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Return to Europe. Reflections after 20 Years of Democratic Renewal

Research Report on Hungary

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RETURN TO EUROPE:
REFLECTIONS AFTER 20 YEARS OF DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL
RESEARCH REPORT ON HUNGARY

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ABSTRACT

This report offers a reflection on the state of democracy in Hungary twenty years after the change of regime. It examines the democratic transition using material from an opinion poll and an accompanying focus group. The second part investigates the institutional setup and the internal mechanisms of Hungary's democracy promotion activities, identifying the main governmental and non-governmental players involved. Drawing on expert interviews, some of current conceptual and practical challenges are discussed. The conclusion assesses the findings of both the public survey and the expert interviews and offers a synthesis and policy implications. This research is part of a comparative study led by the Policy Association for an Open Society, comparing public attitudes towards democracy and democracy promotion in the four Visegrád countries.

1 This research has been conducted under the auspices of the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) and was funded by the Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency of the European Union and by the International Visegrad Fund. The project leaders at the Center for Policy Studies (CEU) were Ágnes Batory and Andrew Cartwright.

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1. Introduction

Two distinct but related pillars form the structure of this paper. The first is a reflection on Hungary's democratic transition using material from an opinion poll and an accompanying focus group discussion. The second pillar is based on expert interviews and provides an insight into the institutional setup and the internal mechanisms of Hungary's democracy promotion activities. Twenty years after the change of regime, this research is part of a comparative study that takes stock of public attitudes towards democracy system in the four Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). It follows up from *Democracy's New Champions*, a study that examined the new institutions and policies that have been developed by the V4 to promote democracy abroad.

Concerning public perceptions of democracy and democratic transition, a representative polling of a sample of the adult population (1,000 respondents) was conducted along with a focus group discussion with young professionals of 27-28 years of age. The reason for selecting this age group was that although members were all born in the past regime, they entered primary school in 1989, which marks the beginning of transition to democracy and market economy. As such, they have been socialized into a political, economic, and social environment in transit. The Hungarian focus group was composed of 12 individuals that represented a balance of genders, professional backgrounds, places of origin, and marital status.

Both the opinion poll and the focus group discussion addressed the following main questions:

- Does the current democratic system offer more or less advantages than the past regime?
- Did the pre-1989 political and economic system require changes and if so to what extent?
- Taking the 20-year perspective, has democracy building been a success or a failure?
- Did external actors make the primary contribution to democratic transition or was democracy accomplished mainly through domestic efforts?
- Should the country be involved in democracy promotion activities abroad?

The first substantive part of this report introduces and analyzes the results of the opinion poll and focus group discussion, while the second is dedicated to an examination of Hungary's democracy promotion activities. First, a brief overview identifies the main governmental and non-governmental players involved in democracy promotion. Then, based on the expert interviews, some of the current conceptual and practical challenges are discussed. The conclusion assesses the findings of both the public survey and the expert interviews and offers a synthesis and policy implications as well.

1.1. Results of the opinion poll and the focus group discussion

According to the opinion poll, a majority of Hungarians are both deeply dissatisfied with the democratic transition and—perhaps as a result—they have largely negative views towards democracy promotion abroad. In both respects, these results differ sharply from the other three country polls (Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia). The focus group discussion not only reinforced the findings of the survey but also offered insights into potential reasons behind the high level of social discontent.

Half of the respondents believed that the present system has either more or much more disadvantages than the previous regime. Just under a quarter believed that the current system offers slightly more advantages, with only 4.4 % saying that there are much more advantages now than before 1989. The question did not ask where the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems lay. When comparing the pre-1989 regime to the present, focus group participants almost exclusively referred to the economic gains and losses of the transition. In this sense, democracy was conflated with capitalism, as shown with the following quote:

“Although we cannot remember the pre-1989 period well, I am convinced that during the communist regime there was a certain living standard achievable for every citizen, whereas nowadays we face economic and unemployment risks and uncertainty in life.”

Another participant offered a more nuanced view on the same issue:

“In certain respect it was better to live in the communist regime but nobody, except for some radicals, wants to bring those times back. It is rather the social security, which was present in the past, to which most people are nostalgic. At the time of the change of regime, expectations were too high and few were aware that every social and political system has its own advantages and disadvantages.”

Focus group participants have been socialized into a society in transition and seem to see material gains and losses as determining success in life. Few were explicitly concerned with democratic values such as personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or the right to participate in political processes. The freedom to travel abroad was unanimously viewed as a very positive outcome of democratization. As they appeared to take these values for granted, these views may be considered as proof that participants have incorporated democratic values. However, their interpretation of democracy was very much concerned with its economic aspects and the political dimension and the civic liberties were much less observed.

There was consensus that “compared to life before the change of regime now there are much more opportunities available but the majority of citizens are unable to take advantage of them.” Another participant added that “certainly, there is greater freedom now but greater freedom should involve greater responsibility and certain commitments, too, and few have recognized this, not even the economic and political elite.”

The vast majority of the poll respondents (84.3 % and 83.4 % respectively) agreed that changes to the past political and economic system were necessary. However, there was a profound divide between those that thought these changes needed to be substantial and those who saw the changes more in sense of minor adjustments. Whilst almost 45 % thought there needed to be major changes to the political system, almost 40 % answered that only minor changes were required. When it came to the economic system, respondents split almost evenly although in this case there were slightly more (42 % compared to 41.2 %) who thought that the changes needed to be minor rather than major.

Both sets of material show that democracy building in Hungary is assessed in a strikingly negative manner. Twenty years after the change of regime, 66.3 % of all respondents considered democracy building to have been a failure. Only 2.2 % thought that it was definitely a success. The focus group participants were all of the opinion that the rule of law does not prevail in Hungary. The next quotation reflects well the concerns that were raised:

“This is not a democracy in which we live now. The greatest problem is that to some privileged groups this is a country of no consequences and this makes others very frustrated. And there is not a strong civic movement either which would enforce the rules and the sense of responsibility.”

