Anti-Americanism in Canada

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CONTENTS

1. Introduction .......................... 5

2. Types of Anti-Americanism .......... 6

3. A Unique Anti-Americanism? An Historical Excursus .... 9

4. Economic Anti-Americanism in Canada, 1783-1989 ........ 11

5. Contingent Anti-Americanism in Canadian Politics ........ 15

6. Oxygenating Contingent Anti-Americanism ............... 19

7. Conclusion ............................ 22
1. Introduction

Much of the burgeoning literature, both scholarly and popular, that appeared in response to the global surge in anti-Americanism in the early 2000s pays little attention to anti-Americanism in Canada. For example, two recent edited collections provide illuminating surveys and analyses of contemporary anti-Americanism not only in a variety of countries in Europe, the Middle East, Central America, Latin America, but also in the United States itself.¹

And those recent works which do examine contemporary anti-Americanism in Canada tend to see these sentiments as little more than a North American manifestation of a broader global phenomenon that exhibits the same characteristics everywhere. The best example would be John Gibson’s argument in Hating America that Canada was part of what he calls an “axis of envy”—countries that hate the United States out of the frustration that has been created by the “utter incomquence” of these countries in global politics.²

While there is no doubt that one can find elements of anti-Americanism in Canada similar to anti-American sentiments elsewhere in the world, on closer examination one finds profound differences between Canadian anti-Americanism and anti-Americanism in other countries. Indeed, the only scholar who has undertaken a monograph-length study of anti-Americanism in Canada, the historian J.L. Granatstein, suggested some ten years ago that the kind of anti-Americanism one finds in Canada is in fact unique. Moreover, Granatstein argued in 1996 that the kind of anti-Americanism that dominated Canadian political discourse for over a century and a half had largely dissipated by the early 1990s.³

The purpose of this paper is to examine Granatstein’s arguments in light of the developments since 1996, when he was writing. It begins by exploring the nature of anti-Americanism in Canada to confirm Granatstein’s contention that Canadian anti-Americanism is unique. I then look at the state of contemporary anti-Americanism in Canada—in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I will argue that Granatstein was correct to suggest that the kind of unique anti-Americanism that had marked Canadian political culture for much of the nineteenth century and all but the last decade of the twentieth century had largely disappeared. However, he was overly optimistic about the decline of this phenomenon. I will show that anti-Americanism is alive and well in Canada, but it is a particular and quite limited strand of anti-Americanism.


² John Gibson, Hating America: The New World Sport (New York: ReganBooks, 2004). Gibson is the host of Fox News Channel’s The Big Story with John Gibson. His hyperbolic title, it might be noted, is not original, nor is the “sport” he purports to identify so “new”: in 1970, a German reporter, Erwin K. Scheuch, published an article in Die Welt in Hamburg entitled “Hating America—the World’s Favorite Pastime,” translated in Atlas 19 (September 1970), 18-21 (though unlike Gibson, who locates the cause of anti-Americanism in the envy of others, Scheuch argued that the anti-Americanism of the late 1960s was in fact a sentiment exported from the United States by self-hating young bourgeois Americans and eagerly lapped up by Europeans).

2. Types of Anti-Americanism

As Inderjeet Parmar has noted, there is little agreement on how to define anti-Americanism; and how one defines it “is not without consequences” for the ensuing analysis. Thus, for Parmar, anti-Americanism is a “multifaceted and complex phenomenon,” and thus “it is important that its varied meanings are explicated.” In fact, most definitions in the contemporary literature try to grapple with the obvious multidimensionality of anti-Americanism.

For example, Josef Joffe, the editor of Die Zeit, identifies five elements of anti-Americanism; indeed, as he notes, these elements define any “anti-ism” (such as anti-Semitism, with which he was comparing anti-Americanism):

- Stereotyping: indulging in general statements that attribute negative qualities to the target group as a whole.
- Denigration: the ascription of moral inferiority to a whole group, traceable in the last resort to an irreducibly evil nature.
- Obsession: the idée fixe that the target group is both omnipresent and omni-causal—an invisible force that explains all misery…
- Demonization: conspiracy [by the target group] … to achieve domination.
- Elimination: the determination to seek an end to troubles by eliminating the alleged source of torment, be it by exclusion, extrusion, or annihilation.

Clearly such a multidimensional definition is appropriate in some national contexts but not all. Not every manifestation of anti-Americanism features the more virulent attributes of Joffe’s definition. For this reason, Moisés Naím has suggested the possibility of what he terms “lite” anti-Americanism: “the anti-Americanism of those in the United States and abroad who take to the streets and the media to rant against the country but do not seek its destruction.”

A somewhat more inclusive (and thus more “lite”) definition is suggested by Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin. In their view, anti-Americanism should be limited to one or more of four characteristics:

- An antagonism to the United States that is systemic, seeing it as completely and inevitably evil.
- A view that greatly exaggerates America’s shortcomings;
- The deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of policies of the United States for political purposes.
- A misperception of American society, policies, or goals which falsely portrays them as ridiculous or malevolent.

Again, such a list would capture the essence of anti-Americanism in many places. However, as will become apparent below, most expressions of anti-Americanism in Canada tends to lack even these attributes. For this reason, in this paper, I use an ideational definition, borrowed from both James W. Parmar, “Selling Americanism, Combatting Anti-Americanism: The Historical Role of American Foundations,” Anti-Americanism Working Papers, Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, 2004, 5-7.


Echoing Moisés Naím, discussed below, Joffe concedes that there are two versions of elimination: the murderous version, which seeks the literal physical elimination or extrusion of the target group, and “elimination-lite,” or efforts to weaken the target or push it back.


Rubin and Rubin, Hating America, ix.
Ceaser and Paul Hollander. Ceaser suggests that “Anti-Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world.” For his part, Hollander defined anti-Americanism as “a particular mind-set, an attitude of distaste, aversion or intense hostility the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or the foreign policies of the United States.” In my view, such pithy ideational definitions capture well the essentially multidimensional nature of the phenomenon while avoiding the necessity of including such intense sentiments such as hatred or malevolence in the definition.

In short, on the street, in university classrooms, in the national media, or in a variety of other fora, Canadians are as likely as others in the international system to exhibit such an anti-American “mindset.” Canadians, like their counterparts elsewhere, engage in criticism of Americans as a people or the United States as a country, often resorting to stereotyping, denigration, and demonization. They are prone to express their concerns about Americanization—the impact of American culture or the American economy on Canada. Protestors in Canada are as likely as their counterparts in other countries to criticize the government in Washington for its unilateralism on issues such as global warming, the International Criminal Court, National Missile Defense, or American support for global capitalism, or American policies in the Middle East or the Asia Pacific.

