displacement Economies in Africa; Bøås and Bjørkhaug, “The IDP Economy in Northern Uganda: A Prisoners’ Economy?”
60 OCHA, “Health Situation in North Darfur’s Zamzam Camp Deteriorating.”
between urbanization, return and resettlement and the encouragement of both urban and rural economies in a synergetic manner, while regarding the connection with the urban reality as inevitable. In this regard, providing solutions for those people that would prefer integration in cities can only be done through a strong collaboration with local authorities on issues of urban planning and long-term housing.

The more traditional solutions of return and resettlement provide a different set of challenges. They are still profoundly dependent on land property rights, on the existing economic possibilities and most importantly on security issues. Therefore, until the issue of land appropriation and the security of civilians are not guaranteed, any solution will be hard to sustain.

**Area-Based Approaches**

Zamzam, as an IDP camp, is under the full supervision of humanitarian organizations. Within the camp, there are various levels of governance, consisting of the sheiks, as leaders and male representatives of the various ethnic groups and communities, and the women’s groups. The next level of governance to which IDPs appeal is the Governor of North Darfur.

After the Darfur Peace Agreement, various committees and institutions were made responsible of the implementation of the DDR’s provisions, which should be enforced in the Five Year Development Plans designed by the State Government. These implementing authorities with whom humanitarian organizations should improve communication and coordination and to whom they should transfer some of the existing responsibilities are: The Darfur Regional Authority (DAR), Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), Darfur Land Commission (DLC), The Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission (VRRC) or the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC).

For real area-based approaches to work, international organizations should consult with and involve local authorities and operate under the existing umbrella of the Darfur Development Strategy and the Darfur Regional Authority (DAR), in a long-term and region based approach, that takes into consideration the reinforcement of local economies (for example the strengthening of livestock) and finds diverse solutions to existing urban economies based on exploitation (like charcoal and brick making).

Practice has shown that life in the camp contradicts the assumption that people’s lives stay still and regain full force only upon return. Within the camp there are both people surviving solely

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63 Bromwich, “Nexus Meets Crisis.”
on the aid packages, as well as those thriving through commerce or urban job creation. There are also those that take advantages of the vulnerabilities of the economy of aid to thrive and through exploiting these resources as well as other people within the camp. The development of displacement economies highlights the interconnected nature of the camp with other actors, with local authorities and with the political and economic climate of the area and nation.  

**Data Trends and Means**

There is insufficient holistic data. Lack of information about the real needs of displaced people and who the displaced are and where they live increases loses of aid and decreases the possibility of cost-effective intervention. This year, for example, the World Food Program (WFP) has finalized a two-year survey in North Darfur camps and has reached the conclusion that, in fact, a great percentage of people receiving food aid were not eligible. In Zamzam, this meant that almost 40 percent of the households assessed were not eligible for food aid anymore. The change announced by the WFP was almost immediate and will probably have strong consequences on the markets and the local economy. Equally, the coordination between the various types of profiles of the many humanitarian organizations could be integrated into one feature of the International Organization of Migration’s (IOM) data matrix, instead of multiple programs from multiple organizations.

Long-term thinking implies having a protocol of risk prevention. In the case of camps, this can be translated into data and technology use for the sustainable creation of future temporary settlements having in mind the possibility that they might become permanent. Before setting up the camp or deciding whether a camp or another settlement should be used, data about available resources (water, land, fuel), markets, local networks, types of economic activities should be an initial requirement.

**Coordination and Partnerships**

The issue of overlap and fragmentation of aid is a real problem in Darfur. But most important is the weakness in coordination of the various efforts for the common goal of recovery and development. A developmental framework implies a holistic approach that uses resources gradually with the goal of creating a structure that is capable to sustain itself. Coordination becomes extremely difficult in situations where there is a lack of long-term means of institutionalized learning. And this is not possible without the implication of local authorities and transmission of values and practices from humanitarian organizations, NGOs to local actors and local authorities. Coordination, in the case of Darfur, should not be limited to singular places or singular problems; rather they should focus on the complementarity of solutions in a territorial and embedded manner. The problems of IDP camps will be tackled when climate change, livestock and economic vulnerability and the formation of administrative and

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64 Hammar, *Displacement Economies in Africa.*

65 Dabanga, “North Darfur Displaced Reject Outcome of WFP Survey.”
institutional structures start forming and become functional and active, even within IDP camps. Coordination in certain instances can slowly lead to the transfer of responsibility and supervision to local authorities.