The majority of respondents (45.5%) said that democracy in Hungary was built mainly with external help. Only slightly more than one-third (34.9 %) thought that democratic transition took place primarily through domestic efforts. As the focus group discussion revealed, this perception of strong external influence may be evaluated negatively rather than positively. Most participants agreed that:

“We received some help from the West but only to an extent that it was good for them but not enough for us. We got help only to become a bit richer to be able to buy their products but remain in the semi-periphery.”

Participants agreed that the USA and the European Union assisted Hungary in democratic transition only to the extent that their material interests dictated. They were also convinced that without the prospect of substantial economic gains, the West would not have offered much help at all. This skepticism towards the motivations that countries have for democracy building is perhaps one explanation for why so few respondents support democracy promotion abroad. A majority, 56.6 %, thought that Hungary should not engage in democracy promotion activities abroad. The focus group participants had more positive attitudes towards spreading democratic values, although critical voices regarding the state’s involvement in such projects were also raised:

“I may be too skeptical about it but I do not think that the state should initiate such programs - it should rather be the role of civic organizations to promote democracy. ”

However, most of the focus group believed that Hungary’s democracy promotion should be about providing economic help. Few mentioned the role of educational initiatives or technical assistance concerning constitutional matters or election issues. Participants did believe that negative examples might also be very instructive and, in this sense, Hungary could offer the experience of institution building to democratizing countries. All things considered, the general frustration and dissatisfaction of Hungarian society, which became apparent in the survey results, was well reflected in the focus group discussion. The next section attempts to find those underlying dimensions that may give rise to such negative views.


1.2. Interpretation of the survey results and focus group discussion

Two major factors contribute to the high level of discontent with Hungarian democracy. The first is the dissatisfaction with the economy, something that is clearly aggravated by the ongoing economic crisis that has hit Hungary especially hard. The second is the widely shared view that the political elite in the country have been discredited. This gives rise to a sense of moral crisis, which may also culminate in signs of social disintegration such as the rise of radical parties, the emergence of quasi military defense groups and an increase in violence against minorities.¹ Furthermore, these attitudes can help generate an overall mistrust in the institutions of the state that is then directly projected onto the democratic system itself.

The opinion poll offers several insights into the above described phenomenon. For example, if we disaggregate the responses to the question on democracy building by political preferences, then it becomes clear that voters of all the parties as well as the non-voters consider democratic transition a failure. While supporters of extremist parties tend to be unhappier, there is no significant division between voters of the governing socialists or the centre-right opposition in respect of the outcome of democratization. The general public frustration towards the political system (and to the political elite) is further illustrated by the high share of those who either did not have or did not reveal their party preferences (36 %).


1 Jobbik, the extreme-right political party called, gained an unprecedented 14.77 % at the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections (more than 427,000 votes) and thus was able to send three MPs to the EP, while the governing socialist party (MSZP) performed just slightly better at 17.37 % and has 4 elected MPs. (source: National Election Office, <http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/index.html>). The so-called Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), a quasi-military defense group strongly affiliated with Jobbik, has recently been banned but still remains popular. At the same time, several violent attacks against the Roma minority have occurred, among which the most shocking has been a series of murders committed by a group of extreme-right people.

Figure 1: From a 20-year perspective, do you think that building democracy in our country was a success or failure? (% of respondents by political preference)




Discontent is not the preserve of any one age group. As Figure 2 demonstrates, in every single age cohort the majority shares the view that democracy building has been rather a failure in Hungary, although the level of discontent drops as we move from the oldest to the youngest generations.

Figure 2: From a 20-year perspective, do you think that building democracy in our country was a success or failure? (% of respondents by age group)




If we break down the figures by highest educational attainment (elementary, vocational, high school or university) then there are some important differences between those with higher and lower qualifications. There were significantly higher numbers of those with high school or university education who said that democracy building was rather a success (30 % and 34 % respectively) as compared with those with an elementary or vocational school background (18 % and 21 %). abroad. In both respects, these results differ sharply from the other three country polls (Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia). The focus group discussion not only reinforced the findings of the survey but also offered insights into potential reasons behind the high level of social discontent.

Figure 3: From a 20-year perspective, do you think that building democracy in our country was a success or failure? (% of respondents by highest education attainment)



This division may demonstrate that in addition to the widely held dissatisfaction with the political elite and the political system, there are differences between groups. This is apparent in Figure 4, which displays the disaggregation of responses by employment status.

Figure 4: From a 20-year perspective, do you think that building democracy in our country was a success or failure? (% of respondents by employment status)




Although a majority in each group shares the view concerning the failure of democratic transition, the proportion at the negative extreme (“definitely a failure”) changes significantly if we compare the employed, the unemployed and the retired. Whilst 14.4 % of the employed thought that democracy building has definitely been a failure, amongst the unemployed and the retired, the proportion sharing this view was more than twofold (29.5 % and 25.7 % respectively). This shows that the latter groups tend to assess democratic transition more negatively than others, which may be attributed to their disadvantageous economic position.

Further support to this argument comes from responses to the question does the current system offer more or less advantages than the previous regime. While employed people were evenly split between the two sides, the unemployed and the retired were clearly of the belief that the present system offers more or much more disadvantages than the previous. Since 38.8 % of all the respondents were in one of these two groups, their impact on the overall results was crucial. When assessing the degree of changes needed

to the old political and economic system, this division between employed, unemployed and retired becomes even evident. The majority of those employed thought that both the political (54.4 %) and the economic (51.1 %) systems needed substantial change. By contrast, the majority of the unemployed and the retired believed that only minor changes were necessary in both systems (46.6 % and 48 % regarding the political and 51.1 % and 52.5% concerning the economic system). The unemployed and the retired were also twice as likely to believe that the previous system did not require any changes as those listed as employed.

Figure 5: If you comparing the pre-1989 period with the present, do you think the current has more advantages? (% of respondents by employment status)




Questions on the success of democratic transition and on whether the current system offers more or less advantages than the past regime are complementing each other. Respondents were fairly consistent with their choices when giving an answer to these questions: 43.3 % of all respondents claimed that the current system has more disadvantages and at the same time considered democracy building rather a failure. Only 5.3 % of the respondents claimed that building democracy was rather a success while considering the present system as having more disadvantages than the past one. However, those who thought that there were more advantages now than in the past also slightly tended to assess democratic change negatively: 10.7 % of all respondents were on the view that democracy building was rather a failure although they thought that the present system offered more advantages. The same pattern characterizes those who could not distinguish between the present and the past in terms of advantages: they were more likely to assess democratic transition as a failure.