However, for all the superficial similarities, there are some important differences. First, anti-Americanism in Canada does not exhibit the same varieties that we see in other places, such as Europe. As Adam Garfinkle has noted, European anti-Americanism comprises three distinct, though interrelated, strands. One is philosophical anti-Americanism, associated with the rejectionism of the nature of the American polity by European thinkers over the two centuries after the American Revolution. A second type is cultural anti-Americanism, a concern over Americanization of local culture and mores. The third is contingent anti-Americanism, “stimulated by the dislike of particular policies or personalities in any given U.S. administration.” I will show that anti-Americanism in Canada has not been grounded in any comparable philosophical critique—perhaps not surprisingly, since the vast majority of people who live in Canada, whether aboriginal peoples or newcomers, English-speaking or French-speaking, are in ideology and culture far more American than they are European.

Rather, as Granatstein argued in his history of anti-Americanism in Canada, such a perspective does not accurately capture what is the unique nature of anti-Americanism as it has been exhibited in Canada, an anti-Americanism has been historically grounded in a unique variety of concerns about Americanization that includes, but goes well beyond, the cultural anti-Americanism outlined by

12 Ceaser, “Genealogy of Anti-Americanism”; a variant of this article appears as “The Philosophical Origins of Anti-Americanism in Europe,” in Hollander, ed., Anti-Americanism, 45-64. For a fuller discussion, see his Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
14 As John W. Holmes put it archly in 1981, “It is in any case nonsense to talk about Canada being Americanized when it has always been just as much an American nation as the United States ... and there is no reason to claim that the United States way is any more natively North American than the Canadian.” Life With Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 114.
Garfinkle. I argue that the comparable form of anti-Americanism we see in Canada is economic anti-Americanism.

In Granatstein’s view, Canadian anti-Americanism is unique not only because it is so old and enduring—but also because it is so weak and bland when compared with anti-Americanism in other regions of the world.\(^{15}\) Indeed, Granatstein, writing in the mid-1990s, believed that anti-Americanism in Canada had “faded away”—the anti-Americanism that had been the feature of the 1988 general election fought on the issue of the free trade agreement that had been signed between Canada and the United States was, in his view, the “last gasp” of a once-powerful force in Canada. Instead, in his estimation, “anti-Americanism will likely continue in an attenuated, powerless form as a useful and instinctive device that Canadians will employ to differentiate themselves from their neighbors.”\(^{16}\)

In this paper I conclude that Granatstein’s prognosis was generally correct: the kind of anti-Americanism that had been so firmly entrenched in Canadian political culture—the opposition to being taken over or absorbed by the United States that had fuelled such sustained opposition to the forces of continentalism and economic integration, economic anti-Americanism—is indeed dead, at least for the moment. Judging by their behavior in both the marketplace and the ballot box, and by their rhetoric, the vast majority of Canadians appear to have made peace with the deep economic and cultural integration between Canada and the United States that has taken place over the last two centuries, accelerating in spurts after the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, the First World War, the Second World War, the Auto Pact of 1965, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement that came into force on 1 January 1989 and the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force on 1 January 1994. And while many of those who were part of the ultranationalist movement of the 1970s and 1980s are still active in Canadian politics, that movement transmogrified in the 1990s into a broader movement opposed to global capitalism rather than to a putative American takeover of Canada.\(^{17}\)

Granatstein was also correct in his prognosis that anti-Americanism in Canada would continue to be a feature of Canadian political culture, although in attenuated form, and designed primarily as a means to differentiate Canadians from Americans. What Harvey M. Sapolsky has termed “low grade anti-Americanism”—cultivating an image of Canada as a “kinder, gentler, more nuanced” country than the United States—continues to be very much in evidence. This attempt to differentiate manifests itself in the contingent anti-Americanism identified by Garfinkle.

However, I will argue that, writing in 1996, Granatstein did not anticipate the degree to which the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien would actively embrace a certain kind of anti-Americanism in the late 1990s that would affect Canadian-American relations during the administration of George W. Bush. Unlike most Canadian governments, which have tried to manage and downplay the contingent anti-Americanism that has always manifested itself in Canadian politics, the Chrétien government in effect oxygenated anti-Americanism in Canada, legitimizing and indeed in ways

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\(^{15}\) For all the deeply-rooted and pervasive anti-American sentiments in Canada, one would be hard-pressed to find the kind of virulent attitudes reported in many of the contributions to Hollander, ed., *Understanding Anti-Americanism*, or Ross and Ross, eds., *Anti-Americanism*.

\(^{16}\) Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home?*, 285; writing in 1998, Bruce C. Daniels, “Younger British Siblings: Canada and Australia Grow Up in the Shadow of the United States,” *American Studies International* 36:3 (October 1998), 35, opined that anti-Americanism in both Australia and Canada was at an “all time low.”

\(^{17}\) An example of this dynamic is the Council of Canadians, formed in 1985 by Maude Barlow. The Council’s activities in the late 1980s focused on asserting Canadian sovereignty and opposing the free trade agreement with the United States. In the 1990s, the Council shifted its focus, campaigning on other issues, such as genetically modified food, the corporatization of health care, factory farming, or the bulk export of water: see www.canadians.org.

actively encouraging anti-American sentiments because, by Chrétien’s own admission, it was good politics.

3. A Unique Anti-Americanism? An Historical Excursus

One key difference between anti-Americanism in Canada and the kind of anti-Americanism one finds in other societies lies in the deep historical roots of the sentiment in Canada. After all, Canada is the only political community in the world which exists as the result of a conscious rejection of the United States of America.

Canada’s existence has its origins in the American revolution. When the Continental Congress convened by the leaders of the thirteen colonies decided to launch an armed insurrection against the authority of the imperial government in London, it was hoped that the other British North American colonies—in particular the provinces of Nova Scotia (which at the time included much of present-day New Brunswick) and Canada and its dependencies, which had been ceded by France to Britain by the Treaty of Paris, 1763—would join the revolutionaries, or the “Patriots,” in the creation of a new nation.