**Funding**

Since 2004 to the present, humanitarian funding ranged from 900 million to 400 or less in recent years. Considering this, the Darfuri authorities claim that the entire population is in some way affected by the conflict. Continuing year-by-year funding based on uncertain data of needs is unfeasible. The administrative and financial reality of Darfur, that receives less than half of other regions in Sudan from state revenues, makes funding a top-priority.

The most successful type of intervention has been using vouchers, such as the food vouchers and aid in the form of kits for various needs. Most of the aid goods have become a part of the local economy and many IDPs have become small traders involved in exchange or rent of some of these goods. Considering their ability to adapt and their coping mechanisms, a shift towards investments and microcredits could be a good start from relief to development approaches.

Most importantly, humanitarian organizations have to consider the fundamental shift towards multi-year planning, between three and ten years and the possibility of directing financial resources to the local government and provide supervision and evaluation in collaboration with other donors.

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66 Daun, “Rethinking Durable Solutions for IDPs in West Darfur.”
3. Kathmandu, Nepal: Urban Assistance in Disaster-Prone areas

Background Information

- Evaluating the creation of a camp as a last possible decision; use new data technology to evaluate the best position based on environmental and economic possibilities,
- Creating connections with local authorities through a protocol of transferring of responsibilities,
- Finding new, creative funding tools that direct financial resources both to local authorities as well as people,
- Investing in new technologies in communication, housing and sustainable exploitation of resources,
- Investing in research for the local understanding of IDPs and their changing needs and characteristics,
- Evaluating multiple solutions simultaneously, both return, integration and resettlement at the same time,
- Investing in creating units for urban planning in collaboration with local experts
- Greater involvement in political advocacy and legal issues related to land expropriation and compensations for IDPs,
- Better coordination tools between agencies and local authorities; using new data technologies for IDP tracking.

Kathmandu, capital of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, is the largest municipality of the country and the urban center of Kathmandu Valley, Nepal’s biggest urban conglomeration. It has the highest population density in Nepal. Out of the 28.17 million Nepalese, 2.5 million live in Kathmandu. The city is one of the fastest growing in South Asia. It is the country’s economic core. The World Bank categorizes Nepal as a low income country. In 2010, 25.2 percent of the population lived below national poverty lines. Since the 1950s, Nepal has depended strongly on foreign development aid, which accounts for more than five percent of annual GDP. Resources have been invested to build up the country’s economy and infrastructure. Since 2005, the country has received more than 6,000,000,000 USD. Nepal has undergone a decade of political turmoil surrounding the introduction of a new constitution. While a stable government is now in place, the opposition remains large and social, economic and access problems continue creating further instability. Bureaucratic structures are

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/36764_36764urbanpreparednesskathmandufull.pdf
69 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
extensive; staff is not elected but appointed. No local elections have taken place within the past 17 years.

Kathmandu is the world’s most earthquake prone city, the country is known for being at high seismic risk. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs collaborate with the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator for strategic coordination and consultation mechanisms for the central humanitarian partners. Key humanitarian actors include UN-Agencies, INGOs and the Red Cross movement who are involved and work towards coordination, policy development and decision-making. In 2006, the Nepal Inter-Agency Standing Committee was formed. The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium was established as a platform for the government, aid agencies, donors and international financial bodies in 2011.

Clusters are groups of humanitarian UN and non-UN organizations according to each of the main sectors of humanitarian action. They have clear responsibilities for coordination and provide clear points of contact in case of an emergency. Clusters are accountable for the delivery of adequate humanitarian work. They are established in case of clear humanitarian needs within a sector, numerous international, national and local actors within sectors and if national authorities need coordination support.