Table 1: Share of all respondents assessing the advantages of the democratic system and the success of democratic transition in comparison with the pre-1989 era

	More advantages	More disadvantages	About the same / Don't know	Total
Rather a success	16.8 %	5.3 %	6.1 %	28.1%
Rather a failure	10.7 %	43.3 %	12.4 %	66.4 %
Don't know	0.9 %	1.6 %	3.1 %	5.6 %
Total	28.4 %	50.1 %	21.5 %	100.0 %

The above discussion highlights some underlying characteristics of the population which sees democracy building as rather a failure. Voters of extremist parties, those belonging to the older generations, those with lower educational attainments and those either retired or unemployed were the groups that demonstrated a substantially higher level of discontent as compared to others. However, the following figures show that public dissatisfaction with the current system also has a territorial aspect, reflecting internal regional disparities and in this way, highlighting the economic dimension of discontent with democracy. The 19 counties of Hungary were evenly aggregated into four different groups according to the latest available GDP per capita data (from 2006), while Budapest was treated as a separate group.²

Figure 6: County grouping according to GDP per capita in 2006




Budapest is by far the wealthiest region with a GDP per capita exceeding 21,000 EUR (at current prices), whereas the richest county, Győr-Moson-Sopron, was just below 11,000 EUR per capita. The four county groups therefore represent the relative wealth of the regions, from the richest (8,000-11,000 EUR per capita) through the higher mid-range (6,800-8,000 EUR), the lower mid-range (6,000-6,800 EUR) to the poorest counties at below 6,000 EUR. To the richer groups mostly western and northwestern counties of Hungary belong while the poorer ones are made up of the eastern and south-eastern counties.³

Figure 7 displays the distribution of answers to the question about the success of democratic transition by county group. In the poorest counties, over a quarter of the respondents (28.7%) felt that democracy building has definitely been a failure. If we combine those saying that democracy building was rather or definitely a failure, then over two-thirds of respondents in the two poorest groups thought this, rather than just over 60 % in the capital.

2 Data obtained from the Territorial Statistical Yearbook (2008) of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.


3 Richest counties (per capita): Győr-Moson-Sopron (€10,961), Komárom-Esztergom (€9,780), Vas (€9,401), Fejér (€9,240); higher mid-range: Pest (€8,135), Zala (€7,571), Csongrád (€7,031), Veszprém (€6,906), Baranya (€6,862), Hajdú-Bihar (€6,845); lower-mid range: Heves (€6,555), Tolna (€6,422), Bács-Kiskun (€6,317), Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (€6,301), Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok (€6,216); poorest: Somogy (€5,922), Békés (€5,479), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (€5,068) and Nógrád (€4,713).

Figure 7: After 20 years, do you think that building democracy in your country was a success or a failure? (% of respondents by groupings of counties, GDP per head in EUR, 2006)



An even more striking division appears when inquiring about the advantages of the current system. As we move from Budapest to the poorer regions, the share of those that believing that there were slightly more or much more disadvantages now than before 1989 increases substantially.

Figure 8: If you compare the pre-1989 period with the present, do you think the current one has more advantages (by groupings of counties according to their GDP per capita in EUR in 2006)?



The vast majority of respondents from the poorer counties thought that neither the pre-1989 political nor the economic system needed profound changes. They thought that the old system needed only minor reform or that no changes were needed at all, which poses a sharp contrast to the opinion of respondents from other regions.

These findings support the argument that economic uncertainty and welfare play a crucial role in the public assessment of the current democratic system. There is a strong territorial division between the economically more prosperous regions and those areas lagging behind. Due to location choices of foreign investors, amongst other things, regional disparities have become exacerbated since the change of regime, and the gap between the relatively rich and the poor areas has increased (Antalóczy and Sass 2005, Brown et. al. 2007, Fink 2006). The high expectations after 1989 that living standards would rise were not entirely fulfilled and this may partly explain the levels of current public discontent.

One may have to look back in time in order to understand why the situation has evolved this way.

In the previous era, in order to appease the population and to avoid the outbreak of another revolution, the Kádár regime⁴ was convinced that it had to offer a relatively good standard of living accessible to every citizen, in return that people stayed away from politics. The communist regime could only provide this by compromising on foreign debt. Hungary's relatively high standards of living, compared to other eastern bloc countries, were financed with huge foreign debts, something which eventually was a major contributor to the collapse of the regime.

During the period of “existing socialism,” Hungarians may have internalized the idea of generous, seemingly “cost-free” social services and, again relatively speaking, widespread access to consumer goods. This was reflected in popular expectations towards regime change often expressed in rather materialistic terms: people thought the changes would bring higher standards of living, a steady rise in economic growth and a better life. The political elite gave credence to these beliefs in its communications. Since both the transition to democratic rule and the market economy took place simultaneously, the concepts of democracy and market economy became strongly interwoven in people's minds. Democratic transition is widely considered a welfare project and as such the notion of democracy has been captured by rather simplistic expectations about its material benefits. A very similar development took place around the time of entering the European Union. The political communication made people believe that membership in the EU would solve many of the country's problems for good. The Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn 2008 showed the disillusionment which followed: only 31 % of all Hungarian respondents said that being a member of the EU was a good thing, placing the country the second lowest in the EU-27. In Autumn 2003, by contrast, 56 % of respondents said that becoming a member of the EU would be a good thing.⁵

Expectations towards regime change appear to be largely unfulfilled: regime change was followed by a sharp fall in economic output generating a huge rise in unemployment, lower household incomes and the weakening of the social welfare system. Certain regions have been particularly harshly affected by these changes and many have not been able to recover fully.⁶ The current economic crisis that involved both the depreciation of the currency and the introduction of austerity measures hit people hard, particularly the many Hungarians who held foreign currency based mortgages. In other words, the promises made for regime change and EU accession remain unfulfilled in many people's minds, fueling rising popular discontent and disillusionment with the economic and political systems.