However, there was little interest in joining the American Revolution in either Québec or Nova Scotia; neutrality is a more apt characterization of the dominant sentiments in those provinces. In Québec, the French-speaking elites who had not returned to France after the British seizure of Montreal in 1760—the Roman Catholic clergy and the seigneurs, the holders of rural land grants in New France—and the new English-speaking merchant class who arrived after the Conquest remained generally loyal to British authority. The loyalty of the French-speaking elites should not be surprising. Not only were the first two English governors of the newly-created Province of Québec both sympathetic to the Canadiens, but in 1774 the imperial government in London passed new legislation that was designed to counter the growing disaffection of the thirteen colonies by unambiguously wooing the French-speaking elites in Québec. The Quebec Act of 1774 formally restored the privileges that the Church had enjoyed under French rule, such as a legal right to tithes. The seigneurs were likewise pleased that the Act also restored their privileges by re-instituting the old civil law in place of English common law. Moreover, both groups were pleased by the Quebec Act’s provision that there would be no elected assembly, which would necessarily exclude all Catholics, but rather a governor and an appointed council. Members of the English-speaking merchant class were highly displeased at all these provisions of the Quebec Act, but the legislation sought to mollify them by joining the Ohio lands to the province and thus closing them off to westward expansion by the


20 The Treaty of Paris ceded to Britain all of Nouvelle-France except the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off the southern coast of Newfoundland; this included what was then known as Canada (much of the present-day provinces of Québec and Ontario) and its dependencies, the islands in the Gulf of the St Lawrence River, including Île Saint-Jean (subsequently renamed St John’s Island, and then, in 1799, Prince Edward Island) and Cape Breton Island; the lands of the Ohio valley and the lands of Louisiana east of the Mississippi River.

21 Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, 13.

22 For example, after the bishop of Québec died, General James Murray, the first governor of the newly-conquered province, helped arrange the consecration of a new bishop of Québec, even though the Catholic Church was illegal. Murray not only helped find a successor but also sent him to France so that he could be consecrated. Since without a bishop, no priests could be ordained, Murray’s action generated considerable support from the Church.
thirteen colonies, adding a vast expanse of territory for the Montreal entrepôt trade. While some of the English-speaking merchants in Québec had ties to the thirteen colonies, in the main they were too deeply tied to the imperial fur trade centered in London to consider joining the American revolutionaries.

Attitudes were similar in Nova Scotia, although for different reasons. While there was some sympathy for the Patriot cause in the thinly-populated coastal areas of the province (many of whom were from the thirteen colonies who had moved to Nova Scotia to occupy farms and villages left vacant when the British expelled the French-speaking Acadian population of the region in the 1750s), the elites in Halifax who controlled Nova Scotia politics were firmly tied to the British imperium. Halifax received massive imperial subsidies for the heavily-fortified naval base and the merchant class did well from war contracts and the imperial sea-borne trade in the Caribbean. In addition, there were few economic connections to the continental hinterland. In short, the elites had too much to lose by joining the revolution.

For this reason, the Continental Congress ignored Nova Scotia entirely but it did send an appeal to the people of Québec to send delegates to the Philadelphia congress in May 1775. However, the response from both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadian elites was less than enthusiastic: one of the Montreal merchants attended the Philadelphia congress as an unofficial observer. Later in the year, the Continental Congress sent two revolutionary armies north to capture Montreal and Québec in an attempt to eliminate the military threat posed by the imperial forces and to rally the rest of British North America to the revolutionary cause. While Montreal was captured, the siege of Québec City ended in failure. The French-speaking elites urged the habitants—the small farmers and yeomen of Nouvelle-France—to rally to the imperial cause (the bishop even threatening to withhold the sacraments from recalcitrants). But the habitants were indifferent to both the pleas of their elites or the blandishments of the revolutionaries—at least until the revolutionaries began raiding their farms, and were eventually defeated. And although the new American state enshrined a special welcome for Canada in its first constitution,23 the invitation was never accepted.

The overt rejection of the revolutionary cause by those in the provinces of Québec and Nova Scotia in the opening stages of the war was even more deeply entrenched by what happened to those in North America who chose not to side with the Republican revolutionaries but to remain loyal to the Crown. Some “Loyalists” (or “King’s Men”) formed militias and took up arms against the Patriots; others sought refuge in New York City, which remained in British hands throughout the Revolutionary War; others still fled as refugees. Many had had their property seized or had been persecuted for their objections or for fighting on the British side. Between 60,000 and 100,000 people from the thirteen colonies fled the new republic during or after the Revolution; approximately 40,000 went north, including about 2000 free African-Americans and 1000 Iroquois. Of this number, 32,000 made their way to Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, trebling the population of these colonies and prompting the creation of two new provinces, New Brunswick and Cape Breton Island. Approximately 8,000 came to the province of Québec, crossing at Niagara Falls, at Kingston, and up the Hudson valley south of Montreal. They were given land grants and subsidized tools and settled the north shore of Lake Ontario and the Ottawa valley, forming the nucleus of what would eventually become the province of Ontario.

There was also a northward flow of refugees from the Ohio valley. When the British decided in 1782 to sue for peace after a series of defeats at the hands of the Americans and the French, who had intervened to assist the revolutionaries in 1778, the entire trans-Allegheny region was still in British

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23 Article XI of the original Articles of Confederation of 1778 read: “Canada acceding to this confederation, and adjoining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.”
hands, held by Loyalist militias, British regular troops, and their First Nations allies, primarily the Iroquois. Despite this, during the negotiations that led to the Peace of Paris of 1783, British negotiators decided to offer the Ohio valley to the Americans, prompting an exodus of Loyalists and Iroquois to what would become southern Ontario.

The “United Empire Loyalists,” as those Loyalists who sought refuge in Canada were known, tended to bring with them much more negative views about the new republic. Unlike the colonists of Québec and Nova Scotia, who were on the whole unenthusiastic about the Revolution but not necessarily fiercely loyal to the Crown, the Loyalist elite tended to be highly antagonistic towards the political regime that was the cause of their dislocation. While United Empire Loyalist attitudes were by no means homogenous, at bottom there was a common rejection of the American republican model of government in favor of a British monarchical model.

In short, as this brief excursus into North American history demonstrates, the people who occupied the remaining British North American colonies at the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 had fundamentally rejected the idea of union with the United States. The separate political community that developed to the north of the United States of America in a series of legislative/constitutional steps from 1774 to 1982—was thus, in a very real sense, an on-going act of anti-Americanism like no other in the international system.