Clusters were merged with national sectoral coordination mechanisms, thus absorbing cluster functions. The cluster system was nationalized in 2013 meaning that clusters are under governmental leadership and management. Every agency has a national ministry counterpart. The National Emergency Operation Centre of the Ministry of Home Affairs plays a key role in disaster management at national level. Chief district officers and village development committees support the efforts. A disaster framework is in place assigning roles and responsibilities to the ministries.

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The Earthquake

On April 25, 2015 an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale struck 81 km north-west of Kathmandu (see Annex 7). Nearly 9,000 people were killed, and up to one million houses destroyed across the country.\(^{75}\) It was followed by severe aftershocks reaching the magnitude of 7.3 on May 12, 2015. Heavy investments had been made in preparedness especially within the eight months before the earthquake. Response had been reviewed taking into account former responses to floods and issues with traditional ways of responding in Nepal tackled. This included the deflation of the bloated architecture and the identification of accountability and responsibility gaps. While the impact of the 2015 earthquakes differed from what was expected, the challenges remained predictable.\(^{76}\)

Urban Challenges and Way Forward

Activation and Coordination

Immediate challenges included the mobilization and coordination of the international community in support of the government. Preparedness and familiarity with the local context facilitated coordination and actors were able to reach out far more quickly than in previous responses without an active cluster system. This saved up to one week. Most actors knew each other well due to the intensive preparations that had taken place in the months before the earthquake. Clusters and ministries were activated within five hours.

Upon governmental request coordination in Kathmandu was led by the government. International agencies focused on rural areas. It was crucial to take the local context into account. A closer alignment between local and international coordination and cluster structures is needed to avoid creating parallel streams. In the shelter cluster, the contingency plan including the emergency shelter design had only been agreed on by ten agencies. Most of the 120 agencies coming in, lacked knowledge of the scope designed, coordination agreements


\(^{76}\) Personal Communication C. Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium. Budapest. 02/05/2016.
and scenarios planned in the shelter cluster. Making the different actors work according to what had been agreed on in a local scheme remained challenging. Moreover, including non-traditional local actors such as religious organizations or schools into established coordination structures has been difficult.\textsuperscript{77}

**Relief and Recovery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Are you satisfied with what NGOs are doing for you after the earthquake?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative: 55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral: 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive: 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know: 3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Do you feel you have been heard?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative: 73%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral: 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive: 4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know: 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unheard: 1%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

After the earthquake and contrary to many other humanitarian interventions the amount of relief goods provided was not one of the problems of response. The help delivered, however, often did not meet people’s requirements. According to Community Survey conducted by the Inter-Agency Common Feedback Project, Kathmandu scored lowest in adequacy of government response.\textsuperscript{78} NGO-relief saw similar criticism. Participants in the Kathmandu Perception Reports also claimed that relief distribution was based on castes and political party affiliation. Relief was promised but never received and government and NGO plans remained unclear. Information sharing was insufficient leaving people without the required knowledge of where to register for support and which support they were eligible for.\textsuperscript{79} Distribution was described as based on a ‘first come first serve’ system.\textsuperscript{80}

Communication has to be two-ways to enable feedback and adjust relief and response to communities’ needs and wishes. Feedback mechanisms like the Community Perception Reports are strong tools that can serve this purpose. 100 Surveys were conducted per round on issues of health, relief, recovery and


\textsuperscript{79} See Community Perception Reports KATHMANDU.

\textsuperscript{80} See Community Perception Reports KATHMANDU.
gender. \textsuperscript{81} A Communication for Communities approach was established including the use of mobile phone systems and local actor organizations such as boy scouts. It was hosted through the Regional Coordinator’s office. Radio operators can serve as a strong means of information if sufficient communication networks and national-local coordination are in place. Closer interaction with affected communities also helped to silence rumors and superstition, e.g. about why the earthquake struck.