The political elite may also be held responsible for this outcome. There is a widespread disappointment in the numerous cases of corruption that are reported in the media. The fact that successful prosecutions in these cases appear rare creates the impression that justice cannot catch up with the privileged.⁷ That the political elites lack any real sense of responsibility undermines their credibility in many people's eyes.⁸ As argued earlier, this may feed the perception that democratic institutions are unable to fulfill their tasks with the result that the entire Hungarian democratic system is assessed negatively.

4 After the 1956 Revolution, which was crushed by an overwhelming Soviet military attack, János Kádár became Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. He stayed in power until 1988. As such, the decades leading to the change of regime are marked as the Kádár era.

5 Eurobarometer Survey, Hungarian National Report, Autumn 2008, pp.10-11, at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_hu_nat.pdf.

6 For an overview of some of the literature on regional development in Hungary, see Andrew Cartwright, et al. 'Social capital, regional development, and Europeanisation in Hungary – a literature review,' Center for Policy Studies, 2007, at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/ESOC/Lab/pdf/Social%20capital%20and%20Regional%20Development%20in%20Hungary.pdf>.

7 According to Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hungary fell 8 positions compared to 2007 and ranked 47th. The country was criticized for the lack of transparency in party and campaign financing, and because of “the weakness in law enforcement and light sanctions in corruption cases.” *Budapest Business Journal*, 23 September 2008, at: <http://www.bbj.hu/index.php?col=1002&cid=44189>.

8 Only 10 % of the Hungarian respondents trusted political parties, almost half the average rate in the EU-27 (19 %). E Eurobarometer survey, Hungarian National Report, Spring 2009, p. 7, at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_hu_hu_nat.pdf.

2. Domestic institutional structure of Hungary's democracy promotion activities


Hungary's involvement in the promotion of democracy abroad is a relatively recent phenomenon. At the time of writing this report (December 2009) Hungary still does not have an official document that sets out the overall strategy, something that perhaps accounts for the overlapping responsibilities of the various governmental agencies involved. A framework document has been scheduled for some time. In its absence, the next most important document indicating relevant guidelines and principles is the External Relations Strategy that was adopted in March 2008. Since 2008, there has been a governmental committee for international development cooperation (IDC) whose responsibility it is to coordinate IDC activities, including democracy export. However, this body is mostly a consultative rather than a policy setting forum. The overall strategic direction for democracy promotion is determined within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Within the MFA, several departments are involved in democracy projects. In order to coordinate among them, the so-called Democracy Workgroup was established in 2007, which began its operation in 2008. This Workgroup consists of six departments, as shown in Figure 9. Its task is to "set the strategic direction of democracy assistance, to decide on the democracy assistance projects to be financed from the Democracy Appropriation, to coordinate between the different departments, and to organize external communications" (Horváth 2008: 55-56). The Workgroup receives project proposals from civil organizations, from embassies and other organizations. Since it operates under the auspices of the Department for International Development Cooperation the head of this department has a major influence in determining the strategy as well as the projects to be implemented (Horváth 2008).

The MFA has a contracted implementing agency, Hungarian International Development Assistance Non-Profit Company (HUN-IDA), which carries out certain international development and democracy assistance projects. The contract between the two parties will expire at the end of 2009 and, following public tendering, a new organization is expected to be announced by the MFA. However, there is also an NGO that is partly affiliated with the government. The International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) was established in 2005 along with the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation (CDPF), which is a government-founded body. The ICDT is an independent institute of the CDPF and receives funding from it so, although the government does not directly allocate funds for the ICDT, through its regular budget allocation to the CDPF, it does have access to budgetary resources. In spite of this, the ICDT tries to position itself as a traditional NGO and it is indeed fully autonomous in choosing its partners for project implementation.

Since 2003, the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND) has been the umbrella organization for civic bodies involved in international development. Several of its members are engaged in democracy export, one of them, whose representative was interviewed, is the Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights (DemNet). DemNet has been active since 1995. Besides HAND and its members, there are other NGOs that are involved in democracy promotion, for example, Freedom House Europe has been promoting democracy since 1995 when it was registered in Hungary. Finally, the Association of European Election Officers (ACEEEO) is a major specialized NGO advocating the transparency of elections in the broader region and it has been active since 1991.

Figure 9: Governmental and non-governmental institutions in Hungary involved in democracy promotion



3. Hungarian democracy promotion abroad: An analysis

This section provides an analytical summary of the interviews of those involved in democracy promotion. First, the conceptual roots of Hungary's democracy promotion activities are discussed then a detailed analysis of the socio-political and institutional background follows highlighting the key problems and challenges. The next chapter outlines some suggestions on how to improve the Hungarian approach to democracy export, while the last discusses the country's participation in international cooperation of democracy promotion.

3.1. Domestic democratization and democracy promotion abroad: The missing link

Hungary has a long track record in international development assistance. Prior to the change of regime these missions were carried out mainly in the so-called "non-aligned" states. They were implemented under the ideological guidance of the Soviet Union and helped to extend the influence of the communist bloc. The international contacts and networks that were established gained new significance after the change of regime.

After 1989 Hungary attempted to play a stabilizing role in the Central and Eastern European region, including the export of democracy and democratic norms in the neighborhood. The passage to OECD membership in 1996, NATO in 1997 and the European Union in 2004 marked the completion of the democratic transition. It also involved the expansion of the geographical scope of democracy promotion activities from the regional to the global level. This is where the long established contacts with such countries as Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Yemen played an important role and Hungary used these to help in its democracy promotion activities.

However, the incorporation of democracy promotion within foreign policy was not so much the outcome of domestic political consensus, but is more of a need to respond to external pressures and to satisfy international demand. All those interviewed agreed that international factors and external constraints were the main reason why democracy assistance became an explicit foreign policy goal. Membership in the aforementioned international organizations entails certain commitments such as taking part in democracy promotion and at least in regard to the country's goal of playing a regional stabilizing role, these external expectations coincided with domestic ambitions.