But the anti-Americanism in Canada after the Revolutionary Wars was not the kind of philosophical anti-Americanism outlined by Garfinkle, even though some Loyalists maintained that their opposition to the new republic was grounded in ideological differences. Rather, it was an anti-Americanism grounded in opposing the spread of a particular kind of political formation and a particular kind of economic integration. Indeed, it can be argued that the kind of anti-Americanism we saw develop in Canada was more akin to cultural anti-Americanism, though, as I will argue below, its focus was on the economic aspects of Canadian-American relations.

There can be little doubt that anti-American sentiments were very much part of the political culture in British North America in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. As Kenneth McNaught has suggested, the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists “tipped the ‘Canadian’ scales decisively beyond the mere point of neutrality on the central question of continental union.” The Loyalists created in Canada a mythology of rejectionism of the American experiment, fostering an almost stereotypical view of the United States as “Satan’s Kingdom,” a land of republican anarchy, where

24 The key acts of the British Parliament that forged the development of Canada as an independent polity after the Quebec Act of 1774 include: the Canada Act, 1791, which divided Québec along the Ottawa River into Upper Canada and Lower Canada; the Act of Union, 1840, which reunited Upper and Lower Canada into a single United Provinces of Canada East (formerly Lower Canada, or Québec) and Canada West (formerly Upper Canada, or Ontario) with a legislature that featured exactly equal representation for each of the Canadas; the British North America Act, 1867, which created a self-governing Dominion from the united province of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia; the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which granted Canada and the other self-governing dominions sovereignty; and the Canada Act, 1982, which “patriated” the constitution by terminating the practice of amending the Canadian constitution via acts of the British Parliament. After Confederation, Canada grew to its present boundaries by the acquisition of the Northwest Territories from the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1870, the islands in the Arctic archipelago in 1880, and the addition of six new provinces: Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), Saskatchewan (1905), Alberta (1905), and Newfoundland (1949).


26 Quoted in Thomson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, 16.
money and the democratic mob ruled, where violence and brute strength prevailed. “The bitterness was profound,” Granatstein and Hillmer have written, “the determination to make of Canada something different from the United States almost fanatic in the tenacity with which it was held.”

Over the two hundred years after the Revolutionary Wars, however, Canadian attitudes towards the United States took a fundamentally paradoxical form. On the one hand, Canadians persistently embraced ever-increasing levels of economic and cultural integration with the United States. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Canadian economy became increasingly integrated with—and dependent on—that of the United States. Moreover, this integration occurred despite periodic efforts by the Canadian government to forge a different path, such as the National Policy of 1878, designed to foster the growth of a manufacturing sector behind high protectionist tariff walls, or the Third Option in the 1970s, designed to diversify the Canadian economy and reduce the growing dependence on the United States. By the 1980s, two hundred years after the fracturing of British North America, over 80 per cent of Canada’s trade—and thus a huge percentage of Canadian wealth—was dependent on the United States. At the same time, there was an increasing embrace of American culture, particularly accelerated in the latter part of the twentieth century as a result of movies and television. Again, this cultural integration occurred despite periodic efforts of Canadian governments to advance some distinctive Canadian culture. In short, over this period, Canadians, both English-speaking and French-speaking, became progressively Americanized, both economically and culturally.

At the same time, however, Canadians persistently rejected the United States as a model society, persistently rejected American republicanism as an inappropriate means of governance, and persistently characterized the United States and Americans as a threat to the existence of Canada. The Loyalist ideology of anti-Americanism was built over the course of the nineteenth century, entrenched every generation by fresh quarrels with the United States. Thirty years after the end of the Revolutionary War, the United States and Britain fought a second war, fuelled by American grievances over British policies in North America. As in 1775, Americans invaded Canada in an effort to spread the benefits of republicanism. The brief but brutal battles of the War of 1812, and the exposure of divided loyalties among many in Canada, created a second layer of anti-Americanism as the invasions were used by Loyalists to confirm their argument that the United States posed a threat to British North America. In addition, this war legitimized the efforts of the Loyalist elite to marginalize the later arrivals from the United States by depriving them of the rights given to the original Loyalists, arguing that no one who had been educated in republican principles could possibly embrace British political principles.

A third layer of anti-Americanism was added in the late 1830s as the dominance of Upper Canada politics by the Loyalist elite produced a reaction in the form of a reform movement; comparable

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27 Granatstein and Hillmer, For Better or For Worse, xiii.

28 The “NP,” as it was known, was introduced by Sir John A. Macdonald, the Conservative prime minister, after the Conservatives won the 1878 elections. An example of classical economic nationalism modeled on both German and American protection, the NP raised tariffs from an average of 17.5 per cent to 28 per cent, with rates on some products like iron set at 35 per cent. Peter Waite, Canada 1874-96: Arduous Destiny (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).

29 The best survey of the Third Option is to be found in J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), chap. 6.

30 In the years after 1791, when Upper Canada was created, the provincial administration sought to encourage settlement by offering land grants and naturalization after seven years. Large numbers of Americans migrated north in response: by 1800, the so-called “late Loyalists” outnumbered the original Loyalists, Americanizing many communities in Upper Canada. Some of these joined the American invaders during the War of 1812.

31 See Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 26.
reform movements appeared in Lower Canada and the Maritimes. In 1837, this movement culminated in separate rebellions in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada. In Lower Canada, the leader of the rebellion, Louis-Joseph Papineau, the speaker of the Legislative Assembly, openly advocated joining the United States. In Upper Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie, the leader of the Reformers, had met President Andrew Jackson and admired the American system of government. When Mackenzie in Upper Canada sought to topple the provincial government by staging an uprising in Toronto and London, Ontario, supportive invasions were launched from the United States. The uprising was unsuccessful, and Mackenzie fled to the United States, where he established a provisional government in exile, prompting an increase in anti-Americanism, manifested in assaults on Americans and in an attack by the Upper Canada militia across the border into the United States to burn a boat used by the rebels.

The entrenchment of anti-Americanism in the first half of the nineteenth century was crucial in the process of forming a unified Canada. One of the consequences of the 1837 rebellions—and the involvement of Americans—was to convince imperial officials that the annexation of the British North American colonies by the United States could best be avoided, in the words of Lord Durham’s 1839 Report, by “giving their inhabitants a country which they will be unwilling to see absorbed into one more powerful.” To be sure, giving British North Americans a country would take another generation, and would not occur until the United States was plunged in a civil war.