The current relief scenario is being revised since September 2015 to include response lessons and new planning assumptions.\textsuperscript{82} To fasten the process of relief distribution and response on the ground, less time is given to assessments. Some of the traditional response steps are skipped. A detailed overview is needed of available data on previous responses and need assessments, projects funded, respective donors and access to affected communities.

Continuous risk awareness and constant preparation for relief are crucial. Preparation has to become more operational, a good overview of stocks is needed. Some stock products were outdated when the earthquake struck. Ways have to be found to keep stocks updated and meet basic standards while keeping maintenance costs as low as possible.

\textit{Urban Preparation and Inter-Cluster-Cooperation}

Even though the epicenter was expected to be in Kathmandu, the city was not adequately prepared for an urban earthquake. In Kathmandu, urbanization is rapid, urban development remains unplanned and –coordinated, densification of urban areas is uncontrolled. Open spaces are filled quickly. Informal settlements are growing. Construction practices are simple, augmenting the city’s vulnerability. Enforcement of building regulations


\textsuperscript{82} Personal Communication A. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Budapest. 28/04/2016.
like the National Building Code of 1994 is poor. Many building structures could not stand the horizontal shake. They produced large amounts of debris reducing access for emergency services and relief agencies and strongly limiting the humanitarian community’s ability to provide relief items. Open spaces were too scarce for adequate evacuation.\textsuperscript{83}

Interdependent clusters have to work closer together; preparedness is needed across various lines of response. Many of the humanitarian challenges faced, date back to insufficient development work prior to the earthquake. Before the earthquake the level of humanitarian and developmental cooperation was low. One interviewee from UN OCHA mentioned that the development sector was completely divorced from the humanitarian one.

After the April 25 earthquake, the humanitarian coordinator quickly created another platform within the HCT, which was the operational focal point. This created a change in focus from development focused work prior to the earthquake towards a humanitarian response orientation after the earthquake. Developmental partners only received more attention from June/July on when the monsoon was being feared.\textsuperscript{84} Cooperation and awareness for the need to work together has grown since the earthquake, also under the umbrella of the HCT+. Meetings take place regularly; an agenda is being developed. However, processes need to be understood and adjusted from both sides. According to OCHA and the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) coherence has to be created across national and international responders, e.g. on official phases. Recovery planning has to be done simultaneously with other phases. The strong leadership needed to enhance cooperation and monitor implementation of programs cannot be provided by the Nepalese government. The international community has to step in.

Urban planning and development have to be monitored professionally to prevent the rebuilding of previous infrastructural vulnerabilities. The representative from the NRRC mentioned that agencies missed a lot of windows to incorporate resilience into planning. Legislation is needed that allows leading across the government to ensure that resilience becomes one of the key elements of recovery. According to the same expert, support has to be long-term, encompassing at least 20 years, especially when dealing with local actors. As neighborhoods in Kathmandu strongly differ, the approach should be area-based with decision-making being community driven. Especially community-based organizations representing the interests of the urban poor and vulnerable have to be part of the process. These include groups such as the Dalits, women- and child-headed households, renters and the infirm. They are often underrepresented at national and municipal level.\textsuperscript{85}

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\textsuperscript{84} Personal Communication B. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Budapest. 01/05/2016.
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Programming Tools: Capacity Building for Reconstruction

While awareness of the seismic risk is high, the fractured political landscape and legislation in the country hamper following up on recommendations and slow down reconstruction. Governmental capacities for responding and preparation are low. Disaster management and legislation are outdated. 26 Ministries share the responsibilities for natural disasters.\(^{86}\) Under the current Disaster Response Framework roles and responsibilities for the ministries were defined. However, ministries were not up to speed. They did not have response plans.

Capacity mapping for different ministries was insufficient before the nationalization of clusters. Programs were not designed for individual clusters. The timeline rather suited the international community than the country. The interviewees mentioned that many of the bodies were not able to deliver after the disaster, accountability and leadership were weak.