Whilst Hungary could not have made democracy promotion part of its foreign policy agenda had it not managed this transition itself, at the same time, it was not initially evident that this process could be the "selling point." According to one of the interviewees, "we did not recognize ourselves that the experience of democratic transition may be a value in itself that could qualify as a "marketable" export product – external actors made us recognize it." Some experts went even further, declaring that the spreading of the "transition experience" is an artificial construct informally imposed by western democracies. Publicizing the Central and Eastern European transition as a success story and as the victory of democracy and market capitalism may be in the interest of older Western democracies still carrying the historical burden of colonialism. By encouraging the new member states to get involved, the supposedly European program of international development tied to democratic conditionality is enhanced. Even if the stimulus did have external origins, there were those involved in democracy promotion in Hungary who identified with this democratic development agenda. However, the absence of an "organic" internal development may be the cause for some of the institutional and financial shortcomings that characterize the Hungarian approach to democracy promotion.

3.2. Problems and challenges in Hungarian democracy promotion

Regarding the institutional make-up of democracy promotion activities, both the government and NGO representatives made similar diagnoses, although the NGOs were more critical. Notwithstanding the almost complete lack of public awareness and support for this work, the current political environment is also not conducive to democracy assistance. Both the legal framework and a coherent policy strategy are missing and there is no clear division of labour between the various governmental institutions. Whilst this can create problems, the openness of the environment can also offer opportunities for NGOs to shape the future policy directions.

Social and political support for democracy promotion

The experts interviewed agreed that most Hungarians are unaware of this policy field, although it is true that they are rarely informed about democracy promotion work. In the current economic climate, a public campaign about the necessity for democracy promotion would probably not receive a favorable reception. For one ministry official, such a campaign would probably generate objection and discontent because “people would not approve the spending of public money abroad.”

Opinions differed on the extent to which politicians and political parties support democracy assistance projects. Although there appears a general political consensus on spreading democratic values, this may not translate into normative commitments. Political support rarely gets beyond the rhetorical level. As an NGO representative put it, “it looks good in a politician’s CV to be involved in democracy promotion.” However, present political circumstances do not encourage those engaging in real support and taking practical actions. While Hungarian society remains uninformed about the values of the activity, it is hard to create broad societal support for the view of Hungary as a democracy promoter.

The legal background of the policy

As of autumn 2009 Hungary has no official strategy for democracy assistance, although such a document was promised for autumn 2008. In part, the delay may be explained by the fact that the legal background has not been clarified. The drafting process began long ago within the MFA. The Ministry has cooperated with the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND), an umbrella organization, and has incorporated many of its recommendations. The law would serve as a strategic document that sets out the institutional background and mechanisms through which international development cooperation and democracy promotion would operate. According to the Head of Department for International Cooperation and Development (DIDC) at the MFA, in spite of these prolonged preparations, the law will not be submitted to the Parliament in this parliamentary cycle. There is an ongoing conflict within the government with the Ministry of Finance disputing the financial implications while the Ministry of Justice rejects it on the grounds of not being operational. Compared to the other two ministries, the MFA is by far the weakest partner. It remains to be seen whether the status quo will change after the parliamentary elections in spring 2010. Without a stronger commitment of the new government to international development cooperation and democracy assistance, the present situation will likely remain.

The pending status of the law and the lack of strategy also mean that funds are unpredictable and unstable, varying year by year. This makes planning more difficult. As the NGO representatives said, the current project-oriented approach supports short-term approaches. Instead of placing the projects within a long-term strategic program, the Hungarian government tends to run many small-scale, sometimes parallel programs, often with little impact.

Conceptual and institutional problems

The major criticism was that in both international development cooperation and democracy assistance there is no effective coordination among governmental actors. The “strategy” is dependent upon the bureaucracy, the social networks and the personal influence of key individuals. Both ministry officials and NGO representatives argued that the ideal scenario would be for the strategy to determine the institutional setup. In the current situation each player pursues its own goals and interests and even within the MFA there is a noticeable lack of coordination between departments and units involved in democracy promotion. This is reinforced by Zoltán Tóth, Secretary General of the Association of European Election Officers (ACEEEO), who recalled that when his organization put on a major event in 2008, more than 50 officials had to be invited from the MFA. They were all, to some extent, involved in promoting democracy abroad, but had it not been for the ACEEEO meeting, many of them would not have known they worked in the same field.

These arrangements lead to controversies on the conceptual level. Both Dénes Tomaj, the Head of DIDC at MFA and Ibolya Bárány, the managing director of the Hungarian International Development Assistance Non-Profit Company (HUN-IDA) claim that Hungarian democracy promotion has a “demand-driven” approach, meaning that the only projects that are implemented are those that have preliminary approval from the target countries. In short, non-democratic countries targeted for democracy assistance are first asked if they consent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this approach to democracy promotion is not shared by all. István Gyarmati, President and CEO of the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) argues that a democratic country should demonstrate normative power towards non-democratic regimes by not compromising on the profile of democracy promotion projects. These conceptual disagreements between the ICDT and the Ministry and its implementation agency reflect the lack of a democracy assistance strategy to which all relevant actors could align.⁹

Due to the lack of a coherent framework, target countries are also defined inconsistently. While the MFA officially focuses on the Western Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), several projects are implemented in countries with which Hungary has long-established relationships such as Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Burma. In 2008, the major Hungarian democracy assistance projects were realized in North Korea, Cuba, Palestine, Moldova, Burma, Kosovo and Albania.¹⁰

While governmental representatives were mainly criticizing the low amount of budgetary funds available for democracy promotion, NGOs took a critical stance concerning how these resources are distributed. Some claimed that it is not the level of expertise that is the primary determinant of gaining access to financial resources but the quality of personal contacts and political ties. The tendering process of the governmental funds open to NGOs is seen as too bureaucratic, cumbersome and unnecessarily complicated, which also makes many of them rather reluctant to submit project proposals. However, turning abroad for funding is not an easy option as there is much more competition for resources between NGOs at the international level.