The achievement of self-governing Dominion status in 1867 did not diminish the well-entrenched Loyalist anti-American ideology that claimed that the primary threat to the well-being of Canadians was the United States. Despite the Fenian Raids of the mid-1860s, and despite the loose talk by Americans about “Manifest Destiny,” there was a diminishing fear that the United States would seek to annex Canada by force, particular when it was clear that the imperial government in London and the government in Washington had little interest in fighting a third war. Rather, the focus was on the threat posed by the Americanization of the Canadian economy and of Canadian culture.

Much of this concern turned on the issue of free trade between Canada and the United States (or, as it was called in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “reciprocity”). In both the 1891 and 1911 general elections, free trade with the United States was the key issue, and on each occasion, those whose economic interests would have been negatively affected—primarily the manufacturers who were protected by high tariff walls—helped generate an anti-Americanism that would see reciprocity defeated. In 1891, the campaign inspired a torrent of anti-American sentiment, as manufacturing interests distributed propaganda with slogans like “Keep Out the Wolves.” Indeed, in 1911, the Liberal government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, which had negotiated a free trade agreement and fought an election on the issue, went down to defeat in a wave of anti-American sentiment generated in large part by the business community (and helped by incredibly loose talk by Americans about how the agreement would hasten the absorption of Canada by the United States).

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32 Irish–American members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Fenians, conducted terrorist attacks in Canada in the 1860s. The purpose of the raids was to provoke another war between the United States and Britain, which, the Fenians believed, would further the cause of Irish independence.

33 This phrase was first used by an American editor, John Louis O’Sullivan. In 1845, he wrote that it was America’s “manifest destiny … to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” Quoted in George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi, America: A Narrative History, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 333.

34 See Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 48-49.

35 Champ Clark, the Speaker-designate of the House of Representatives, stated in the middle of the Canadian election campaign that he favored the free trade agreement because “I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions.” Quoted in J.L. Granatstein, “Free Trade Between Canada and the
The victory of the Conservatives under Robert Borden in the 1911 elections cast a long shadow in Canadian politics, legitimizing the anti-Americanism in Canada that viewed free trade as the harbinger of the death of the nation. Its impact can be seen in the reactions of William Lyon Mackenzie King, prime minister from 1921-1930 and 1935-1948, when presented with a draft free trade agreement in 1948 that had been negotiated by Canadian and American officials. Although he had approved the negotiations, King, who was merely months away from retirement, worried that the agreement would spell the end of Canada, and he would go down in history as the prime minister who was responsible for the end of the nation. He rejected the draft agreement. Likewise, in 1983, running for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, Brian Mulroney explicitly rejected the idea of a free trade agreement with the United States, citing the 1911 elections. “That’s why free trade was decided on in an election in 1911,” Mulroney said in June 1983. “It affects Canadian sovereignty, and we’ll have none of it, not during leadership campaigns, nor at any other times.” On another occasion, he told reporters that Canada “could not survive with a policy of unfettered free trade.”

Mulroney won both the leadership of the Progressive Conservative party in 1983, and the prime ministership of the country, leading the PCs to a massive parliamentary majority in the general elections of September 1984. Within a year of gaining office, however, Mulroney changed his mind on free trade. He was persuaded that given the depth of protectionist sentiment in the United States Congress, Canada should seek guaranteed access to the American market via a comprehensive free trade agreement. An agreement was negotiated with the administration of Ronald Reagan, and signed in 1987. In 1988, the general election was fought on the issue of the free trade agreement, with the 1911 positions reversed: the Conservatives were proposing free trade, and the Liberals (and the social democratic party, the New Democratic Party) vociferously opposed to the agreement. Although 52 per cent of the electorate voted for candidates of parties opposed to the agreement, the Conservatives received 43 per cent of the vote, which under Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system translated into a large majority in the House of Commons. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement came into force on 1 January 1989.

Granatstein has argued that Canadian anti-Americanism between the 1770s and 1980s was in large part driven by those in Canada with a vested interest in the particular political outcomes that anti-American sentiments would produce. The Loyalist myths of the 1800s, focusing on the putative ills of American “mob” democracy and the supposedly superior qualities of a more conservative monarchical system, suited the oligarchs of Upper Canada well. Likewise, the characterization of the United States as grasping wolves, eager to swallow the British dominion, served the interests of a particular groups in Canada. The argument is not new: as Granatstein himself notes, the historian Frank Underhill wrote in 1929 that “the same interests are preparing to wave the old flag and to make their own private profit, political and economic, by saving us once more from the United States.”

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36 Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 92-93.
37 Quoted in Lawrence Martin, Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the Mulroney Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1993), 44.
38 Quoted in Thomson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, 286.
39 Quoted in Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 266.
But the wisdom of Granatstein’s argument can be determined by examining what happened when dominant elites in Canada stopped pushing economic anti-Americanism as an acceptable ideology. \(^{40}\) By the early 1980s, there was a growing elite consensus, reflected in both the private sector and within the state apparatus, that the historical opposition to closer economic integration with the United States was obsolete. \(^{41}\) Changes in behavior quickly followed: whereas in 1911 business interests in Canada lined up squarely against free trade, in 1988, business was very much in favor of free trade, joining with the Conservatives in deriding the opposition of the Liberals and the New Democrats as out-moded anti-Americanism. More importantly, as the free trade agreements with the United States and then Mexico began to have an impact on the huge growth of Canadian wealth in the 1990s, \(^{42}\) economic anti-Americanism within the broader public died almost completely, strongly suggesting that economic anti-Americanism in Canada has indeed needed the oxygen provided by dominant elites.

5. Contingent Anti-Americanism in Canadian Politics

While we have seen the disappearance of economic anti-Americanism in Canada since the early 1990s, we have not seen the disappearance of the third kind of anti-Americanism identified by Garfinkle, contingent anti-Americanism—in other words, the dislike of particular policies or personalities of any given United States administration. This form of anti-Americanism can (and does) co-exist with other forms of anti-Americanism; but it also can (and does) co-exist with essentially positive attitudes towards the United States, allowing us to explain, in Canada’s case, why anti-Americanism takes the “low-grade” or “lite” form it does. While for many years contingent anti-Americanism co-existed with economic anti-Americanism in Canada, it can be argued that with the disappearance of economic anti-Americanism, this has emerged to be the dominant form.