After a 10-year-period of political standstill following a civil war, political leaders in Kathmandu prioritized the constitutional reform and dealing with the opposition over rebuilding. The new constitution envisions the re-division of Nepal into seven provinces. The ethnic minorities Madhesi and Tharu claim that this reshaping weakens their political representation. The constitutional dispute lead to a 135-day unofficial blockade at the border to India through Madhesi members. The blockade was backed by the Indian government.\(^{87}\) Access points for importing humanitarian and development items were blocked. This and the following fuel crisis further slowed down reconstruction and significantly rose prices.\(^{88}\) UN OCHA’s flash appeal was supposed to last five months. When they stood down after seven, the National Reconstruction Authority created to carry the authority for rebuilding still had not taken up its work. The district authorities were waiting for instructions from the capital. Even when national decisions reached the district authorities, decisions were not necessarily incorporated. While at national level ministries showed familiarity with the disaster response framework, preparedness was much lower at district level. Compensation for rebuilding was delayed. Often the money did not reach district authority accounts. When it did, registration lists had often disappeared bringing up issues of eligibility for payments. Colliding interests of various ethnic groups further complicated the situation.

This, again, significantly reduced the speed of reconstruction. The compensation of approximately 2000 USD per family was insufficient to rebuild a destroyed house. Many families were not prepared for the winter. Organizations wanting to rebuild did not receive the needed

\(^{86}\) Personal Communication B. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Budapest. 01/05/2016.


space or guidance for doing so. The situation caused frustration among donors. Out of the 4.1 billion USD donated only one billion was committed. 615 million were available in Nepal in April 2015. With the national level remaining unstable, investments should be scaled up at local level. District level coordination work, awareness raising, training, equipment, supplies and capacity building for decision making and implementing are needed. An annual planning process at district level has been introduced to overcome governance issues and institutionalize preparedness. UN OCHA devoted three months for local capacity building after mapping capacities and gaps. Teams were sent to different districts, programs in Nepali were tailored to the varying contexts. Many participants from district administrations and residents expressed their regrets of not having received the trainings before the earthquake.

**Mapping and Technology**

Assessment in urban areas is complicated by issues of access and density. New satellite and mapping technologies constitute an opportunity. Actors such as MapAction and OpenStreetMap produce maps. Information is then processed by other actors such as Crisis Mappers. Tagging damaged buildings through crowdsourcing and seeding also helps to map the disaster impact and response. Humanity Road produces updates on various issues via social media. DigitalGlobe provides satellite imagery that can be used for damage assessment in combination with pre-earthquake imagery. The preparation done should be included. For example, risk profiles of schools have been mapped to identify vulnerabilities. Drones can be used for first assessments in color-coded, high-quality images. Information gathered by unmanned technologies has to be systematic and structured. In Nepal, organizations such as UAViators and Global Medic were pioneers in the field. Interdependent infrastructural vulnerabilities can be identified through social network analysis. Whenever data and information are systematically collated, they provide a useful resource for agencies.

**Data Trends and Means**

Until now, the level of information sharing between agencies is low. Language barriers arise with contacts at different levels. A common agency network for datasets and information in English would be valuable and resource saving. A data management working group could be used to share and exchange available data. A centralized effort by the National Emergency Operation Centre to translate information released by the government, national and local actors would avoid high costs for translations.

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Phones and tablet computers in combination with adequate information management can help to track population movements. Surveys and assessments can be conducted in collaboration with the district and municipal authorities. The task should be prioritized. During the first week after the earthquake 100,000 people are estimated to have left Kathmandu for rural areas. India saw a huge influx of earthquake evacuees. The international border is well known for human trafficking. Especially vulnerable parts of society such as young girls need protection.