9 The ICDT is formally not part of the governmental framework for democracy export but the Hungarian government played a major role in its establishment, and since 2005 it has received approximately 52 % of its total funding from governmental sources. On funding see page 15 of the ICDT publication, «Promoting Democracy Worldwide 2009», at: http://www.icdt.hu/admin/download/a357ICDT_Brochure_2009.pdf (accessed on 11 January 2010) and on the origins of the Centre its website at http://www.icdt.hu/def_ma.php?sm=15&q=1, accessed on 11 January 2010.

10 Report on the Activities Accomplished on the Field of International Development Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2009, p. 48, at: http://www.kum.hu/NR/rdonlyres/D2DB5DD4-42B2-4D3B-BB59-3F6808D15F03/0/Beszamolo_2008_KB_utan_modositott_vegleges_gya.pdf.

Government financing of democracy promotion

Regarding the financial issues, democracy assistance is certainly among the least supported foreign policy goals. According to Dénes Tomaj, in 2008, Hungary spent 18.45 billion HUF (roughly equal to 68.5 million EUR) that can be accounted as Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, 88 % of this sum was spent through multilateral channels, which in practice denotes the fees Hungary paid to international organizations such as the OECD, the WHO and the EU.¹¹ This implies that Hungary was unable to exert substantial independent control on the vast majority of resources that the country officially spent on international development assistance. Only the remaining 2.2 billion HUF (approximately 8.15 million EUR) were spent through bilateral channels and just a fraction of this sum pertained to democracy promotion projects themselves. Based on the MFA's annual report on Hungary's international development activities, in 2008, 103.5 million HUF (0.383 million EUR) were allocated within the Democracy Promotion Appropriation, which is the separate budget available for democracy assistance projects. Roughly one-third of this sum, 30.1 million HUF, was in the form of contributions to NGO projects, while the rest was spent on MFA projects. In addition, through the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, the ICDT received 100 million HUF.¹² After adding up these figures, the total amount of financial resources secured from the governmental budget for democracy promotion amounted to 203.5 million HUF (0.757 million EUR) in 2008, which is only 1.1 % share of the entire ODA or 9.3 % from the bilateral spending.

The benchmark that is commonly referred to in connection with ODA is set out in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. New member states of the European Union, including Hungary, agreed to spend 0.17 % of their Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA by 2010 and 0.33 % by 2015. However, in 2008, Hungary spent only 0.075 % of its GNI on ODA, which is less than the rate of 0.081 % in the previous year. In both cases, the spending was far from the envisaged target.¹³

The above-calculated sums refer to expenses that were officially labeled as democracy assistance projects. However, they do not include the full range of projects that have democratic promotion content. Based on the MFA's report, the implementing agency, HUN-IDA, accomplished several projects that were not listed as democracy assistance, but nonetheless involved democracy promotion activities. In 2008 for example, such projects included public finance and audit training provided for Vietnamese officials and an education project that was tailored for Moldavian officials to combat economic crime and corruption.¹⁴ The value of these projects amounts to 32.28 million HUF. In addition, the Ministry contributed to several NGO projects that can be considered as having democratic content, although again, they were not funded from the Democracy Promotion Appropriation. These involve, to name a few, the training of election officers in Moldova or the developing of local democracy in Ukraine.¹⁵ The MFA support for these projects amounted to 43 million HUF. Including these expenses in the calculation, the Hungarian government spent about 279 million HUF (1.03 million EUR) on democracy promotion in 2008, which takes 12.7 % of the ODA spent through bilateral channels. This still remains a relatively low share though.

As the current economic crisis has hit Hungary severely, it was necessary to cut public spending. Since government officials consider democracy promotion expenses an item in the budget that can be cut back without immediate political consequences, it became one of the fields for public spending

11 The mandatory Hungarian contribution to the EU's external cooperation programmes, which can be accounted as ODA, reached 13.5 billion HUF (€ 50 million) in 2008, which alone took 73 % of all the Hungarian ODA in that year.

12 Report on the Activities Accomplished on the Field of International Development Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2009, at: http://www.kum.hu/NR/rdonlyres/D2DB5DD4-42B2-4D3B-BB59-3F6808D15F03/0/Beszamolo_2008_KB_utan_modositott_vegleges_gya.pdf.

13 MFA Report, pp. 5-6.

14 A full list of HUN-IDA projects is available in appendix number 9 of the Report, p. 50.

15 These MFA-funded NGO projects are listed in appendix number 9 of the Report, p. 51.

cuts. For instance, the MFA's Promotion of Democratic Transition Appropriation has been reduced from 103.5 to 80 million HUF.¹⁶ In short, the financial prospects of Hungary's democracy assistance projects have not strengthened recently: less money is spent in a still suboptimal legal and institutional environment.

Although the social and political support in Hungary for promoting democracy abroad is relatively weak, the institutional and financial shortcomings are strongly influenced by the lack of an organic, internal demand for such a policy. The substantial external pressures that stimulated Hungary's democracy promotion activities dissuaded the political elite from developing its own normative stance towards democracy assistance. On the one hand, this has generated rather half-hearted governmental commitments to the policy. The political ambitions do not go beyond meeting the minimum international expectations, which has naturally led to insufficient fund allocations. On the other hand, a detailed democracy promotion strategy has not been formulated either. Hungarian officials do not perceive democracy promotion as a policy that may serve the country's interests. The lack of strategy means a lack of policy coherence and, as such, even the scarce financial resources are spent in a rather uncoordinated, therefore inefficient way. According to both the interviewed NGO representatives and government officials, the international community considers Hungary a rather weak and inactive democracy promoter. In addition, experts were of the view that the reduction in the financial resources may result in a further decrease in Hungary's international prestige.

3.3. The way forward: Suggestions to improve Hungarian democracy promotion

Reflecting on the problems and challenges discussed above, the interviewed experts outlined their suggestions that point to the following directions: first, the Hungarian government should identify those areas where Hungary has a distinct, marketable expertise. Second, a coherent strategy and foreign policy image has to be built around these identified assets. Third, the institutional background and mechanisms involving democracy promotion have to be established. This pertains both to the governmental policy-making and to the relationship between governmental agencies and NGOs.