The contingent nature of Canadian anti-Americanism can perhaps best be illustrated by examining the results of a global poll conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the wake of the decision of the United States administration of George W. Bush to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. As Figure 1 shows, Canadians have generally favorable feelings towards America, second only to Americans themselves, and well ahead of the predominantly positive attitudes in other countries that have been traditionally “friendly” towards the United States such as Britain, Israel and Australia. But when asked about their feelings towards Bush or the United States invasion of Iraq, Canadians responded far less positively. While not demonstrating the degree of antipathy for Bush or the invasion of Iraq evident in France or Jordan, Canadians nonetheless suggested in their responses to the BBC poll that their generally positive

\(^{40}\) As the illustrative quotations in Granatstein’s history show, some members of different Canadian elites—academics, writers, intellectuals, or those in the media or the performance arts—continued (and continue) to use the language of “hatred” towards Americans and America, seemingly unembarrassed to use such a word in public to describe their feelings for Americans. However, in Canada, these are not the “dominant” elites.


sentiments about the United States are not automatically reflected in their views of specific American leaders or their policies.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{43} The results of the BBC poll are generally in line with other poll results for Canadian attitudes towards the United States. See, for example, the Environics Research Group/Focus Canada poll conducted for the Association for Canadian Studies in February 2003, available on-line at www.acs-aec.ca/Polls/Poll43.pdf. A majority – 62 per cent – expressed “very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” opinions of the United States; 35 per cent expressed “somewhat unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” opinions. A Leger poll conducted in April-May 2003 revealed that 50 per cent of Canadians believed that American foreign policy had a negative effect on Canada, with 41 per cent believing that the invasion of Iraq was not justified. Leger Marketing, “Canadian Attitudes After the Conflict in Iraq,” May 2003: available on-line at www.legermarketing.com. A November 2004 poll commissioned by a Canadian advocacy group, Friends of America, revealed similar results. While some of the questions were designed to elicit certain responses (“Deep down, I know that Americans are our closest friends”), the poll nonetheless revealed a basic division between warm feelings for the United States and criticism of the foreign policies of the Bush administration. “71% Rate U.S. as ’Closest Friend,’” \textit{National Post}, 29 November 2004.
The dichotomy evident in the 2003 BBC poll is by no means a new phenomenon. Canadians have always had negative views about particular American presidents and about particular policies of the United States. In the last forty years, Canadians responded differently to American presidents: in general, Democratic presidents such as Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Bill Clinton (1993-2001) were viewed more favorably in Canada than Republican presidents, such as Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974), Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), and George W. Bush (a phenomenon that has led some observers to suggest that if Canadians had the vote in American presidential elections, they would overwhelmingly vote the Democratic ticket). For example, it is instructive to compare the generally unfavorable attitude that Canadians held towards George W. Bush and his policies on Iraq in the mid-2000s with the generally favorable attitudes that Canadians had of his predecessor, Bill Clinton, and Clinton’s decision to bomb terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998: in a Gallup poll conducted on 25-26 August 1998, Clinton received a 68 per cent approval rating from Canadians, with 51 per cent of Canadians approving of the air strikes and fully 55 per cent agreeing with the question “If the United States launches similar attacks against terrorist facilities in the future would you approve or disapprove of your country’s military participating in those attacks?”

Throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, we saw similar displays of contingent anti-Americanism in Canada—primarily in the form of opposition to aspects of American global policy, or American policy towards Canada. This contingent anti-Americanism tends to manifest itself in public anger against an American president and/or some act of commission or omission of the United States governments, sometimes involving direct Canadian interests, sometimes involving American policy on issues that do not have a direct bearing on Canada or Canadians. Normally, the flare of public anger or opposition is brief; normally, it does not have a marked impact on the policy of governments in Washington or Ottawa; and normally it does not have an impact on cross-border trade.

There are numerous examples of contingent anti-Americanism in Canada driven by opposition to specific policies or personalities. Some were major events, such as the escalation of the war in Vietnam by President Lyndon B. Johnson in the mid-1960s. The massive opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States had major spillover effects in Canada, producing a kind of miniature replica effect: Canadians held similar protests, engaged in similar denunciations, and indeed used the same slogans as their American counterparts. But the war galvanized Canadian anti-Americanism as no other event has, and not simply because of the draft resisters, dodgers, deserters and others who sought to migrate from the United States during the conflict.

Some contingent anti-Americanism was prompted by relatively isolated incidents that would flare up, give rise to an expression of anti-American anger in Canada, and disappear, relatively briefly. Among these incidents could be included: the accusations by James G. Endicott, a Canadian missionary and leader of a Soviet front organization, the Canadian Peace Congress, that the United States military was using germ warfare in Korea; the suicide of Herbert Norman, the Canadian missionary and leader of a Soviet front organization, the Canadian Peace Congress, that the United States military was using germ warfare in Korea; the suicide of Herbert Norman, the Canadian

44 Gallup Poll, 27 August 1998, as reported by CNN: available on-line at www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/27/poll/. In this poll, Clinton received a 73 per cent approval rating in France; 52 per cent approved of the use of force against terrorist targets and 54 per cent agreed that the French military should participate if there were similar attacks in the future. However, in Britain, Clinton received only a 58 approval rating; 60 per cent disapproved of the use of force; 56 per cent disagreed that the British military should join the United States in similar attacks.

45 Endicott held a rally at Maple Leaf Gardens, at the time the largest venue in Toronto, on 10 May 1952, attended by a crowd of supporters all but a few of whom (who were quickly hustled out by the organizers) cheered his denunciations of American “wickedness.” His claims were widely rejected at the time, and no evidence has ever been adduced in the five decades since to support his charges. However, as Granatstein notes, “What was most significant in this whole episode was that, in the middle of a war in which Canadians were fighting and dying, ten thousand people turned out to cheer a man who was spreading stories that only the most credulous could have believed.” Toronto Star, 12 May 1952, 15; Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 107-108.
ambassador to Cairo, in April 1957, the 1971 decision by the United States to conduct underground tests of nuclear weapons on the Aleutian island of Amchitka. Although the Canadian government was of Brian Mulroney participated in the United States coalition that used force to expel Iraq from Kuwait during the Gulf War in 1991, that conflict generated a great deal of anti-Americanism.

In some cases, a particular administration’s policies on a variety of issues galvanized opposition. For example, the administration of Ronald Reagan attracted a variety of opposition in Canada over the course of the 1980s for its environmental policies (in particular the issue of acid rain from the United States), its defense policies (the Strategic Defense Initiative, the decision to test cruise missiles over Canada in 1982), its Arctic policies that challenged Canadian sovereignty, or its use of force against others in the international system (Libya, Grenada, Nicaragua).