*Markets and Cash-Based Programming*

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In Nepal, cash has been a major feature of the response (see Annex 8). Cash-based programming in combination with market analysis is an effective tool to deliver the help needed in varying sectors and to restore livelihoods. Markets that cash is invested in can serve as low-transaction cost tools to fasten the process of recovery as a whole and self-recovery of local structures in particular, especially in urban settings. The approach should be bottom-up: the international community adds to what local structures can provide. In this regard, national and local private actors should be regarded as delivery partners and not only a resource. The international community must be careful not to damage existing markets through free aid. Public-private partnerships should be fostered. Advanced knowledge of local structures is required. Linking and mapping of the main producers and suppliers and the definition of quality standards should have been done and agreed on before the earthquake. In Nepal, large parts of cash use were shelter driven. However, product quality often did not meet international standards. This has severe consequences for long-term recovery and preparedness in disaster-prone areas. High quality of building materials contributes to resilient structures. Moreover, the private sector in Nepal was not included into the post-earthquake process immediately after the disaster. Analysis is needed on how to quickly deliver adequate technical items in addition to basic products that are expected to be bought with unconditional or multi-purpose cash grants. An earlier interaction with local structures could have prevented gaps.

The private sector and civil society do not use and are often not familiar with the cluster approach. Actors mostly do not have time to go to meetings for different clusters. Inter-cluster cooperation for the creation of common reporting-mechanisms is needed and enhanced coherence are needed to maximize the impact. A central management database can help to track cash.

**Fundraising Mechanisms**

Pooled funding is extremely useful in disaster prone countries. Through country-based pooled funds donors can pool their contributions, which then can be allocated to the most urgent

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humanitarian needs and priorities. Funds can be distributed financing the relief activities of a wide range of national, local and international partners. Funds can be released immediately after a disaster struck. They can be used more efficiently fostering inter-cluster cooperation. While the Nepal aid is very well funded no pooled funding is in place. Issues of accountability and distribution evolve due to the multitude of agencies at country and regional level and the lack of governmental leadership. These also hamper the introduction of multi-year planning and preparedness.

Preparedness has to be prioritized over response. Better preparedness will result in less costs and human losses after the next disaster. As done in the Return to Investment Approach, stressing the economic advantages of time and money arising from better preparedness together with the reduced human losses can help to attract donors. High risk situations like Nepal should be prioritized due to the higher need to invest.

In Nepal, the HCT reviewed previous responses to various types of natural disasters. The result was a first and second year cluster that streamlined responses and requests for funds. The preparedness- modus operandi was changed, money was divided effectively enabling increased support for preparedness.95

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Key Challenges

- Capacity building at national and especially local level to overcome governance issues and institutionalize preparedness,
- Incorporating resilience into planning to not rebuild structural vulnerabilities,
- Strong leadership is needed for cooperation of interdependent clusters, the employment of a Returns to Investment approach and the inclusion of resilience into planning and monitoring has to be provided by the international community as, currently, it cannot be done by the Nepalese government,
- Closer alignment between local and international coordination and cluster structures to avoid parallel streams and conflicting modus operandi is needed,
- Solving issues of accountability and distribution to enhance pooled funding, multi-year planning and disaster preparedness,
- Two-way communication with, feedback from and information sharing with affected communities to secure the adequacy of relief items and distribution,
- Provision of a detailed overview of projects funded and respective donors
- Access to affected communities to revise the current relief scenario. A common agency network for datasets and information in English and a data management working group should be established in a centralized effort,
- New satellite, mapping technologies, drones, crowdsourcing- and seeding can be used to assess the damage. Population movements can be tracked through phones and tabled computers and with the help of district and municipal authorities,
- Revised approach that addresses local market actors and cash- programming in order to enhance self-recovery,
- Analysis on how to quickly deliver adequate technical items in addition to basic products expected to be bought. The international community should only add to what local structures can provide.
Conclusion

We live in an increasingly urbanized world. As indicated by world urbanization trends, since 2007 more than half of the world’s population is living in urban and urban-like settlements by 2050. And this trend does not seem to be slowing down. At the same time, the uneven development of the urban world poses the rightful concern of millions of people living in unsafe, unprotected and unregulated urban settings. In this context, the urgency for humanitarian organizations to shape their responses to the growing possibility of urban crisis, generated by conflict, climate, displacement, housing, health issue, and so on, is immediate. This policy brief aims to respond to this challenge by using three different and yet interconnected examples about the variety of factors that differentiate an urban from a rural crisis and how we can build on that knowledge to design future responses and can increase urban resilience. Highlighting the similarities between these diverse case studies could improve policy makers’ capacity to respond to urban challenges.