Even though some consider the experience of democratic transition an artificial construct for making it an export "product," there seem to be an agreement that this should be the focal point of Hungary's democracy promotion. The second marketable good is the experience of EU accession, which is more tangible and concrete as far as the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* is concerned. Regarding the transition experience, institutional transfer would come in first place as Hungary has a good record in designing and effectively operating institutions such as the electoral and the judicial system, the State Audit Office, the Financial Supervisory Authority or the Constitutional Court. This would not imply a deviation from the actual practice, as current democracy assistance projects already promote the experience of setting up these bodies. However, the interviewees would place much more emphasis on where Hungary went wrong: institutional failures and dead-ends would be highly instructive for transition countries.

Transferring the EU accession experience determines the scope of potential target countries, too. Hungary already implements democracy promotion activities in Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine, however, the EU-related dimension needs a stronger positioning. The export of democratic transition experience gives potentials for Hungarian activity on a global scale, especially if Hungary will expand its activity to Latin-America or Africa in the long run. Dénes Tomaj, the Head of DIDC argues that for democracy promotion in the long-term Hungary will have to identify target countries that are neither European nor former communist, as within the next 5-10 years the Western

16 2009 Budget of the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at: http://www.kum.hu/NR/rdonlyres/C47337AB-31CD-4902-A94F-C9355DE16388/0/2009_evi_koltsegvetes.pdf.

Balkans and the CIS states (the primary targets of Hungary's democracy promotion) will likely become democratic and as such Hungarian democracy promotion would be less valuable. In any case, the range of new or long-term target countries should be determined according to where national interests may be possible to pursue. This gives rise to the need for an integrated approach: the cultural, economic and institutional export of Hungary's experiences should be coordinated at the governmental level and this should be the guiding principle in designing the foreign policy.

Without creating Hungary's foreign policy image to serve as the basis for conducting external affairs, an integrated approach may not be possible, claimed several NGO representatives. Currently, such an image is missing and, according to them, this explains why Hungarian interest representation is currently weak in the international community. This is a direct consequence of the vaguely defined national interests that do not allow for a straightforward articulation of foreign policy goals. The broad range of current target countries of Hungary's democracy export, the incoherent and uncoordinated projects and the scattered, unfocused spending of financial resources are all symptoms of the above situation. In short, the first step to take would be the creation of an external relations identity based on national interests that would enable a meaningful reflection on and reaction to global events. This should definitely precede the adoption of the still pending law on international development cooperation and democracy promotion.

Regarding the institutional background, greater horizontal cooperation between governmental actors involved in democracy export requires a clear delimitation of tasks, duties and responsibilities. Although Györgyi Blahó, coordinator at HAND, argues that there have been significant improvements recently such as bi-monthly consultative meetings between the MFA and HAND, a dialogue on equal terms should still be intensified. In some respect it is surprising how much government officials and NGO representatives agreed on the ideal division of labor. They all shared the view that even though consultation between the two spheres is crucially important, the levels should not become confused: the state should act on the intergovernmental level, while NGOs should act on the level of civil society. This also implies that besides being able to gather and activate a large pool of expertise, the strength of NGOs is to execute bottom-up projects aiming at civic empowerment. The government, in contrast, should confine its activities to top-down initiatives like legislative and institutional transfer.

It is also important that NGOs kept their distance from political parties in order to maintain their credibility, and thus remained unaffected by political cycles. Given that NGOs and the central government may also engage in cooperation with each other, the political neutrality of NGOs will always remain a sensitive issue. Nevertheless, they are the agents that should embark on implementing "hard" projects which, on the intergovernmental level, would probably involve confrontations. At the same time, the government could follow soft, diplomatic methods in spreading democracy abroad. With regards to the actual institutional arrangement, some NGO representatives suggested that the Hungarian government identified 4 or 5 NGOs with which it signed long-term contracts of cooperation. However, such a development might affect the external credibility of the chosen organizations inasmuch as they could be considered as having been incorporated into the governmental sphere.

It goes without saying that the above-described conceptual and institutional innovations require much more predictable funding, a long-term and program-based view, and more efficient project implementation. In addition, the proportion of funds spent through multi- and bilateral channels must be reversed: following international trends, slightly more bilateral than multilateral spending would be desirable: on average, donors spend 40 % of their ODA through multilateral channels and 60 % through bilateral projects.¹⁷ If Hungary wants an independent and visible profile in democracy export, this trend should be followed, according to both the MFA report and the interviewed NGO representatives. This would require an increase and different targeting of current financial resources allocated for democracy promotion. This might be unrealistic in the present socio-economic and political environment.

17 MFA Report, p. 6.

3.4. Hungarian participation in international cooperation of democracy promotion

Having discussed the current domestic background and the potential ways to improve Hungary's democracy promotion, attention has to be devoted to the international environment. The trends and developments on the international level add an important and unavoidable dimension to the design of Hungary's foreign policy image and democracy assistance strategy.

Besides being a member in several multilateral organizations that pursue democracy promotion, at the governmental level Hungary participates in a few formal bi-or multilateral cooperation, albeit often ad hoc and restricted to specific projects. Even in such cases, cooperation does not go beyond the level of financial contributions to the given projects. In contrast, Hungarian NGOs demonstrate much more activity in initiating formal or informal partnerships with other NGOs abroad.

There is little cooperation among the Visegrád countries' governments in connection with democracy assistance. However, the economic crisis and the subsequent reduction in national funding available for democracy export triggered recognition that joint efforts could have a greater impact. As Dénes Tomaj revealed, a pilot project has recently been launched concerning the Western Balkans. A database is being compiled to clarify who does what in these target countries. This would serve as a source to identify potentially parallel projects and the gaps where the Visegrád countries could coordinate their activities.

Regarding NGO cooperation, an important initiative among the V4 is the "Visegrád for Serbia" project, which is implemented by the Slovakian Pontis Foundation, to foster donor cooperation among NGOs of the Visegrád states. Apart from Pontis, DemNet from Hungary participates, while the other members are the Robert Schuman Foundation of Poland, the Czech Democracy and Culture Studies Centre and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence. On a European scale, HAND has become the Hungarian member of CONCORD, which is a Brussels based NGO that provides a platform for European umbrella organizations of NGOs working for international development and democracy. Moreover, HAND, DemNet and another member of HAND, the Civil Society Development Foundation participate in the European Transition Compendium, which is the initiative of the DG Development of the European Commission, and is aimed to gather the transition experience of new member states to feed into a future European development policy.