Interestingly, the numerous trade disputes that Canadians have with Americans tend not to produce the kind of anti-American sentiments that differences over other policy areas do. Those who have been inclined to demonstrate their anger against the United States government for some aspect of American global policy have demonstrated little consciousness of, or sympathy for, their fellow nationals whose livelihoods have been affected by American actions, such as the closure of the border to beef or the imposition of countervails on some product. Likewise, those whose economic interests are affected by American protectionism have not been inclined to demonstrate their anger by protesting outside the American embassy or United States consulates. As a result, trade issues, while they produce just as much anger (if not more, since they affect concrete rather than symbolic interests), do not play an important part in anti-Americanism in Canada.

Norman had been a student at Cambridge in the 1930s and a member of the Communist Party. He had gone on to join the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1939 and had been investigated by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security chaired by Senator Joseph McCarthy in both 1951 and 1952, but had been cleared. His name surfaced again in March 1957. After the subcommittee published its testimony, Norman committed suicide. For reporters, a smiling Robert Morris, the committee’s chief counsel, held up a newspaper whose headline read “Envoy Accused as Red Kills Self.” As Donald Creighton noted, Canadian “grief and anger were great; and these strong feelings were aroused not merely by the outrage of Norman’s death,” but also “by the casual, unconcerned, perfunctory fashion in which both the Canadian and American governments treated it.” Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada, 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 291. Also Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?, 112-119.

The Amchitka test was denounced by church groups and by conservation groups worried about the possibility that the underground explosion would trigger earthquakes or tsunamis. There were large-scale protests held in front of American consulates, and three international bridges were blockaded by protestors. Two Members of Parliament traveled to Washington and picketed the White House. The Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau decided to reflect the growing anger by introducing a resolution in the House of Commons calling on the president to cancel the test; 100 MPs subsequently sent a last-minute appeal to the White House. President Nixon was unperturbed by the Canadian protests; the test went ahead on 6 November. Peter C. Dobell, Canada in World Affairs, vol. 17: 1971-1973 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 400-401.


In 1985, the United States Coast Guard sent an icebreaker, the Polar Sea, through Arctic waters claimed by Canada to be internal waters. Franklyn Griffiths, ed., Politics of the Northwest Passage (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987).
6. Oxygenating Contingent Anti-Americanism

It was noted above that economic anti-Americanism as it was manifested in Canadian politics from 1783 to 1989, depended on the oxygen that dominant elites in Canadian politics regularly provided to ensure that the fire, such as it was, kept burning brightly. On occasion, we have seen the same kind of dynamic in the case of contingent anti-Americanism, where political leaders have sought to use anti-Americanism for political purposes. While most Canadian governments have sought to downplay or minimize contingent anti-Americanism in Canada, there are two clear examples of this dynamic at work: under John Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative prime minister from 1957 to 1963, and under Jean Chrétien, the Liberal prime minister from 1993 to 2003.

John Diefenbaker was elected as leader of the Progressive Conservatives in December 1956. In the 1957 election campaign, Diefenbaker used the anti-Americanism that had been stirred by the suicide of Herbert Norman to maximum electoral advantage, arguing that the Liberals were too pro-American and that Canada was sure to become "a virtual 49th state of the American union." Part of the reason for the Conservative victory in the 1957 election that yielded a Conservative minority government, and then the 1958 election that resulted in a Conservative majority, was the appeal to the anti-American sentiment in Canada. But Diefenbaker's anti-Americanism did not flower until John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in January 1961. In 1961 and 1962, a series of deep quarrels over defense policy, policy towards Cuba, and ultimately, over how to respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, would cause a deep rift in the personal relationship between the two leaders, and lead to an even more frantic attempt by Diefenbaker to play the anti-American card in the 1963 election campaign.

Jean Chrétien came to power in the 1993 general election, having promised during the campaign that he would abandon what he claimed had been the excessively close relationship that the Conservative prime minister, Brian Mulroney, had enjoyed with both Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Chrétien was as good as his word—up to a point. While he did abandon the annual summit meeting with the president that Mulroney had instituted, and while he did not celebrate his relationship with Bill Clinton the way that Mulroney had made much of his relations with Reagan and Bush, Chrétien nonetheless developed a good relationship with Clinton, often playing golf with him and telephoning him frequently over the seven years they were both in office together.

But Chrétien also used anti-Americanism for domestic political purposes. His decision to reinstitute good relations with Cuba (after Canada's relations had been purposely downgraded in the late 1970s as a result of Cuban military adventurism in Africa) was based on his assessment that not...
only would Cuba be an excellent recipient for Canadian International Development Agency contracts, but that the divergence between Canadian and American positions on Cuba could entrench his own claims to be more distant from Washington.55

Indeed, Chrétien’s attitude towards the political importance of anti-Americanism was revealed quite inadvertently in July 1997. While attending a NATO summit in July 1997, Chrétien and Jean-Luc Dehane, the prime minister of Belgium, were chatting with one another in French—without realizing that their microphones were open. Chrétien confided to Dehane that he had made defying the United States “my policy. The Cuba affair, I was the first to stand up [unintelligible]. People like that.” (But Chrétien also added: “You have to do it carefully, because they’re friends.”)56

But with the election of George W. Bush, much of the “care” was abandoned. On numerous occasions, Chrétien left in little doubt his negative sentiments for the Bush administration and his generally skeptical view of the United States in global politics.

One small but telling measure of Chrétien’s attitudes was a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television documentary on 9/11 broadcast on 12 September 2002. Chrétien was quoted on the program expressing the view that 9/11 was the result of a widening chasm between rich and poor, between the weak and the powerful. The West, claimed Chrétien was “looked upon as being arrogant, self-satisfied and greedy and with no limits.” He went on to say that “You know you cannot exercise your powers to the point of humiliation for the others,” he said. “That is what the Western world—not only the Americans—has to realize. I do think that the Western world is getting too rich in relation to the poor world and this is silly.”57 These comments were widely interpreted, in Canada and particularly in the United States, as arguing that the Americans themselves were responsible for 9/11.