Local Governance

Although trivial, the importance of local governance and the active participation and involvement of local actors is crucial for the sustainability of responses. The classical paradigm of humanitarians – limited to immediate support for sustaining lives, has proved ineffective in most situations that are impossible to address without strong local governance. Defining and sustaining local governance is extremely diversified and it can only be based on communication with the affected people and constant communication with the adequate relevant local authorities. It implies creating linkages between the people affected and local authorities and provide both of them with tools to express their needs and to receive the help required.

In order to facilitate this communication, humanitarian organizations need to have local teams that maintain communication and relationships, not only with local authorities, but also with non-governmental and development actors. The prevailing practice of immediate responses with insufficient local knowledge and consultation has generated and generates unintended consequences in the long-run. In the case of Zamzam, such consequences imply establishing a camp without land rights and lacking urban and rural planning in regards to potential livelihood practices. In the case of Kathmandu, besides consultation related to existing legislation and urban planning, promoting dialogue between all relevant actors has proven to be a struggle, whereas in the Beirut case making usage of existing local knowledge and technical capacities has taken place insufficiently.

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**Capacity Building**

Most of the causes of the protracted nature of crisis are maintained because of the lack of local capacity to address those issues in case of a humanitarian exist situation. Again, the challenges differ from case to case. While in some cases the difficulty is creating infrastructure from the beginning, in other situations it is the improvement of the existing infrastructure. Infrastructure entails a broad range of services, administration and financing mechanisms. The contribution and support from humanitarian organizations could be represented through the transfer of knowledge to local authorities (Zamzam), the improvement of existing services and the re-integration of humanitarian aid to the local authorities (Beirut) and better information management and the creation of response mechanisms in the case of Kathmandu. These are only a few examples of how humanitarian action fails to deliver resilience to a change in status quo through natural and man-made disasters. It needs to acknowledge the importance of pre-existing capacity and the need to being able to rely on that infrastructure.

**Regulation and Enforcement of Existing Laws**

In all the cases a strong divide is created by the broad or restricted nature of “mandate” that the humanitarian organizations think they have, the international human rights that protect or reference the rights of the people affected and the mechanisms of responsibility transfer towards the responsible actors. In the case of Kathmandu, a great vulnerability has been in addressing the regulation of safe housing and the provision of houses to the right people. A similar situation still happens in Zamzam, where some of the greatest obstacles in the face of return are land rights issues, whereas in the case of Beirut the difficulty of acknowledging the refugee status for the displaced exposes them to unlawfulness and the incapacity to function in society and gain access to basic public services. Furthermore, the lack of enforcing mechanisms makes it difficult to transfer finances and responsibilities to the right authorities and using the right tools of accountability. Finally, the capacity of enforcing existing legislation is strongly connected with local capacity building and the existing local governance and how humanitarians relate to their existing power.

**Final Remarks**

The urban world allows less space for such solutions as camps and temporary housing, as it restricts the ability to operate based solely on an international mandate, isolated from existing legal and administrative infrastructure. The framework of analysis provided by these case studies should encourage humanitarian organizations, actors and practitioners to re-evaluate their role as humanitarians and adopt a more flexible approach to their work and mission. The prevailing practice of protracted humanitarian crisis, although it might sound contradictory to many, is becoming more and more of a reality. In the context of increasing urbanization, a proliferation of such crisis is inevitable. One specific and highly important observation is that humanitarians have to accept that their work is interconnected with
broader processes and multiple types of actors. Their communication with authorities and development actors needs to be encouraged and sustained if they want to provide effective responses shaped by the realities on the ground. Whether they choose to resume their activities to being the avant-garde of emergency and providing the required help for safeguarding life or trying to address the root causes of the crisis, they have to accept that their actions are not isolated and are embedded in a historical, political and socio-economic context in which various dynamics intervene in their activities. Humanitarians are thus at a cross-road where they can decide if they accept the changing nature of their work.