4. Conclusion: Challenges, trends, and future outlook

Placing the survey results into the context of Hungarian democracy promotion activities, one may note that the modest financial resources and the relatively low profile of democracy export reflect public attitudes. In comparison with the other Visegrád countries, the polling results of the Hungarian population stand out in every aspect and this poses a real puzzle. While the vast majority of Czechs and Poles and a firm majority of Slovaks believed that the current democratic system had more advantages than the past regime, Hungarians believed the opposite. The same pattern appeared when respondents were asked to evaluate the success of democracy building; while close to two-thirds of Czechs, Poles and Slovaks considered democratic transition a success, two-thirds of Hungarians thought it was a failure. Similarly, Hungary was the only country where the majority was against the country's involvement in democracy export.

In the first part of the paper some crucial dimensions were identified that shed light on those segments of the Hungarian society that are especially dissatisfied with the current system. However, they still provide an unsatisfactory explanation to the puzzle of why Hungary as a country is so different from the rest of the Visegrád group. Territorial inequalities, unemployment, economic uncertainty and political corruption are present in each of these states; nevertheless, it is only the Hungarians who demonstrate such a high level of discontent.

Although this paper does not allow for an in-depth analysis of this issue, some hypotheses can still be offered. As it became clear from the survey results, the Hungarian trajectory of democratic transition in the past twenty years can be described as the path leading from the “happiest barrack in the communist camp” to the “most dissatisfied Central European post-communist country.” Such a development might be attributed to the fact that, within the Communist bloc, Hungarian living standards were among the highest. At the time of the change of regime, citizens expected a further substantial increase in welfare while also gaining political freedom and civil liberties. The unfulfilled material promises of democratic transition may have given rise to public discontent with the new system.

However, basing the explanation only on economic factors is insufficient. The critical public evaluation of the democratic system may arise from the absence of a sense of ownership. Among the Visegrád countries, in Hungary the relative majority (45 %) was of the opinion that democracy had been established mostly with the help of other countries. Slovaks, to a smaller extent though, shared the same view but the majority of Poles and Czechs thought that they had achieved everything through their own efforts. The Solidarity movement in Poland and the Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia were mass movements that eventually triggered the change of regime, whereas in Hungary there was no civic movement on a comparable scale. In Hungary, a “pacted,” negotiated regime change took place in which the public was not involved. The public perception of the role of external help in building democracy is an expression of the absence of popular ownership of the whole democratic system. This may result in a more critical attitude towards democracy that was “imposed from above” which, together with the economic reasons, could explain the high level of current disillusionment and discontent.

While domestic support for democracy promotion poses a challenge, there are also threats at the global level. The interviewed experts agreed that in the near future, substantial changes may occur to worldwide democracy assistance. First of all, instead of labeling this activity as democracy promotion, the spreading of good governance practices may gain more emphasis and the human rights dimension of democracy could move to the fore. Second, the advanced industrialized countries, which are currently the most active in international development assistance and democracy export, have to face alternative approach to development. China has embarked on providing large-scale development aid to non-democratic countries but without significant conditionality, which may make it more attractive than the “traditional” assistance offered with a normative content.¹⁸

18 For a recent review of the Chinese approach to African development see Chapter 17 in Richard Dowden, *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles*, Portobello Books, London, 2008.

In the ideal scenario, as outlined by one NGO representative, the multilateral organizations would provide coordination between donor states and facilitate the entry of a donor to a new target country. A more frequent and effective cooperation between countries involved in democracy promotion would be a straightforward response to the above mentioned challenges. However, the existing conceptual differences and tensions between donors create an obstacle to the intensified cooperation. This could be mitigated to a certain extent through multilateral organizations, added an NGO representative.

The challenges for Hungarian decision-makers are manifold. Regarding democracy promotion, the adoption of a strategic plan of democracy assistance incorporating national interests and responding to international challenges should be a priority. Furthermore, the consolidation of the institutional setting and the creation of a solid financial background are additional first steps to take. However, the current public discontent with the domestic democratic system cannot be treated as a policy problem. The real threat which the current Hungarian socio-economic and political situation bears is that it may give rise to radical and extremist political groupings capitalizing on existing social tensions that could be capable of undermining the democratic system. According to a focus group participant,

“... the problem in Hungary is that there are not any mutually shared and accepted social values that we could use as reference points. There is no sense of responsibility and solidarity. The society is individualized to such an extent that democracy cannot function under these circumstances. The whole political, economic and social elite lacks the sense of responsibility and solidarity including ourselves, ordinary citizens, therefore we are also to blame for this situation.”

In order to avoid the decline of the Hungarian democratic system only two decades following the change of regime, efforts are needed from the political and economic elite and from the civil society as well. In short, the institutional framework needs to be filled with real content and democratic norms and values; should such a process take place, the likelihood is that there could be more widespread consensus on the importance of promoting democracy abroad.

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Dénes Tomaj (Head of the Main Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

István Gyarmati (President and CEO of the International Centre for Democratic Transition)

Ibolya Bárány (Managing Director of HUN-IDA, the Hungarian International Development Non-Profit Company)

dr Zoltán Tóth (Secretary General of the Association of Central and East European Election Officers)

Bálint Molnár (Deputy Director of Freedom House Europe)

Györgyi Blahó – (Coordinator, HAND – Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid)

Barbara Erős (Project Manager and Advisor, DemNet, Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights)

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
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
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Appendix


A. When comparing the pre-1989 period with the present, do you think the current one has more advantages? (% of all respondents)




B. Did the pre-1989 political system need changes? If so, to what extent? (% of all respondents)



C. From the perspective of 20 years, do you think that building democracy in our country was a success or a failure? (% of all respondents)



D. Did we build democracy with our own efforts or with external help? (% of all respondents)



E. Do you think it should be the role of our country to help establish democracy in other states? (% of all respondents)