As the crisis over Iraq intensified in the fall and winter of 2002-2003, the Chrétien government’s opposition to the emerging war melded with both an antipathy towards George W. Bush and a deep strain of anti-Americanism in the government and particularly its backbench, sometimes obscuring which was dominant. For example, on 20 November 2002, Chrétien’s director of communications, Françoise Ducros, was reacting to a speech by Bush at a NATO summit in Prague that called for American allies to spend more on defense and to concentrate more on the evolving crisis in Iraq. In front of two reporters, Ducros said of Bush: “What a moron.” After she was named in the national media, Ducros did not resign; the prime minister did not condemn the comment. Rather, his response was to say that Bush was “a friend of mine. He is not a moron at all.” American talk shows picked up the comment and ran with it for the rest of the week and over the weekend. Finally, on 26 November Ducros resigned. Chrétien accepted her resignation, commending her for her service and wishing her good luck. However, as opposition critics and media commentators noted, the delay in her resignation and the refusal of the prime minister to respond harshly to her characterization left the impression that that view was more widely held within the Chrétien government.58

If Ducros’s comments were more properly anti-Bush than anti-American, the comments of a backbench Liberal MP, Carolyn Parrish, were clearly anti-American. On 26 February 2003, while leaving a meeting on Parliament Hill, Parrish was caught by a microphone responding angrily to a


56 Maclean’s, 21 July 1997; Globe and Mail, 10 July 1997.


question from the media by saying: “Damn Americans! I hate those bastards.” Although she apologized afterwards—claiming, quite illogically, that the words did not represent her views—she immediately appeared on *The Mike Bullard Show* on the Comedy Network, where the news clip was replayed to the delight of the largely young crowd, and Parrish unapologetically claimed that she couldn’t promise not to do it again. Although the opposition called on the prime minister to expel her from the Liberal caucus, Chrétien refused to discipline her, leading Andrew Coyne, of the *National Post*, to comment that.

After so many similar episodes, the conclusion is inescapable: Liberal anti-Americanism is not a problem for Mr. Chrétien to manage, but rather an outgrowth of his own attitudes and beliefs. As with its counterparts elsewhere, the Liberal “street” is less a spontaneous popular phenomenon than the unofficial voice of the regime. She may put it in cruder terms, but by and large, Ms. Parrish says what Mr. Chrétien thinks.59

The antipathy towards Bush—if not for Americans more broadly—in Chrétien’s Ottawa had an impact. Bush cancelled a visit to Ottawa that had been planned for May 2003, and pointed refused to extend an invitation to the Canadian prime minister to the ranch at Crawford. Relations between the two leaders through much of the remainder of 2003 remained chilly.

After Paul Martin took over from Chrétien as prime minister in December 2003, he made a conscious effort to improve relations with the United States. However, he continued the tradition of playing the anti-American card in the 2004 general election, making sure that he characterized the opposition Conservatives as proposing an “American-style” health system and “American-style” tax cuts.60

Moreover, Martin made no move to discipline Carolyn Parrish when she continued to express anti-Bush and anti-American views. In August 2004, she characterized anyone supporting Ballistic Missile Defense as being part of a “coalition of the idiots,” mocking Bush’s “coalition of the willing.”61 After the 2004 presidential elections in the United States, she expressed shock at Bush’s re-election and claimed that “Americans were out of touch with the rest of the free world.” Shortly afterwards, she appeared on a satirical CBC program, *This Hour Has 22 Minutes*, and as a joke stuck voodoo pins in the head of a George Bush doll (“where it would do the least damage”), and then stomped on it for the cameras (but then also kissed it).

None of this was enough to attract prime ministerial discipline. What got her expelled from the Liberal caucus was not her anti-Americanism, but what she said in confidence to a reporter about the prime minister. Angry at the lack of support by Martin for her renomination bid, she declared that Martin “could go to hell” if he wanted her to stop speaking her mind. “If [Martin] loses the next election and has to resign, I wouldn’t shed a tear over it.” The story appeared the following morning: Martin expelled her from the Liberal caucus within hours.62

In sum, contingent anti-Americanism remains alive and well in Canada, used for political purposes, just as Granatstein predicted. Even Paul Martin, who came to office promising to restore Canadian-American relations, could not resist playing the anti-American card in the 2004 election campaign. And, saddled with a minority government after the election, he was not prepared to risk challenge anti-American sentiment in his own caucus or in the country by joining the Ballistic Missile Defense scheme. In February 2005, the government announced that it would not be joining BMD, but without offering any explanation—other than to say that it was not in Canada’s interests to join.

7. Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that the kind of anti-Americanism we see in Canada today is neither the philosophical variant so evident in continental Europe or the economic anti-Americanism that was so much a part of Canadian political culture for two centuries. As Granatstein has argued, that variant is no longer dominant, having been abandoned by Canada’s elites in favor of an integrationist perspective. Rather, the strand that is dominant in Canada today is contingent anti-Americanism, where opposition and antipathy to George W. Bush and his administration’s policies co-exist with generalized feelings of friendship, warmth and closeness to Americans and the United States. And while we have seen political leaders in Canada—even those who claim to want to improve Canadian-American relations—play the anti-American card, thus oxygenating contingent anti-Americanism, we do not see any shift from those generalized positive feelings.

This suggests that the anti-Americanism that remains in Canada—low-grade and ultra-lite contingent anti-Americanism—is indeed contingent on political developments in the United States. As I have argued above, Canadian expressions of opposition to Bush—“anti-Bushism”—and expressions of anti-Americanism tended to be all too often intertwined and not easily separable. One implication of this is that the rise in anti-Americanism that many Canadians themselves have reported feeling⁶³ may be temporary and limited to George W. Bush’s tenure in office to January 2009, or to the conduct of the war in Iraq, which may be considerably longer. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that the essentially positive feelings that Canadians have for Americans and for the United States will remain unaffected. For while some Americans may lump Canadians into an “axis of envy,” the kind of sentiments that Canadians have for the United States and for Americans remain as mixed as that original—and unique—act of anti-Americanism in the 1770s.

⁶³ When asked “Speaking personally, have you become a lot more pro-American lately/somewhat more pro-American/stayed the same/somewhat more anti-American/or a lot more anti-American”, respondents in a COMPAS/Global Television Poll conducted 25-27 November 2004, 8 per cent responded a lot more pro-American lately, 23 per cent somewhat more pro-American, 26 per cent reported no change, 27 per cent responded somewhat more, and 21 per cent a lot more. Available online at http://www.compas.ca/data/041201-RisingAnti-Americanism-PB.pdf.