Recommendations

- Increase investments in capacity building, both for humanitarian practitioners and local governance; meaning trainings, tool kits and technical capacities,
- Creating real links of communication with local actors prior to potential disasters and investing in prevention measures; creating profiles of countries based on potential vulnerabilities will cause greater knowledge of the institutions and structures on the ground,
- Involvement in legislation and enforcement at the national and local level,
- Investment in technological solutions; mapping, informational tools, online, platforms and smart urban planning solutions,
- Promote creative financing solutions that allow for multi-year planning and providing incentive funding to local authorities.
References


“Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile. International Labor Organization Regional Office for the Arab States. 2014.


http://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/Rabenau_LED.pdf


Personal Communications


Personal Communication B. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Budapest. 01/05/2016.

Annex 2

SYRIA REFUGEE RESPONSE
LEBANON Beirut and Mount Lebanon Governorates
Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level

As of 31 January 2016

Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees by Province

BEIRUT
- Total No. of Household Registered: 8,680
- Total No. of Individuals Registered: 28,523

MOUNT LEBANON
- Total No. of Household Registered: 74,247
- Total No. of Individuals Registered: 283,433

Legend
No. of Refugees per Cadastral

- 0
- 1-100
- 101-1,000
- 1,001-3,000
- 3,001-10,000
- 10,001-20,000
- 20,001-40,000
- 40,001-60,000
- 60,001-100,000
- 100,001-

Note: This map has been produced by UNHCR based on data and analysis provided by the Government of Lebanon. It is intended to assist UNHCR with internal planning and other humanitarian planning functions. The map does not in any way reflect the views of the Government of Lebanon or the UNHCR

Data Sources:
- CBS and UNHCR
- UNHCR

Registered Refugees by UNHCR as of 31 January 2016

For more information about the map or its data, please contact UNHCR by email at syria-refugees-evacuated@unhcr.org

UNHCR’s Map Arewa Version 2.0 for the Lebanon territory

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Annex 3

Increasing Vulnerability Among Syrian Refugees

Vulnerability assessments conducted on a regular basis since 2015 show a continuous deterioration of the socio-economic situation of refugees. The list of assessments conducted in Lebanon is available on the Information Portal (www.data.unhcr.org) under Assessments in the Latest Documents section.

**DEMOGRAPHICS**

1,069,111 Registered Syrian Refugees

52% Female

48% Male

53% Children

**POVERTY**

In 2015, households living below the poverty line increased to 70% from 45% in 2014.

More than half of households (51%) were living below the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB), double the percentage of 2014 (26%).

**SHELTER**

Many people moving to substandard accommodations

- % living in informal settlements
- % living in camps

**FOOD SECURITY**

Percentage of food insecure households

**RESIDENCY**

- % refugees with legal status
- % refugees with legal status
- % refugees with legal status

**DEBT**

Percentage of households with debt

Average household debt

Prepared by the Interagency Information Management Unit - UNHCR. For more information contact the Interagency Coordination Unit or the information management section.
Annex 4. Zamzam Camp Map
Annex 5

Displacement in Darfur – number of camps – OCHA 2011
Annex 6

Evolution of camp dwelling and eco-exploitation

Figure 7. Automatically delineated IDP camp area / margin on 2004 and 2008 QuickBird imagery. The 2002 image (left) reflects the situation of the villages prior to the effects of migration.

Figure 8. Kernel-density calculations based on the extracted dwellings showing the evolution of the IDP camp Zam Zam between 2002 (situation unaffected by migration) and 2008. Red tones indicate higher dwelling densities.

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97 Lang et al., “Earth Observation (EO)-Based Ex Post Assessment of Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camp Evolution and Population Dynamics in Zam Zam, Darfur.”
Annex 7